Security Architecture and Protocols for Overlay Network Services by Srivatsa, Mudhakar








of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy in the
College of Computing
Georgia Institute of Technology
August 2007
SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND PROTOCOLS FOR
OVERLAY NETWORK SERVICES
Approved by:
Dr. Ling Liu, Advisor
College of Computing
Georgia Institute of Technology
Dr. Calton Pu
College of Computing
Georgia Institute of Technology
Dr. Mustaque Ahamad
College of Computing
Georgia Institute of Technology
Dr. Raghupathy Sivakumar
School of Electrical and Computer
Engineering
Georgia Institute of Technology
Dr. Wenke Lee
College of Computing
Georgia Institute of Technology
Dr. Vijay Atluri
Management Science and Information
Systems Department
Rutgers University
Date Approved: 12 April 2007
To my family,
Srinivasa K. Srivatsa, Umadevi Srivatsa and Karthik K. Srivatsa.
iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This thesis would not have been possible without the generous help and encourage-
ment of many individuals. I would like to express my gratitude to everyone who has
contributed to the process leading to my dissertation. Here I would like to mention
a few of these people.
First and foremost, I would like to thank my advisor Prof. Ling Liu for her
tremendous help and guidance in every phase and aspect of my Ph.D. study. The
flexibility and freedom she has provided me in deciding and evolving my research
focus has been an invaluable asset in my quest to acquire, generate, and disseminate
new knowledge. I am indebted for the countless hours she has spent on perfecting
my work and the immense amount of advice she has given me on research, and career
related matters.
I would like to give my special thanks to Prof. Mustaque Ahamad and Prof.
Calton Pu for their timely advice. I would like to also thank every member of our DiSL
research group for providing a friendly and dynamic working environment and for
engaging in insightful research discussions with me, that have helped in continuously
improving and polishing my work. I would like to thank my committee members
Prof. Vijay Atluri, Prof. Wenke Lee, and Prof. Raghupathy Sivakumar for being
very supportive of my research and for their constructive critiques that have greatly
contributed to my thesis.
I would like to thank my dear friends Mohan K. Bobba and Kapil Gupta for being
the colors of my life in Atlanta, and my long time friends S. Dasarathi and K. Jayanth
Kumar for always keeping in touch with me. I would like to dedicate this work to my
father, mother, and brother for their everlasting love and gratuitous support for me.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvi
I INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Overlay Network Computing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1.1 Publish/Subscribe Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1.2 VoIP Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 Security Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.1 Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.2 Masquerading and Spoofing Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.3 Eavesdropping and Corruption Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.4 User Identity Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3 Thesis Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3.1 Research Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3.2 Information Hiding on Overlay Networks . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3.3 Secure Information Dissemination on Overlay Networks . . 10
1.3.4 Privacy Beyond End-to-End Encryption in Overlay Networks 11
1.4 Thesis Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
II OVERLAY NETWORK SECURITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2 Background and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3 Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.4 Attacks on the Routing Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.4.1 Alternate Lookup Paths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
v
2.4.2 Alternate Optimal (less costly) Lookup Paths . . . . . . . . 24
2.4.3 Detecting and Recovering from Invalid Lookups . . . . . . . 24
2.4.4 Experimental Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.5 Attacking the ID-to-Key Mapping Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.5.1 Quantitative Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.5.2 Experimental Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.5.3 Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.6 LocationGuard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.6.1 Targeted File Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.6.2 LocationGuard Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.6.3 Concepts and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.6.4 LocationGuard File System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.7 Location Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.8 Routing guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.8.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.8.2 Determining the Safe Obfuscation Range . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.8.3 Ensuring Safe Obfuscation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.8.4 Strength of Routing guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.9 Location Inference Guards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.9.1 Passive Inference Guards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.9.2 Host Compromise based Inference Guards . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.9.3 Location Rekeying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.10 Experimental Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.10.1 Implementation-Based Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.10.2 Simulation-Based Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.10.3 Location Inference Guards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.11 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.12 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
vi
III PUBLISH/SUBSCRIBE NETWORK SECURITY . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.2 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.2.1 Reference Pub-Sub Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.2.2 Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.3 EventGuard Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.3.1 Design Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.3.2 System Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.4 EventGuard: Security Guards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.4.1 Tokens, Keys and Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.4.2 Subscribe Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.4.3 Publish Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.4.4 Advertise Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.4.5 Unsubscribe Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.4.6 Unadvertise Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.4.7 Routing Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.4.8 Rekeying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.5 EventGuard: Scalable Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.5.1 Numeric Attribute Based Matching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.5.2 Comparison with Subscriber Group Approach . . . . . . . . 98
3.6 EventGuard: r-Resilient Network Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3.6.1 Communication Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
3.6.2 Resilience to Message Dropping Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.6.3 Low Cost Resilient Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
3.7 EventGuard Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
3.7.1 Micro-Benchmarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
3.7.2 Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
3.7.3 Macro-Benchmarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
3.8 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
vii
3.9 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
IV VOIP NETWORK SECURITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
4.2 Preliminaries: Skype Lookup Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
4.3 Attacks on the Session Initiation Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
4.3.1 Caller Identification Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
4.3.2 Countering Triangulation based Timing Attacks . . . . . . . 137
4.3.3 Experimental Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
4.4 Attacks on Voice Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
4.4.1 Flow Analysis Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
4.4.2 VoIP Privacy using k-Anonymity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
4.4.3 Experimental Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
4.5 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
4.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
V TRUST AND REPUTATION MANAGEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
5.2 TrustGuard: An Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
5.2.1 System Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
5.2.2 Problem Statement and Solution Approach . . . . . . . . . 173
5.3 Strategic Malicious Nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
5.3.1 Cost Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
5.3.2 Dependable Trust Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
5.3.3 Fading Memories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
5.4 Fake Transactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
5.4.1 Unforgeable Transaction Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
5.4.2 Fair Exchange of Transaction Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
5.5 Dishonest Feedbacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
5.6 Performance Enhancements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
viii
5.6.1 Efficiently Storing Feedbacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
5.6.2 Minimizing the Replica Lookup Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
5.7 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
5.7.1 Guarding from Strategic Node Behaviors . . . . . . . . . . . 191
5.7.2 Guarding from Fake Transactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
5.7.3 Guarding from Dishonest Feedbacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
5.7.4 Transaction Success Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
5.8 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
5.8.1 Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
5.8.2 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
5.9 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
VI CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
6.1 Open Issues and Future Research Directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
6.1.1 Open Issues in the Context of this Thesis . . . . . . . . . . 206
6.1.2 An Outlook for Future Research Directions . . . . . . . . . 208
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
VITA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
ix
LIST OF TABLES
1 Probability of Lookup Failure (p = 10%): Quantitative Analysis . . . 29
2 Attack on ID Mapping Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3 Lookup Identifier obfuscation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4 LocationGuard File Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5 Mean Fraction of Good Nodes in Uncompromised State (G′) . . . . . 63
6 Time Interval between Location ReKeying (normalized by 1
λ
time units) 64
7 Entropy (in number of bits) of a Zipf-distribution . . . . . . . . . . . 64
8 Countering Lookup Frequency Inference Attack Approach I: Result
Caching (with 32K files) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
9 Max Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
10 Avg Cost: R = 104 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
11 KDC Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
12 Subscriber Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
13 Theoretical Lower Bound: NS = 103 and R = 104 . . . . . . . . . . . 103
14 Theoretical Lower Bound: φR = 100 and R = 10
4 . . . . . . . . . . . 103
15 Computation Overheads for EventGuard Operations: w is some topic,
pbl is a publication, and m denotes the number of topics marked on
message pbl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
16 Message Size Overhead due to EventGuard including only those mes-
sages sent on the pub-sub network: m denotes the number of topics
marked on the publication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
17 EventGuard Storage Overhead: HTsize denotes the total size of the
hashtable maintained for detecting flooding based DoS attacks (HTsize
is at most a few tens of KBs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
18 Relative Cost paid by Malicious Nodes Vs Toff (normalized by maxH) 197
x
LIST OF FIGURES
1 Lookup algorithm for legitimate nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2 Probability of a lookup failure: Initial TTL = 100 and p = 10% . . . 29
3 Lookup Costs: Scenario 1 with M = 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4 Lookup Cost: Scenario 2 with M = 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5 ID Mapping scheme: attack a specific data item d . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6 LocationGuard: System Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
7 LocationGuard: Conceptual Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
8 Lookup Using File Identifier Obfuscation: Illustration . . . . . . . . . 44
9 Countering Frequency Analysis Attack by file identifier obfuscation.
X1X2, Y1Y2 and Z1Z2 denote the ranges of the obfuscated identifiers
of files f1, f2, f3 stored at node n. Frequency inference attacks works
in scenario (i), but not in scenario (ii). Given an identifier otk ∈ Y1Z1,
it is hard for an adversary to guess whether the lookup was for file f1
or f2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
10 Implementation Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
11 File Read Overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
12 File Write Overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
13 Probability of a Target File Attack for N = 1024 nodes and R = 7
using DoS Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
14 Probability of a Target File Attack for N = 1024 nodes and R = 7
using Host Compromise Attack (with no token collection) . . . . . . . 62
15 Probability of a Target File Attack for N = 1024 nodes and R = 7 using
Host Compromise Attack with token collection from compromised nodes 62
16 Countering Lookup Frequency Inference Attack Approach II: File Iden-
tifier obfuscation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
17 Countering File Replica Frequency Inference Attack: Location Rekey-
ing Frequency Vs File Update Frequency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
18 Basic Pub-Sub System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
19 EventGuard Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
20 Handling Flooding based DoS attacks in EventGuard . . . . . . . . . 91
xi
21 Constructing Resilient Networks: Thick lines represent links in the
binary tree network and the dashed lines represent additional links
added to binary tree network to make its ind = 2 . . . . . . . . . . . 91
22 Key Tree: Range Queries on Numeric Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
23 Num Keys per Subscriber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
24 Num Keys per Publisher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
25 KDC Load . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
26 Confidentiality and Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
27 Flooding-based DoS Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
28 MS Load . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
29 Communication Cost Vs Number of Recepients N(w) . . . . . . . . . 116
30 Resilience Vs a with ind = 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
31 Resilience Vs ind with a = 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
32 Throughput . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
33 Latency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
34 Resilience to Flooding-based DoS Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
35 Skype Peer-to-Peer VoIP Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
36 Shortest Path using Skype P2P Lookup Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . 126
37 Triangulation Attack Illustration: Caller Lies in Shaded Region . . . 126
38 Distance Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
39 Caller Identification with ε = 10ms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
40 Caller Identification with 10 Malicious Nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
41 Stochastic Shortest Path Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
42 Stochastic Vs Deterministic Triangulation Attack . . . . . . . . . . . 135
43 Top-10 Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
44 10 Malicious Nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
45 Differential Vs Stochastic Triangulation Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
46 Top-10 Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
47 10 Malicious Nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
xii
48 Top-κ Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
49 Number of Malicious Nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
50 Random Walk Search Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
51 Latency Perturbation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
52 Controlled Random Walk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
53 Multi-Agent Random Walk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
54 Latency Perturbation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
55 Controlled Random Walk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
56 Multi-Agent Random Walk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
57 Optimal Parameter Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
58 Top-10 Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
59 Top-k . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
60 VoIP Flow Bandwidth: G.729A (CS-CELP) Audio Codec with 8 Kbps
Compression and Packet Duration 20ms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
61 Flow Analysis Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
62 Mixing Flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
63 Resisting Flow Analysis Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
64 Tracing Voice Calls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
65 Shortest Path Tracing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
66 Tracing Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
67 Shortest Path Tracing Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
68 Shortest Path Tracing Vs Naive Tracing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
69 Precision and Recall with 128 Erlang Call Volume . . . . . . . . . . . 153
70 F -measure with κ = 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
71 Entropy with κ = 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
72 Top-m Probability with κ = 2 and Latency Prior . . . . . . . . . . . 156
73 Computation Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
74 Compromised Proxies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
75 1-anonymity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
xiii
76 2-anonymity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
77 AASIP Vs SIP: Top-10 Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
78 AASIP Vs SIP: 128 Erlangs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
79 AASIP Vs SIP: Path Latency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
80 Compromised Proxies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
81 Computation Cost: k-Anonymity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
82 Computation Cost: Tolerating Malicious Proxies . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
83 Messaging Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
84 Search Latency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
85 Node Load . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
86 TrustGuard Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
87 Cost of Building Reputation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
88 Dependable Trust Model: Illustration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
89 Updating Fading Memories: FTV [i] denotes the faded values at time
t and FTV ′[i] denotes the faded values at time t + 1 . . . . . . . . . 180
90 Cost of Building Reputation with Delayed Conflict Resolution . . . . 185
91 Model I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
92 Optimistic versus Pessimistic Summarization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
93 Effect of Varying Parameters in the Trust Model . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
94 Probability of False Positives and False Negatives with 100% Collusion 190
95 Probability of False Positives and False Negatives with 20% Collusion 190
96 Trust Value Lookup Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
97 Trust Model with a Small History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
98 Trust Model with a Large History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
99 Trust Model with Fading Memories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
100 Fair Exchange of Transaction Proofs: Optimistic Vs Trust-Value Based
Exchange Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
101 Robustness in Non-Collusive Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
102 Robustness in Collusive Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
xiv
103 Transaction Success Rate: Assuming No Fake or Dishonest Feedbacks 198
104 Transaction Success Rate: Non-Collusive and Collusive Settings . . . 198
xv
SUMMARY
The recent years have witnessed a wide spread proliferation of the Internet to
encompass multiple autonomous organizations, heterogeneous platforms and mobile
and wireless computing stations. This ubiquitous nature of the Internet not only
makes it easy to access information and services from anywhere at anytime, but also
facilitates the acquisition and generation of new information. The ever growing per-
vasiveness of the Internet has been accompanied by an increasing number of security
threats. We have witnessed several security attacks against online services either for
extortion reasons or for impairing and even disabling the competition. Therefore, we
believe that security is becoming an increasingly integral component of a system’s
correctness.
The wide spread growth of the Internet is best captured by the emergence of the
overlay network computing systems. Overlay network computing systems and appli-
cations have continued to evolve over the past decade, ranging from SETI@Home and
music sharing systems (Gnutella, KaZaa, and Limewire) to more sophisticated ap-
plications, including file storage systems (cooperative file system (CFS), Farsite, and
OceanStore), publish-subscribe systems (Siena, Scribe, and Gryphon), and Skype-like
voice over IP (VoIP) systems. The overlay network computing model provides many
opportunities for information dissemination across different organizational bound-
aries, heterogeneous platforms, and a large, dynamic population of users and has
shown the potential to become a prominent network computing paradigm for large
scale distributed applications. The massive distributed nature of these applications
exposes them to a wide range of security threats ranging from eaves dropping, data
corruption and denial of service (DoS) attacks.
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Conventional wisdom suggests that in order to build a secure system, security
must be an integral component in the system design. However, cost considerations
drive most system designers to channel their efforts on the system’s performance,
scalability and usability. With little or no emphasis on security, such systems are
vulnerable to a wide range of attacks that can potentially compromise confidentiality,
integrity and availability of sensitive data. It is often cumbersome to redesign and
implement massive systems with security as one of the primary design goals. This
thesis advocates a proactive approach that cleanly retrofits security solutions into
existing system architectures. The first step in this approach is to identify security
threats, vulnerabilities and potential attacks on a system or an application. The
second step is to develop security tools in the form of customizable and configurable
plug-ins that address these security issues and minimally modify existing system code,
while preserving its performance and scalability metrics.
This thesis demonstrates techniques to build secure frameworks for massively dis-
tributed applications in a way that preserves the application’s performance, scalabil-
ity, ease of use, cost effectiveness and real-time guarantees. We use overlay network
applications to shepherd through and address challenges involved in supporting se-
curity in large scale distributed systems. In particular, the focus is on two popular
applications: publish/subscribe networks and VoIP networks. Briefly, the following
contributions are made in the areas of secure overlay network applications:
• Our work on VoIP networks has for the first time identified and formalized
caller identification attacks on VoIP networks. We have identified two attacks:
a triangulation based timing attack on the VoIP network’s route set up protocol
and a flow analysis attack on the VoIP network’s voice session protocol. These
attacks allow an external observer (adversary) to uniquely (nearly) identify the
true caller (and receiver) with high probability [103, 101] (see chapter 4).
• Our work on the publish/subscribe networks has resulted in the development of
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an unified framework for handling event confidentiality, integrity, access control
and DoS attacks, while incurring small (6%) overhead on the system. Our
work has for the first time proposed a key isomorphism paradigm to preserve
the confidentiality of events on publish/subscribe networks while permitting
scalable content-based matching and routing [98, 102] (see chapter 3).
• Our work on overlay network security has resulted in a novel information hiding
technique on overlay networks. Our solution represents the first attempt to
transparently hide the location of data items on an overlay network [99, 97] (see
Chapter 2).
• Our work on overlay network security has identified several vulnerabilities in
trust management systems. We have shown that strategic malicious behavior





The recent years have witnessed a wide spread proliferation of the Internet to encom-
pass multiple autonomous organizations, heterogeneous platforms and mobile and
wireless computing stations. This ubiquitous nature of the Internet not only makes it
easy to access information and services from anywhere at anytime, but also facilitates
the acquisition and generation of new information. The ever growing pervasiveness
of the Internet has been accompanied by an increasing number of security threats.
We have witnessed several security attacks against online services either for extortion
reasons or for impairing and even disabling the competition. Therefore, we believe
that security is becoming an increasing integral component of a system’s correctness.
With the wide spread growth of the Internet, overlay networks have emerged as
a new parallel and distributed computing paradigm. Overlay network computing
systems and applications have continued to evolve over the past decade, ranging from
SETI@Home and music sharing systems (Gnutella [38], KaZaa [50], and Limewire
[56]) to more sophisticated applications, including file storage systems (cooperative file
system (CFS) [23], Farsite [7], and OceanStore [53]), publish-subscribe systems (Siena
[16], Scribe [25], and Gryphon [12]), and Skype-like voice over IP (VoIP) systems [2].
The overlay network computing model provides many opportunities for information
dissemination across different organizational boundaries, heterogeneous platforms,
and a large, dynamic population of users and has shown the potential to become a
prominent network computing paradigm for massively distributed applications.
Conventional wisdom suggests that in order to build a secure system, security
must be an integral component in the system design. However, cost considerations
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drive most system designers to channel their efforts on the system’s performance,
scalability and usability. With little or no emphasis on security, such systems are
vulnerable to a wide range of attacks that can potentially compromise confidentiality,
integrity and availability of sensitive data. It is often cumbersome to redesign and
implement massive systems with security as one of the primary design goals. This
thesis advocates a proactive approach that cleanly retrofits security solutions into
existing system architectures. The first step in this approach is to identify security
threats, vulnerabilities and potential attacks on a system or an application. The
second step is to develop security tools in the form of customizable and configurable
plug-ins that address these security issues and minimally modify existing system code,
while preserving its performance and scalability metrics.
Before discussing the security challenges in overlay network applications, we pro-
vide some background information on overlay network computing. We use two pop-
ular overlay network applications: publish/subscribe networks and VoIP networks to
demonstrate their rich functionality, ease of deployment and use, cost effectiveness,
real-time guarantees, and performance and scalability benefits.
1.1 Overlay Network Computing
An overlay network is a virtual network created on top of an existing transport net-
work such as TCP/IP. Unlike traditional distributed computing, overlay networks
aggregate large number of computers and possibly mobile or hand-held devices. An
overlay network provides mechanisms to create and maintain the connectivity of an
individual node to the network by establishing network connections with a subset of
other nodes (neighbors) in the overlay network. The overlay network employs rout-
ing protocols that allow individual computers and devices to share information and
resources directly, thereby obviating the need for dedicated servers. Overlay network-
ing technologies provide some desirable system properties for supporting pervasive
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and cooperative application sharing across the Internet, such as anonymity, fault tol-
erance, low maintenance & low administration cost, and transparent and dynamic
operability.
1.1.1 Publish/Subscribe Networks
A growing number of emerging Internet applications requires information dissemina-
tion across different organizational boundaries, heterogeneous platforms, and a large,
dynamic population of publishers and subscribers. A publish-subscribe overlay ser-
vice is a wide-area communication infrastructure that enables data access and data
sharing across potentially unlimited number of publishers and subscribers, scattered
geographically across the wired and wireless Internet. A wide-area publish-subscribe
(pub-sub for short) system is often implemented as a collection of spatially dis-
parate computing nodes (or network servers) communicating with each other through
content-based routing protocols on top of an overlay network. In such an environment,
publishers publish information in the form of event notifications and subscribers have
the ability to express their interests in an event or a pattern of events in the form
of subscription constraints. The pub-sub overlay network uses content-based routing
schemes to dynamically match each publication against all the active subscriptions,
and notifies the subscribers of any publication that matches their registered interest,
ensuring that subscribers only receive notifications of those events that match their
subscribed interests.
An important characteristic of pub-sub overlay services is the decoupling of pub-
lishers and subscribers combined with content-based routing protocols, enabling a
many (publishers) to many (subscribers) communication model. Such a model presents
many inherent benefits. By offloading the task of identifying destination addresses
of publication events from the publishers to the pub-sub overlay network, it not only
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allows message routing to be handled in a way that avoids unnecessary message repli-
cations but also enables dynamic and fine-grained subscriptions. As a result, the
pub-sub overlay services have proven to be scalable and effective for wide-area in-
formation dissemination across distinct administrative domains and heterogeneous
systems.
1.1.2 VoIP Networks
Voice over IP (VoIP), also known as Internet telephony or IP telephony, is emerg-
ing as a mature and practical technology alternative to traditional public switched
telephone networks (PSTN). VoIP technology enables people to make phone calls
through public Internet. As audio quality, bandwidth usage, and setup convenience
are reaching acceptable levels, many organizations have switched to VoIP. According
to TeleGeography Research, world wide VoIP’s share of voice traffic has grown from
12.8% in 2003 to an estimated 75% in 2007. There are three important reasons for
this wide spread adoption of VoIP networks. First, one of the most prevailing rea-
sons for such rapid VoIP deployment is reduced costs. Second, VoIP offers very rich
call forwarding features including, redirecting a call based on the time of the day,
etc. Another indisputable reason is the fact that VoIP represents a significant step
towards the integration of voice and data networks.
A VoIP overlay service is a wide-area communication infrastructure that enables
phone calls between callers and receivers that are scattered geographically across the
wired & wireless Internet, landlines, cell phones, etc. A VoIP network is implemented
as a collection of spatially disparate computing nodes (VoIP proxy servers) communi-
cating with each other through two routing protocols on top of a peer to peer overlay
network. The SIP (session initiation protocol) sets up a voice path between the caller
and the receiver. The voice path includes one or more nodes on the VoIP overlay
network such that two consecutive nodes on the path are neighbors on the overlay
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network. The RTP (real-time transport protocol) is used for exchange voice packets
between the caller and the receiver. The voice traffic is itself encoded (and encrypted)
using standard audio codec such as CS-CELP. Similar to the pub-sub overlay net-
work, a VoIP network achieves significant performance and scalability benefits by
offloading the task of identifying receiver and transporting the voice traffic to a large
and distributed VoIP overlay network.
1.2 Security Issues
1.2.1 Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks
Recently we have seen increasing numbers of denial of service (DoS) attacks against
online services and web applications either for extortion reasons, or for impairing
and even disabling the competition [18, 55, 73]. These DoS attacks are increasingly
mounted by professional attackers using huge zombie networks consisting of thou-
sands of compromised machines on the Internet [43, 108, 105]. An FBI affidavit [18]
describes a DoS attack on an e-Commerce website using a 5,000 node zombie net that
caused a loss of several millions of dollars in revenue. Hence, countering DoS attacks
on online services has become a very challenging problem.
The overlay network has to protect the applications data hosted by the overlay
nodes from DoS and host compromise attacks. Protecting the overlay network nodes
from DoS and host compromise attacks improves the availability of an application. In
an overlay network model, DoS attacks can target three different layers: (i) TCP/IP
layer [87, 35, 13, 113], (ii) overlay network layer [17, 51], and the application layer
[49, 115]. In addition to attacks from external adversaries, the overlay network has to
develop solutions to mitigate insider DoS attacks, wherein a set of malicious overlay
nodes attempt to launch a DoS attack on the applications hosted by the overlay
network.
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1.2.2 Masquerading and Spoofing Attacks
The overlay network has to protect the applications data hosted by the overlay nodes
from incorrect or fake (spoofed) application data. Protecting the overlay network
nodes from incorrect or fake application data guarantees the authenticity of appli-
cation data hosted by the nodes. In an overlay network, authenticity attacks can
be of two types: (i) an adversary may attempt to spoof the identity of a legitimate
content provider and send incorrect or fake application data to the overlay network
nodes [109], and (ii) an authentic content provider may flood the overlay network
nodes with incorrect or inaccurate application data [119, 48]. The latter problem is
prevalent in today’s Internet wherein, we have multiple competitive web servers (with
possibly conflicting interests) publishing doctored information [42].
1.2.3 Eavesdropping and Corruption Attacks
The overlay network has to protect the confidentiality and integrity from: (i) the
overlay network nodes, and (ii) unauthorized users. In several applications, the clients
may not trust the overlay network nodes with the confidentiality and integrity of the
application data. The malicious overlay network nodes may be able to eavesdrop or
corrupt the application data hosted by them. In addition, malicious overlay nodes
may collude with one another in their attempts to compromise the confidentiality and
integrity of application data.
The overlay network allows users to specify access control rules on application
data. These access control rules restrict the set users that can access a given piece
of application data hosted by the overlay network. However, malicious users may
be curious to access application data and services that they are not authorized to
access. In addition, malicious users may collude with one another and with the
malicious nodes in the overlay network to compromise the confidentiality and integrity
of application data.
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1.2.4 User Identity Attacks
In several user privacy sensitive applications such VoIP network, an overlay network
has to protect the identity of the users from an external observer (adversary). The
overlay network in the VoIP scenario has to not only maintain the voice traffic a
secret, but also hide the ’who is talking to whom’ information. The use of VoIP over-
lay network has made it much easier to achieve anonymity in voice communications,
especially when VoIP calls are made between computers. Since VoIP calls between
peer computers have no phone numbers associated with them, and they could easily
be protected by end-to-end encryption and routed through low latency anonymizing
networks (e.g., Onion Routing [40], Tor [28], Freedom [11], and Tarzan [37]) to achieve
anonymity. Intuitively, computer to computer VoIP calls could remain anonymous if
they are encrypted end-to-end and routed through a low latency anonymizing net-
work. However, the malicious overlay network nodes and the external observer may
be able to observe the traffic routed through them. In addition, malicious overlay
network nodes may collude with an adversary to compromise user privacy.
1.3 Thesis Contribution
This thesis aims at developing system-level security algorithms and techniques for
several existing computing platforms and applications, focusing on overlay networks,
publish/subscribe networks and VoIP networks. While it is commonly believed that
it is very hard to secure large scale open distributed systems, this dissertation work
presents pragmatic techniques for supporting security mechanisms that minimally
modify an existing system code and yet preserve its performance and scalability met-
rics.
There are three main problems addressed in this thesis.
• It is widely acknowledged that using weak (weak communication and computa-
tion power) overlay network nodes, makes it more vulnerable to targeted denial
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of service (DoS) attacks. We show that even when an attacker is significantly
stronger than an overlay network node, one can mitigate targeted DoS attacks
by hiding critical information on a large overlay network.
• It is has been shown that secure and scalable information dissemination on
overlay networks reduces to secure multi-party computation problems (which
incur very high computation and communication costs). We point out that for
several practical publication-subscription matching operators, one can indeed
achieve both scalable and secure information dissemination protocols on overlay
networks.
• It is widely believed that using end-to-end encryption on overlay networks ap-
plications, such as voice and multi-media streaming, protects user identity. We
point out that there are several other vulnerabilities that should be formally
analyzed in order to effectively defend against user identity attacks on overlay
networks.
1.3.1 Research Philosophy
The research philosophy adopted in this thesis is the notion of retrofitting security into
legacy applications. The input is a large scale distributed system that has typically
been tuned for functionality, performance and scalability. The first step involves
studying the system using various theoretical methodologies (including network flows,
statistical inference, applied cryptography, information hiding, game theory) with the
goal of identifying potential security flaws in the application. The second step involves
developing systems-level security solutions in the form of customizable plug-ins that
could be neatly weaved into the original system code by minimally modifying the
code itself. The third step is to perform performance and scalability benchmarks on
the secure version of the legacy application and quantify the overhead of our security
plug-ins.
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The main contributions from this thesis are summarized below.
1.3.2 Information Hiding on Overlay Networks
We have presented techniques that exploit the structure of a distributed hash ta-
ble (DHT) based overlay network to improve its resilience to DoS attacks [97]. We
improve the resilience of overlay networks to DoS attacks using three techniques:
replicating application data, redundant routing, and verifiable routing. Replicating
application data ensures that the data is available to users as long as a threshold
number of replicas of the application data are available. Redundant routing using
independent paths ensures that two nodes can communicate with one another even
if some of the nodes are not operational either due to DoS attacks or host compro-
mise attacks. Verifiable routing mechanisms use DHT structures to probabilistically
detect malicious nodes attempting to misguide the routing algorithm; on detecting
a malicious behavior, an overlay node reroutes the message via an alternate path on
the overlay network.
We have proposed a location hiding algorithm that can hide the location of appli-
cation data or an online service on a large overlay network [99]. Location of data on
an overlay network refers to the IP address of the overlay network node that hosts
the service. The key intuition here is that without knowing the location of a ser-
vice, it is very hard for an adversary to launch a DoS attack on the service. The
location hiding algorithm introduces the concept of a location key. Analogous to a
cryptographic key, a user can locate any named data object on an overlay network
if and only if the user knows the location key associated with that data object. We
exploit the structure of the overlay network to obfuscate lookup queries on the overlay
network. The obfuscation methodology uses a probabilistic one-sided error algorithm
that preserves the performance and scalability of the lookup protocol, while making
it hard for an adversary to guess a location identifier even after observing polynomial
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number of routing queries on the overlay network (polynomial in the number of bits
of the location key). We have also studied inference attacks on our location hiding
algorithm and proposed location re-keying based techniques to defend against them.
Several research papers have proposed reputation management systems to con-
done content providers providing incorrect or inaccurate application data or services
[119, 48]. Reputation management systems essentially create a feedback loop that
allow content consumers (users) to rate the content providers based on the quality
of the data obtained from the content providers (via the overlay network service
provider). In course of time, all legitimate users will rely only on the data provided
by reputed content providers; hence, low quality content providers would eventually
run out of business. We have identified three important vulnerabilities in reputation
management systems. First, we provide a dependable trust model and a set of formal
methods to handle strategic malicious nodes that continuously change their behavior
to gain unfair advantages in the system. Second, a transaction based reputation sys-
tem must cope with the vulnerability that malicious nodes may misuse the system
by flooding feedbacks with fake transactions. Third, but not the least, we identify
the importance of filtering out dishonest feedbacks when computing reputation-based
trust of a node, including the feedbacks filed by malicious nodes through collusion. We
have built three security guards to defend against these attacks using cryptographic
techniques and Byzantine fault-tolerant techniques [100, 104, 69].
1.3.3 Secure Information Dissemination on Overlay Networks
We have developed techniques to protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability
of application data from the overlay network nodes for publish-subscribe networks
[98]. We use cryptographic techniques adapted using application specific knowledge
(pub-sub matching operators) to secure the pub-sub system. We developed six guards
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(security wrappers) around six publish-subscribe primitives: publish, subscribe, ad-
vertise, unsubscribe, unadvertise and route to protect the publish-subscribe service
against confidentiality & integrity attacks, and authenticity attacks. We have also
developed a r-resilient publish-subscribe overlay network topology that is resilient to
overlay network level DoS attacks.
We have developed techniques to support flexible access control rules on the ap-
plication data provided by the content providers [102]. In a publish-subscribe service
access control rules are specified as constraints. For example, a subscriber S who has
subscribed for a subscription filter φ = 〈〈topic, EQ, cancerTrail〉, 〈age, >, 20〉〉
should be able to read the patient record rec in an event e = 〈〈topic, cancerTrail〉,
〈age, 25〉, 〈patientRecord, rec〉〉, but not the patient record rec′ in an event e′ =
〈〈topic, cancerTrail〉, 〈age, 15〉, 〈patientRecord, rec′〉〉. We have proposed and
developed the notion of key isomorphism to handle this problem: we associate an
authorization key K(φ) with a subscription φ and an encryption key K(e) with event
e such that K(e) is efficiently derivable from K(φ) if and only if e matches φ. We
use the semantics of operators like <, >, ≥, ≤, substring, superstring, prefix, and
suffix to construct isomorphic key spaces in an efficient and scalable manner.
1.3.4 Privacy Beyond End-to-End Encryption in Overlay Networks
We have identified two attacks on VoIP networks and proposed solutions to mitigate
them. The first attack operates on the VoIP route set up protocol with the goal of
compromising the identity of the caller [103]. We have developed three triangulation-
based timing analysis attacks on the route set up protocol that exploit its broadcast
nature and its shortest path properties to identify the caller with high probability. We
have shown that any distributed shortest protocol is vulnerable to such triangulation-
based timing analysis attacks. We exploit the fact that in a VoIP network, a one-way
latency of up to 250ms is nearly unperceivable to human users. Hence, we develop
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three security guards that alleviate caller identification attacks and yet satisfy the
one-way latency constraint of 250ms. Our caller identification guards implement
two key ideas. First, we introduce uncertainty into timing information by adding
stochastic perturbations to the network latencies. Second, we propose two search
algorithms that combine random walk and broadcast algorithms with the goal of
reducing lookup latency and yet providing better protection against triangulation
based timing attacks.
The second attack operates on the voice session. We have developed flow analysis
attacks on VoIP networks [101]. A flow (sufficiently long lasting packet stream)
analysis attack measures the volume of flow (packets per unit time) between two
nodes on the VoIP network and uses this information in conjunction with the VoIP
network topology to determine a caller & recipient pair. The constant packet rate of
VoIP flows makes it easier for an external observer to trace a flow from a caller to a
receiver. We describe three statistical inference based flow analysis attacks on VoIP
networks with increasing sophistication. These attacks help an adversary to identify a
small list of potential recipients for a given VoIP call. We have also developed practical
techniques to achieve quantifiable and customizable privacy on VoIP networks. We
reduce the efficacy of flow analysis attacks by mixing one or more VoIP flows. The
constant packet rate nature of VoIP places makes it easy for one or more VoIP flows
to be mixed without leaking much information to an external observer. We have
implemented a route set up and maintenance protocol that accepts a customizable
anonymity parameter k form the caller. The protocol ensures that it sets up a voice




The rest of this is organized as chapters dedicated to security issues in overlay net-
works and two popular overlay network based application: publish/subscribe networks
and VoIP networks. In each of these chapters background information including sys-
tem and threat models are provided before the core technical content is described.
The specific contributions are given in the introduction part of each chapter, whereas
the related work in the literature is reported at the end of the chapter. Concretely,
this thesis is composed of the following chapters.
Chapter 2 presents secure routing issues in large scale overlay networks. We
first identify three vulnerabilities in routing protocols on large overlay networks. We
advocate information hiding techniques to hide data on an overlay network such that
only an authorized user can locate the data. We present modifications to the overlay
network lookup and routing protocol, a formal security analysis of the protocol, and
present experimental results that demonstrate the performance and scalability of the
proposed protocol.
Chapter 3 presents security issues in publish/subscribe networks. We present a
suite of guards to secure a publish/subscribe against a wide range of availability,
confidentiality and integrity attacks. We propose the notion of key isomorphism to
support event confidentiality & integrity and efficient multi-path event dissemination
trees for scaleable and secure distribution of events on the publish/subscribe networks.
Chapter 4 presents security issues in VoIP networks. We identify and formally
study two attacks on VoIP networks: a triangulation based timing attack that oper-
ates on the route step up protocol and a flow analysis attack that operates on the voice
session. We present modifications to the VoIP network protocols, a formal statisti-
cal inference based security analysis, and experimental results that demonstrate the
performance, scalability and real-time guarantees offered by the proposed protocol.
Chapter 5 presents authenticity issues in large scale overlay networks. We identify
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three vulnerabilities in reputation based management systems and propose solutions
to defend effectively against them. We also present experimental results that demon-
strate the efficacy of our proposal against a wide range of attack strategies.




A number of recent applications have been built on distributed hash tables (DHTs) based
overlay networks. Almost all DHT-based schemes employ a tight deterministic data place-
ment and ID mapping schemes. This feature on one hand provides assurance on location of
data if it exists, within a bounded number of hops, and on the other hand, opens doors for
malicious nodes to lodge attacks that can potentially thwart the functionality of the overlay
network.
This chapter studies several serious security threats in DHT-based systems through
two targeted attacks at the overlay network’s protocol layer. The first attack explores the
routing anomalies that can be caused by malicious nodes returning incorrect lookup routes.
The second attack targets the ID mapping scheme. We disclose that the malicious nodes
can target any specific data item in the system; and corrupt/modify the data item to its
favor. Third, we identify targeted file attacks, wherein an adversary attempts to attack a
small (chosen) set of files (data items) by attacking the nodes that host them. For each
of these attacks, we provide quantitative analysis to estimate the extent of damage that
can be caused by the attack; followed by experimental validation and defenses to guard the
overlay networks from such attacks.
2.1 Introduction
A new breed of serverless file storage services, like CFS [23], Farsite [7], OceanStore [53] and
SiRiUS [39], have recently emerged. In contrast to traditional file systems, they harness the
resources available at desktop workstations that are distributed over a wide-area network.
The collective resources available at these desktop workstations amount to several peta-flops
of computing power and several hundred peta-bytes of storage space [7].
These emerging trends have motivated serverless file storage as one of the most popular
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application over decentralized overlay networks. An overlay network is a virtual network
formed by nodes (desktop workstations) on top of an existing TCP/IP-network. Overlay
networks typically support a lookup protocol. A lookup operation identifies the location of
a file given its filename. Location of a file denotes the IP-address of the node that currently
hosts the file. There are four important issues that need to be addressed to enable wide
deployment of serverless file systems for mission critical applications.
Efficiency of the lookup protocol. There are two kinds of lookup protocol that have
been commonly deployed: the Gnutella-like broadcast based lookup protocols [38] and the
distributed hash table (DHT) based lookup protocols [106] [77] [84]. File systems like CFS,
Farsite and OceanStore use DHT-based lookup protocols because of their ability to locate
any file in a small and bounded number of hops.
Malicious and unreliable nodes. Serverless file storage services are faced with the
challenge of having to harness the collective resources of loosely coupled, insecure, and
unreliable machines to provide a secure, and reliable file-storage service. To complicate
matters further, some of the nodes in the overlay network could be malicious. CFS employs
cryptographic techniques to maintain file data confidentiality and integrity. Farsite permits
file write and update operations by using a Byzantine fault-tolerant group of meta-data
servers (directory service). Both CFS and Farsite use replication as a technique to provide
higher fault-tolerance and availability.
Targeted File Attacks. A major drawback with serverless file systems like CFS, Farsite
and OceanStore is that they are vulnerable to targeted attacks on files. In a targeted
attack, an adversary is interested in compromising a small set of target files through a DoS
attack or a host compromise attack. A denial-of-service attack would render the target
file unavailable; a host compromise attack could corrupt all the replicas of a file thereby
effectively wiping out the target file from the file system. The fundamental problem with
these systems is that: (i) the number of replicas (R) maintained by the system is usually
much smaller than the number of malicious nodes (B), and (ii) the replicas of a file are
stored at publicly known locations. Hence, malicious nodes can easily launch DoS or host
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compromise attacks on the set of R replica holders of a target file (R B).
Efficient Access Control. A read-only file system like CFS can exercise access control
by simply encrypting the contents of each file, and distributing the keys only to the legal
users of that file. Farsite, a read-write file system, exercises access control using access
control lists (ACL) that are maintained using a Byzantine-fault-tolerant protocol. However,
access control is not truly distributed in Farsite because all users are authenticated by a
small collection of directory-group servers. Further, PKI (public-key Infrastructure) based
authentication and Byzantine fault tolerance based authorization are known to be more
expensive than a simple and fast capability-based access control mechanism [21].
Bearing these issues in mind, in this chapter we present LocationGuard as an effective
technique for countering targeted file attacks. The fundamental idea behind LocationGuard
is to hide the very location of a file and its replicas such that, a legal user who possesses
a file’s location key can easily and securely locate the file on the overlay network; but
without knowing the file’s location key, an adversary would not be able to even locate the
file, let alone access it or attempt to attack it. LocationGuard implements an efficient
capability-based file access control mechanism through three essential components. The
first component of LocationGuard is a location key, which is a random bit string (128 bits)
used as a key to the location of a file in the overlay network, and addresses the capability
revocation problem by periodic or conditional rekeying mechanisms. A file’s location key is
used to generate legal capabilities (tokens) that can be used to access its replicas. The second
component is the routing guard, a secure algorithm to locate a file in the overlay network
given its location key such that neither the key nor the location is revealed to an adversary.
The third component is an extensible collection of location inference guards, which protect
the system from traffic analysis based inference attacks, such as lookup frequency inference
attacks, end-user IP-address inference attacks, file replica inference attacks, and file size
inference attacks. LocationGuard presents a careful combination of location key, routing
guard, and location inference guards, aiming at making it very hard for an adversary to infer
the location of a target file by either actively or passively observing the overlay network.
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In addition to providing an efficient file access control mechanism with traditional cryp-
tographic guarantees like file confidentiality and integrity, LocationGuard mitigates Denial-
of-Service (DoS) and host compromise attacks, while adding minimal performance overhead
and small storage overhead to the file system. Our initial experiments quantify the overhead
of employing LocationGuard and demonstrate its effectiveness against DoS attacks, host
compromise attacks and various location inference attacks.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides terminology and
background on overlay network and serverless file systems like CFS and Farsite. Section
2.3 describes our threat model in detail. We present the core techniques of LocationGuard
in Sections 2.6, 2.7, 2.8 and 2.9. We present a concrete implementation and a thorough
experimental evaluation of LocationGuard in Section 2.10, related work in Section 2.11, and
conclude the chapter in Section 2.12.
2.2 Background and Terminology
In this section, we formally describe a set of common properties of structured overlay
networks. Our formal model brings out the important concepts behind DHT-based systems
like Chord [106], CAN [77], Pastry [84] and Tapestry [10] that aid us in analyzing the
vulnerabilities and security threats on structured overlay networks.
A typical DHT-based overlay network consists of a routing table based lookup service.
The lookup service maps a given key to a node (usually the IP-address of the node) that
is responsible for the key. Storage protocols are layered on top of the lookup protocol.
For instance, CFS [23] is a wide-area cooperative file system layered on Chord [106]; while
OceanStore [53] is a distributed file system layered on Tapestry [10]. A generic DHT-based
lookup service has the following properties:
• (P1) A key identifier space, K. K is a m-bit identifier space where each data
item is mapped to a unique identifier d ∈ K using any standard hash function (like
MD5 [80] or SHA1 [32]).
• (P2) ID Mapping Scheme defines a node identifier space S. For example, Chord
uses a one-dimensional circular identifier space; while CAN uses a d-dimensional
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coordinate space. Each node n is assigned an identifier ID(n) ∈ S. Some DHT based
systems (CAN [77]) allow nodes to choose their identifier, while most others derive
the identifier of a node n, namely ID(n), as a strong one-way function of an external
identifier (EID) of the node n. For example, ID(n) could be equal to hash(IP (n)),
where IP (n) denotes the IP-address of node n. In this example, IP-address of a node
is used as its external identifier.
• (P3) Rules for dividing the node identifier space among the nodes. The
DHT-based schemes define a responsibility function for every node n which maps it
to a contiguous segment of identifier space S at time t, denoted as Respt(n). At
any given time instant t, {Respt(n) | n ∈ N(t)} partitions the node identifier space
S, where N(t) refers to the total collection of all nodes in the system at time t.
The algorithms also ensure that statistically every node n shares the identifier space
equally; that is, at any time instant t, sizeof(Respt(n)) ≈ sizeof(S)N(t) . Note that the
function sizeof depends on the nature of the identifier space. For example, in Chord,
sizeof(x) could be defined as the length of the segment x; while in CAN, sizeof(x)
could be defined as the volume of the coordinate space spanned by x.
• (P4) Data Placement Scheme specifies rules for mapping keys to nodes: A node
n is responsible for a key k ∈ K at time t if and only if k ∈ Respt(n). This guarantees
that any key k would always be found since the set {Respt(n) | n ∈ N(t)} partitions
the node identifier space S.
• (P5) Routing Scheme uses the per-node routing tables. Routing table entries on
every node maintain references to other nodes. More specifically, a distance metric
is defined between any two identifiers i and j as dist(i, j). For example, in Chord,
dist(i, j) may be simply defined as the length of the segment (i, j); while in CAN
dist(i, j) could be defined as the Cartesian distance between the points i and j in
a d-dimensional coordinate space. When a node n is queried for key k, it returns a
node m that is closer to key k; that is, dist(ID(n), k) ≥ dist(ID(m), k).
• (P6) Rules for updating routing tables as nodes join and leave. When a new
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node m joins the network at time t, it typically contacts an existing node n ∈ N(t)
such that ID(m) ∈ Respt(n). Note that there always exists such a node n since the
set {Respt(n) | n ∈ N(t)} partitions the identifier space S. The node m typically
assumes responsibility over a portion of the identifier space mapped to node n; that
is; Respt′(n) and Respt′(m) partitions the space Respt(n) for t
′ > t. Similarly, when
a node leaves the network, it hands over its responsibilities to another node in the
system.
The DHT-based systems guarantee location of any data item within a bounded number
of application level hops. However, this advantage comes with a price: the DHT-based
systems enforce a highly rigid structure and rely heavily on the correct functioning of
(almost) all nodes in the system. In short, an attacker can potentially harm the overlay
network by targeting these delicately balanced structures enforced by DHT-based systems.
2.3 Threat Model
Adversary refers to a logical entity that controls and coordinates all actions by malicious
nodes in the system. A node is said to be malicious if the node either intentionally or
unintentionally fails to follow the system’s protocols correctly. For example, a malicious
node may corrupt the files assigned to them and incorrectly (maliciously) implement file
read/write operations. This definition of adversary permits collusions among malicious
nodes. We assume that the underlying IP-network layer may be insecure. However, we
assume that the underlying IP-network infrastructure such as domain name service (DNS),
and the network routers cannot be subverted by the adversary.
An adversary is capable of performing two types of attacks on the file system, namely,
denial-of-service attacks, and host compromise attacks. When a node is under denial-of-
service attack, the files stored at that node are unavailable. When a node is compromised,
the files stored at that node could be either unavailable or corrupted. We model the mali-
cious nodes as having a large but bounded amount of physical resources at their disposal.
More specifically, we assume that a malicious node may be able to perform a denial-of-
service attack only on a finite and bounded number of good nodes, denoted by α. We limit
20
the rate at which malicious nodes may compromise good nodes and use λ to denote the
mean rate per malicious node at which a good node can be compromised. For instance,
when there are B malicious nodes in the system, the net rate at which good nodes are
compromised is λ ∗B (node compromises per unit time). Every compromised node behaves
maliciously. For instance, a compromised node may attempt to compromise other good
nodes. Every good node that is compromised would independently recover at rate µ. Note
that the recovery of a compromised node is analogous to cleaning up a virus or a worm from
an infected node. When the recovery process ends, the node stops behaving maliciously.
Unless and otherwise specified we assume that the rates λ and µ follow an exponential
distribution.
2.4 Attacks on the Routing Scheme
A typical DHT-based overlay network constructs a topology in which every node plays
the role of a client, a server, a router, and a domain name server. Nodes act as router
cum domain name server when they translate an identifier to the IP-address of a node
that is responsible for the identifier (see Property P4 in Section 2.2). Malicious nodes can
potentially exploit this feature to misguide legitimate nodes with incorrect lookups. For
example, a malicious node can lie about the next hop when it is queried for some identifier.
This could result in denial of information - a legitimate node is denied access to a data
item; or result in sub-optimal performance of the lookup algorithm.
There are several possible defense mechanisms to counteract such vulnerabilities. Con-
cretely, the properties of the distributed lookup algorithm can be used to ascertain whether
a lookup for a given identifier is correct or not. For example, Sit and Morris [93] exploit
the fact that: at each hop of the Chord lookup algorithm the query originator knows that
the lookup protocol should lead him/her closer to the destination identifier (see Property
P5 in Section 2.2). Hence, the query originator can check for this and detect an incorrect
lookup. On sensing an incorrect lookup, the query originator can choose an alternative
(possibly sub-optimal) path towards the destination identifier. Informally, a lookup path
from a source node n to a destination node m is the sequence of nodes through which the
21
lookup operation succeeds. In view of the above discussion, the performance of a lookup
algorithm (in the presence of malicious nodes) depends on the following three factors: (i)
Existence of multiple alternate paths between any two identifiers, (ii) Lookup costs along
alternate paths between any two identifiers, and (iii) Ability to detect incorrect lookups.
2.4.1 Alternate Lookup Paths
We first highlight the importance of alternate (possibly sub-optimal) paths in enhancing the
performance and the robustness of a lookup algorithm in the presence of malicious nodes.
We capture the notion of alternate lookup paths using the notion of independence of lookup
paths. We formally define independence between two lookup paths as follows:
Definition Independent Lookup Paths: Let P and Q be different lookup paths from node n
to node m. Two lookup paths P and Q are said to be independent if and only if they do not
share a common node other than the source node n and the destination node m.
Hence, each independent lookup path 1 between a node n and a node m is a statistically
independent route for a lookup with key k ∈ Resp(m), originated at node n, to succeed. Note
that the property of independence is stronger than that of alternate paths. For instance,
there may exist multiple paths between node n and node m; however all these paths may
happen to share a common node, thereby making no two of them independent.
Most of the DHT-based systems do not guarantee the existence of multiple independent
lookup paths between any two identifiers. For instance, in Chord, all lookups for a key
k ∈ Resp(m) will succeed only through the node pred(m), where pred(m) denotes the
predecessor of node m along the Chord identifier circle. Hence, the number of independent
lookup paths between any node n and key k ∈ Resp(m) is one, since all such lookup paths
include node pred(m). If the node pred(m) were malicious, lookup for any key k ∈ Resp(m)
would fail. On the other hand, this situation is greatly mitigated in DHT-based schemes
like CAN that have multiple independent lookup paths between any two identifiers. More
1In general one can estimate number of independent paths as follows: By Menger’s theorem [60],
the number of independent paths equals the vertex connectivity of a graph; and vertex connectivity
can be measured using network flow techniques [61]
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specifically, a d-dimensional CAN topology has d independent lookup paths.
We use the probability of lookup failure as a metric for measuring the benefits of alternate
lookup paths. A lookup for node m at node n results in a failure if all the lookup paths
from node n to node m contain at least one malicious node. Intuitively, larger the number
of independent lookup paths, smaller is the probability of lookup failure. In the following
portions of this section we derive bounds on the probability of lookup failure in terms of
the number of independent lookup paths.
2.4.1.1 Quantitative Analysis
Let ind denotes the number of independent lookup paths between the source and destination
node, p denotes the fraction of malicious nodes in the system, and M denotes the number
of hops required for a lookup to succeed. Given ind independent lookup paths of length M
hops, one can show that the probability of lookup failure is bounded by Equation 1.
pind ≤ Pr(lookup failure) ≤ (1− (1− p)M )ind (1)
Note that the existence of ind independent paths between a source node src and destination
node dst implies that there exists nodes {n1, n2, · · · , nind} one of which occurs on all paths
from the node src to node dst. The lower bound is derived from the fact that a lookup
from node src for node dst is guaranteed to fail if all the ind nodes {n1, n2, · · · , nind}
were malicious. Let {P1, P2, · · ·Pind} be any set of ind independent lookup paths between
node src and node dst containing nodes {n1, n2, · · · , nind} respectively. The probability
of a lookup succeeding on any lookup path Pi with M hops equals (1 − p)M , namely, the
probability that all the nodes on that path were good. The upper bound follows from the
independence of lookup failures along each independent lookup path 2. For small values
of p, the probability of lookup failure can be approximated to (M ∗ p)ind (M ∗ p  1).
Intuitively, the longer a lookup path (M), the higher is the chance that at least one node
on the lookup path turns out malicious. The statistical independence in lookup failures
along multiple independent paths ensures that the probability of lookup failure decreases
2This is an upper bound because the presence of alternate (but not independent) lookup paths
may decrease the probability of lookup failure
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exponentially with the number of independent paths (ind).
2.4.2 Alternate Optimal (less costly) Lookup Paths
Yet another important issue to be addressed with regard to alternate lookup paths is the
cost of these alternative paths themselves. Ideally, the alternate paths should be alternate
optimal paths; otherwise, choosing highly sub-optimal alternate paths may degrade the
performance of a lookup algorithm. Unfortunately, most of the DHT-based schemes do
not address such issues. For illustration, in Chord, say a node n queries a good node x
for key k and obtains the result as node y. Now, node n issues a query for key k to node
y. If node y were malicious, it would return an incorrect lookup result. If node n were
to detect the invalid result, the best choice it has is to ask node x (previous node on the
lookup path) for its next best choice for the query with key k. Now, node x has to return
a sub-optimal result, since it is not aware of any node that is closer to key k than the
malicious node y. Since Chord maintains pointers to nodes at distance that are an integer
power of 2, it is likely that the next best choice proceeds only half the distance along the
identifier circle when compared to the optimal choice. On the other hand, in CAN it is quite
possible for the alternate paths to be near optimal. Consider the same scenario described
above. Assume, without loss of generality, that the identifier of node x and key k differ
along coordinates {c1, c2, · · · , cl}. Now, if node x and node y varied along a coordinate cj
(for some j, 1 ≤ j ≤ l), then node x could choose other neighboring nodes that vary along
coordinates other than cj . In comparison with Chord, the alternate choices provided for a
lookup in CAN, is likely to be much closer to optimality. We defer further discussion on
alternate-optimal paths to the end of this section.
2.4.3 Detecting and Recovering from Invalid Lookups
Having highlighted the importance of good alternate paths, we now study the importance
of detecting incorrect (malicious) lookups. In the discussion that follows, we assume two
failure modes for nodes in our system: Crash failures and Byzantine failures. When a node
has crash failed it does not return any results for lookup queries. Under Byzantine failure,
a node can return a potentially malicious value for any lookup query. In the following
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portions of this section, we quantitatively analyze the cost of lookup operation under both
these failure modes. For the sake of simplicity of analysis, we assume that the DHT-based
scheme has multiple alternate-optimal paths between any two identifiers (like CAN). Hence,
the results obtained from the results of our analysis below can be viewed as lower bounds
on the lookup costs. Algorithm 1 shows the algorithm used by legitimate nodes to detect
and recover from invalid lookup results.
Secure LookUp(key k)
(1) for all good nodes n
(2) m← n
(3) repeat
(4) m← lookup(m, k)
(5) if k 6∈ Resp(m) AND dist(m, k) > dist(prev(m), k)
(6) repeat
(7) m← next best node for key k from node prev(m)
(8) if m = nil
(9) m← prev(m)
(10) end if
(11) if m = nil
(12) Report lookup failed
(13) end if
(14) until m 6= nil
(15) end if
(16) until k ∈ Resp(m)
(17) end for
Figure 1: Lookup algorithm for legitimate nodes
2.4.3.1 Quantitative analysis
Let M denote the mean number of hops required to perform a lookup operation. For in-




d where N is the number of nodes in
the system and d represents the dimensionality of CAN’s coordinate space. Let p denote
the percentage of bad nodes in the system. Also assume that the bad nodes are uniformly
spread throughout the node identifier space. Let f(x) be a function that maps the number
of hops required for a lookup when all nodes are good to the number of hops required when
p% of the nodes are malicious. In other words, if a lookup would require x hops when all
nodes are good, it would require f(x) hops when p% of the nodes are bad.
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Crash Failures. Assuming crash failures for nodes, f1(x) (the mapping function for crash
failures) satisfies the following recurrence relation.
f1(x) = 1 + (1− p)f1(x− 1) + pf1(x) (2)
When a node n queries a node m for the next hop towards a key identifier k, node n
expends one hop. If node m is a good node (probability = 1 − p) then it would return a
correct lookup result. Hence, node n would have to traverse x− 1 more hops to reach the
key identifier k in the scenario where no node has crashed. In the presence of crash-failed
nodes, this would require f1(x − 1) hops by the definition of function f1. If node m had
crashed (probability = p), it would not return any lookup result. Node n on detecting this
(though a timeout mechanism) can choose an alternate-optimal path towards key k. Hence,
node n would have to traverse x more hops to reach the key identifier k in the scenario
where no node has failed. In the presence of crash-failed nodes, this would cost node n
additional f1(x) hops (it is still possible to reach key k in x hops in spite of ruling out one
lookup path, since we have assumed the presence of alternate-optimal pathss).




Hence, the expected (average) number of hops required for a lookup operation is, E[f1(x)] =
M
1−p since, M = E[x] by definition.
Byzantine Failures. Assuming Byzantine failure of nodes, the cost of a lookup operation
depends on certain properties of the DHT-based system. In most of the DHT-based systems
it is possible to detect invalid lookups with a reasonable degree of certainty since the lookup
at each hop is supposed to get closer to the destination identifier [93]. Hence, the query
originator can check for this and detect an incorrect lookup. Upon finding an incorrect
lookup, the query originator can choose an alternative (possibly sub-optimal) path towards
the destination identifier. However, in certain cases like CAN’s RTT optimization, the
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lookup results cannot be verified since the intermediate lookup results are not available
to the source node (query originator). In view of the above discussion, we consider the
following two scenarios:
• Scenario 1: An incorrect lookup can always be detected.
• Scenario 2: An incorrect lookup cannot be detected; and hence, the querier blindly
follows the lookup result.
Observe that Scenario 1 is simply equivalent to that of crash failure of nodes. Note that
if a non-malicious node n receives an incorrect lookup from a malicious node m then node
n can simply assume that node m has crash failed. Hence, the lookup cost in scenario 1 is
given by Equation 3.
Assuming that incorrect lookups can neither be detected or corrected, f2(x) (the map-
ping function for scenario 2) satisfies the following recurrence relation,
f2(x) = 1 + (1− p)f2(x− 1) + pf2(M) (4)
Note that the first two terms in the expression for f2 follows from the same arguments for
crash failures; it costs unity for node n to query m and f2(x − 1) additional hops if node
m were good. However, if node m were malicious, it would return an incorrect lookup and
node n would blindly abide by node m’s result. Note that a collection of malicious nodes X
may keep circulating the query among nodes in X, thereby ensuring that the query never
succeeds. However, this would cost bad nodes in terms of their bandwidth for answering
repeated queries. Hence, we assume that bad nodes return a random node in the system
as the next hop for key k to the query originator node n. Now, since the random node
could be located anywhere in the network, it would be M hops away from the key k in the
scenario where all nodes are good. Hence, in the presence of malicious nodes, the lookup
operation would cost node n additional f2(M) hops.
Using the recurrence relation 4 we compute the average number of hops required for
a lookup operation as follows. We approximate E[f2(x)] to f2(E[x]) which is equal to
f2(M) (since M = E[x]). Note that f2(M) denotes the lookup cost for scenario 2 in the
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presence of malicious nodes when it would have required M hops in the absence of malicious
nodes. We observed that in most DHT-based systems the mean number of hops M is also
the most probable number of hops between any two random nodes in the system. Hence,
such an approximation does not significantly perturb our analytical results. Further, our
experimental results in Figure 4 show that this approximation is acceptable. Hence,
E[f2(x)] ≈ f2(M) =
1− (1− p)M
p(1− p)M (5)
Summary. Clearly, scenario 2 pays higher penalty for its inability to detect and recover
from invalid lookups. Intuitively, in scenario 1 (or under crash failures), the lookup makes
one successful hop with a probability 1− p; hence, each hops translates into 11−p hops. On
the other hand, scenario 2, pays heavily for every failed lookup. Let us say that we start
with a state S where the lookup operation is M hops from its target. Now, this lookup
operation succeeds if all the nodes in the path to the target are good (Pr = (1− p)M ); else
it is back to its original state S. Hence, the probability that a lookup succeeds in any given
attempt starting from state S is (1−p)M ; and hence the lookup cost is varies as (1−p)−M .
2.4.4 Experimental Validation
We have so far identified and quantitatively analyzed the importance of multiple indepen-
dent paths, alternate optimal paths, the ability to detect and recover from invalid lookups.
Now we present two sets of experiments to validate the above analysis. First, we study
the dependency between the number of independent paths and the probability of lookup
failure. Second, we measure the lookup cost in the presence of malicious nodes and evaluate
the performance of the proposed defense mechanisms regarding to the two scenarios: An
incorrect lookup (1) can always be detected or (2) cannot be detected.
Experiment I. In this experiment, we demonstrate that having multiple independent
lookup paths indeed decreases the probability of lookup failures. We simulated the working
of a P2P system using the Chord lookup protocol with 1024 nodes. The average lookup
cost when there are no malicious nodes is 5, i.e., M = 5. We also constructed CAN systems
with approximately the same average lookup cost; a 2-dimensional CAN with 100 nodes
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DHT Lower Expt Upper
Bound Result Bound
Chord 0.1 0.29 0.40
CAN-2 0.01 0.09 0.16
CAN-3 0.001 0.04 0.06
CAN-4 0.0001 0.015 0.028
CAN-10 0.0 10−4 10−4
Table 1: Probability of Lookup Failure






























Figure 2: Probability of a lookup fail-
ure: Initial TTL = 100 and p = 10%
(M = 5), a 3-dimensional CAN with 216 nodes (M = 4.5), a 4-dimensional CAN with 625
nodes (M = 5), and a 10-dimensional CAN with 1024 nodes (M = 5). A random set of p%
of the nodes were chosen to behave maliciously. From a practical standpoint, we associate
a time-to-live (TTL) with every lookup operation. Hence, a lookup operation is successful
only if it terminates correctly within TTL overlay network hops.
Table 1 compares the experimental results with the bounds obtained from our analyti-
cal model (Equation 1, Section 2.4.1) when p = 10%. Although the bounds obtained from
our quantitative analysis are not absolutely tight (because Equation 1 does not consider
alternate but not independent paths), the trends revealed by our analysis closely reflect the
results obtained from our experiments. Most importantly, observe that the upper bound on
the probability of lookup failure sharply decreases with increase in the number of indepen-
dent lookup paths. This motivated us to experiment with overlay network with different
number of independent paths.
Figure 2 shows the probability of lookup failure with TTL = 100 and p = 10% and
varying M . Observe that the probability of lookup failure increases with the mean number
of hops (M). Note that for any lookup path to succeed, all the nodes on the lookup path
must be non-malicious; longer the path, higher is the probability that at least one malicious
node appears on that path.





























Figure 3: Lookup Costs: Scenario 1




























Figure 4: Lookup Cost: Scenario 2 with
M = 5
for the scenarios 1 and 2 discussed in section 2.4.3. Figure 3 shows the average lookup
cost for scenario 1 wherein, the legitimate nodes verify whether the lookup result appears
to be valid by checking if the new node is indeed closer to the key k. On detecting an
invalid lookup, node n gets the next best alternative node and forwards the query to it.
Note that this strategy for detecting invalid lookups has scope for an one-sided error; it
may conclude that an incorrect (or a sub-optimal) lookup result is correct. The estimates
from our quantitative analysis are labeled as ‘check Ehops’ (Equation 3, Section 2.4.3); they
denote the lower bounds obtained on the expected number of hops assuming a large number
of independent paths. The lines labeled ‘chord check’ and ‘cand check’ refer to the cases
wherein the lookup protocol checks for validity as a part of the Chord, and the d-dimensional
CAN protocols respectively. We shall discuss the implications of Figure 3 in conjunction
with Figure 4. Figure 4 shows the average lookup cost for scenario 2 wherein, the legitimate
nodes do not test the validity of lookup results. The line labeled ‘nocheck Ehops’ (Equation
5, Section 2.4.3) shows the results obtained from our quantitative analysis. The lines labeled
‘chord nocheck’ and ‘cand nocheck’ refer to the cases where the Chord and the d-dimensional
CAN protocols were used without checking for the validity of lookup operations. Based on
Figures 3 and 4, we can testify the following statements:
• Validate our quantitative analysis. Observe that ‘check Ehops’ and ‘nocheck Ehops’
act as lower bounds for the ‘check’ and the ‘nocheck’ versions of the lookup protocol
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respectively. Also, observe that the results for a 10-D CAN closely matches our
quantitative analysis, since our analysis was specifically targeted at obtaining lower
bounds on lookup costs assuming a large number of independent paths between any
two identifiers.
• Checking the validity of a lookup result becomes very important for large values of p.
However, for small values of p, checking the validity of a lookup result is not very
vital in the presence of multiple independent paths. In fact, for p ≤ 40%, a 10-D
CAN with no validity checks incurs no more than 5-8% higher lookup cost than a
10-D CAN that performs validity checks. But, for large values of p (around p = 70%),
lookup protocols that do not include validity checks incur as high as 40-50% (for 10-D
CAN) to about 200% (for Chord) (Note that Figure 4 shows the results only up to
p = 50%).
• Importance of good alternate paths. Since ‘can10 check’ has multiple near-optimal
alternate paths, its lookup cost is within twice of the optimal lookup cost even when
p equals 70%. On the other hand, ‘chord check’ shows much poorer performance,
primarily because of the fact that Chord does not provide multiple independent
lookup paths. Further, the vitality of alternate paths is more blatantly revealed
by Figure 4 from the fact that, ‘chord check’ performs much worse (3-4 times) than
‘can10 nocheck’.
2.5 Attacking the ID-to-Key Mapping Scheme
In this section, we present the ID-to-Key mapping attack (ID Mapping for short) that show
how the malicious nodes could exploit the identifier-to-key mapping to corrupt a chosen data
item stored in the system by spoofing multiple identities (pseudo-spoofing). We quantify and
analyze the cost of attacking a chosen data item and discuss some approaches to mitigate
this problem.
The famous Sybil Attack chapter [30] showed that entities (nodes) can forge multiple
identities for malicious intent, and hence, a small set of faulty entities may be represented
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through a larger set of identities. Douceur concludes in [30] that for direct or indirect
identity validation (without using a centralized trusted agency), a set of faulty nodes can
counterfeit an unbounded number of identities (pseudo-spoofing). One solution suggested
to counter the Sybil attack in [30] is using secure node IDs that are signed by well-known
trusted certifying authorities. However, as Douceur pointed out himself that mandating
that every node must possess a certificate would turn out expensive. Hence, one is forced
to employ weak secure node IDs (with challenge-response schemes to verify the node IDs);
for example, several systems like CFS [23] use the IP-address of a node as its weak secure
ID. Therefore, it becomes very important to quantify and analyze the security trade-offs
when weak secure IDs are used. This section discusses an extension of the pseudo-spoofing
attack which results in the loss of a chosen data item (d) assuming the identity of the data
item (ID(d)) is known.
Almost all DHT-based system use a strong one-way hash function (like MD5 [80] or
SHA1 [32]) to derive a node identifier from its external identifier (EID) (refer Section 2.3);
and, any node p has direct access to a data item d if and only if ID(d) ∈ Resp(p) (see
properties P2 and P4, Section 2.2). Therefore, for a malicious node n to target a data
item with identifier d, it needs to select an EID such that if node n joins the system with
ID(n) = hash(n.EID), it will be made responsible for the target data item d. However,
we show that the cost of attacking a specific data item d ∈ K (key identifier space K) is
much easier than inverting the ID mapping hash function. Recall that by birthday paradox
[117], the cost of inverting a strong one-way hash function is O(
√
sizeof(S)), where S is
the hash space (in our case, the identifier space). In this section, we present a O(G) attack
for attacking any chosen data item stored in the system. This attack assumes significance
because the number of good nodes G is of the order of a few thousands, while sizeof(S)
for say MD5 is 2128.
Concretely, given the identifier of a data item d a malicious node can locate the node at
which the data item d is stored using the lookup protocol. Let the data item d be stored at
node q at time t, namely, ID(d) ∈ Respt(q). A malicious node p gains access to the target
data item d as follows: First, it attempts to pick an EID that hashes into Respt(q). As we
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have described in section 2.2 (P6), when a node p with ID(p) ∈ Respt(q) joins the network,
it would share the responsibility of node q. Given that the node p gets assigned a portion
of the node q’s responsibility, there is a good chance that the target data item d indeed
gets assigned to node p. Observe that if the system did not enforce restrictions on a node’s
identifier, a malicious node p could trivially choose its node identifier to be ID(d) thereby
ensuring that the target data item d is assigned to it. Algorithm 5 shows the algorithm
used by malicious nodes to perform a target data item attack.
ID Mapping Attack(data item d)
(1) m← LookUp(d)
(2) repeat
(3) EID(n) = Set of EIDs owned by node n
(4) eid← Randomly choose an EID address from set EID(n)
(5) ID(n)← hash(eid)
(6) until ID(n) ∈ Resp(m)
(7) Join the system with identifier as ID(n)
(8) if data item d is assigned to node n
(9) Corrupt data item d
(10) else
(11) Repeat procedure ID Mapping Attack
(12) end if
Figure 5: ID Mapping scheme: attack a specific data item d
2.5.1 Quantitative Analysis
Let G denote the number of good nodes in the system. Assume for the sake of simplicity
that there are no malicious nodes in the system. Now, every node in the system would be
responsible for approximately 1/Gth portion of the identifier space. The identifier space can
be viewed as if it were divided into G equal sized buckets. Hence, the probability that a
random identifier falls into a given bucket q is 1/G. The probability that a malicious node








where the first k−1 attempts fails to fall into bucket q, while the kth attempt succeeds. Ob-
serve that the number of attempts required in Equation 6 follows a Geometric Distribution.
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The malicious nodes could choose q such that their target data item d is currently held by
node q, i.e., ID(d) ∈ Respt(q). Using the standard properties of a Geometric distribution,
it follows from Equation 6 that the expected number of attempts required to obtain an
identifier that hashes into node q is G. Also, the probability that more than G attempts
are required is 1
e
for substantially large values of G. But, having obtained an identifier
that hashes into node q’s identifier space does not guarantee that the malicious node p is
assigned the target data item d. (Note Respt′(p) and Respt′(q) partitions Respt(q), for
t′ > t (see property P6 in Section 2.2). Since the data item d can lie anywhere in the
identifier space assigned to node q, the probability that node p gets to store data item
d after it joins the network is 12 . Hence, with a reasonably large probability, a malicious
node p can obtain access to a target data item d in G attempts. Hence, an adversary that
possesses G pseudo-identifiers can obtain access to the target file replica fi with probability
















Consequently, one can improve the chances of this attack in O(G) attempts since, for some
integer c > 0:










In a system where R replicas are maintained for each data item, a group of B malicious
nodes may join hands to corrupt a data item d irrecoverably as follows. Each of the malicious
nodes performs an ID Mapping attack using the above strategy on any of the R replicas
of data item d. When the malicious nodes succeed in gaining control over cr copies of the
data item d, they can corrupt it and leave the system.
Consider the case wherein the IP-address of a node is used as its EID. Given the fact that
IPv6 can potentially provide every node with thousands of addresses, it is quite feasible,
though expensive, for a malicious node to perform this attack. The same argument is
also applicable to dial-up users who obtain Dynamic IP-address from a huge ISP (Internet
Service Provider). Also note that computing O(G) hashes is computationally feasible. As a
simple example, using the standard OpenSSL library, a typical 900MHz Pentium III takes
about 1 second to compute one million hashes (MD5).
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G Mean time E[NEID] Pr(NEID ≤ 4G) Pr(NEID ≤ 8G)
(ms)
1024 2.32 2112 0.80 0.96
2048 4.22 4301 0.76 0.95
4096 8.47 8157 0.76 0.97
8192 16.08 16421 0.84 0.99
Table 2: Attack on ID Mapping Scheme
2.5.2 Experimental Validation
We simulated the Chord lookup protocol [106] with varying number of good nodes. We chose
100 random data items to attack. Table 2 summarizes our observations on the number of
EIDs required for a successful attack on these data items. Our observations very closely
match the results from our analysis (Equation 7): Pr(NEID ≤ 4G) = 0.79 and Pr(NEID ≤
8G) = 0.96.
2.5.3 Defense
The Sybil attack chapter [30] suggests the use of trusted certification authorities to strictly
bind an identity to an entity (node). However this requires every node to reveal its identity
in order to join the system. It may also discourage a few nodes from joining the overlay
network in the first place. In order to reduce certification costs and motivate users to join
the overlay network, one could employ weak secure identifiers, like the node IP-address,
which can be challenged and verified easily.
There are other approaches that could mitigate this problem. When a new node joins
the system, it typically contacts a publicly known and trusted bootstrap server to obtain
an entry point node to bootstrap itself into the system. In our solution, the bootstrap
server assigns a random id ∈ S to a node (and issues a certificate with a short life-time)
when it joins the system. Observe that if a malicious node joins the system O(G) times, it
gets assigned a given target data item with a large probability as in Equation 7. However
note that contrary to the techniques that derive a node’s ID from its EID, a malicious node
cannot offline determine the EID that can be used to gain control over the target data item.
Instead, the malicious node has to physically attempt joining the system O(G) times, each
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time contacting the bootstrap server. Note that contacting the bootstrap server O(G) takes
significantly longer time; but, it does not prevent a malicious from eventually gaining control
over a target data item. To prevent this, one could implement weak security checks through
the bootstrap server; for example, the bootstrap server could detects frequent attempts by
a node from a single IP-domain 3 to join the system. In conclusion, the overlay network
may use weak secure IDs as long as spoofing a large number of pseudo-identifiers over a
short duration of time is very hard.
2.6 LocationGuard
2.6.1 Targeted File Attacks
Targeted file attack refers to an attack wherein an adversary attempts to attack a small
(chosen) set of files in the system. An attack on a file is successful if the target file is either
rendered unavailable or corrupted. Given R replicas of a file f , file f is unavailable (or
corrupted) if at least a threshold cr number of its replicas are unavailable (or corrupted).
For example, for read/write files maintained by a Byzantine quorum [7], cr = dR/3e. For
encrypted and authenticated files, cr = R, since the file can be successfully recovered as long
as at least one of its replicas is available (and uncorrupt) [23]. Most P2P trust management
systems such as [119] uses a simple majority vote on the replicas to compute the actual
trust values of peers, thus we have cr = dR/2e.
Distributed file systems like CFS and Farsite are highly vulnerable to target file attacks
since the target file can be rendered unavailable (or corrupted) by attacking a very small
set of nodes in the system. The key problem arises from the fact that these systems store
the replicas of a file f at publicly known locations [51] for easy lookup. For instance, CFS
stores a file f at locations derivable from the public-key of its owner. An adversary can
attack any set of cr replica holders of file f , to render file f unavailable (or corrupted).
Farsite utilizes a small collection of publicly known nodes for implementing a Byzantine
fault-tolerant directory service. On compromising the directory service, an adversary could
obtain the locations of all the replicas of a target file.
3Multiple IP-addresses owned by a node hopefully fall into the same IP-domain
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Figure 6: LocationGuard: System Ar-
chitecture
Figure 7: LocationGuard: Conceptual
Design
Files on an overlay network have two primary attributes: (i) content and (ii) location.
File content could be protected from an adversary using cryptographic techniques. However,
if the location of a file on the overlay network is publicly known, then the file holder is
susceptible to DoS and host compromise attacks. LocationGuard provides mechanisms to
hide files in an overlay network such that only a legal user who possesses a file’s location
key can easily locate it. Thus, any previously known attacks on file contents would not
be applicable unless the adversary succeeds in locating the file. It is important to note
that LocationGuard is oblivious to whether or not file contents are encrypted. Hence,
LocationGuard can be used to protect files whose contents cannot be encrypted, say, to
permit arbitrary regular expression based keyword search on the file contents.
2.6.2 LocationGuard Approach
We first present a high level overview of LocationGuard. Figure 6 shows an architectural
overview of a file system powered by LocationGuard. LocationGuard operates on top of
an overlay network of N nodes. Figure 7 provides a sketch of the conceptual design of
LocationGuard. LocationGuard scheme guards the location of each file and its access with
two objectives: (1) to hide the actual location of a file and its replicas such that only legal
users who hold the file’s location key can easily locate the file on the overlay network, and
(2) to guard lookups on the overlay network from being eavesdropped by an adversary.
LocationGuard consists of three core components. The first component is location key,
which controls the transformation of a filename into its location on the overlay network,
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analogous to a traditional cryptographic key that controls the transformation of plaintext
into ciphertext. The second component is the routing guard, which makes the location
of a file unintelligible. The routing guard is, to some extent, analogous to a traditional
cryptographic algorithm which makes a file’s contents unintelligible. The third component
of LocationGuard includes an extensible package of location inference guards that protect
the file system from indirect attacks. Indirect attacks are those attacks that exploit a file’s
metadata information such as file access frequency, end-user IP-address, equivalence of file
replica contents and file size to infer the location of a target file on the overlay network.
In the following subsections, we first present the main concepts behind location keys
and location hiding (Section 2.6.3) and describe a reference model for serverless file systems
that operate on LocationGuard (Section 2.6.4). Then we present the concrete design of
LocationGuard’s three core components: the location key (Section 2.7), the routing guard
(Section 2.8) and a suite of location inference guards (Section 2.9).
2.6.3 Concepts and Definitions
In this section we define the concept of location keys and its location hiding properties.
We discuss the concrete design of location key implementation and how location keys and
location guards protect a file system from targeted file attacks in the subsequent sections.
Consider an overlay network of size N with a Chord-like lookup protocol Γ. Let
f1, f2, · · · , fR denote the R replicas of a file f . Location of a replica f i refers to the
IP-address of the node (replica holder) that stores replica f i. A file lookup algorithm is
defined as a function that accepts f i and outputs its location on the overlay network. For-
mally we have Γ : f i → loc maps a replica f i to its location loc on the overlay network
P .
Definition 1 Location Key: A location key lk of a file f is a relatively small amount (m-
bit binary string, typically m = 128) of information that is used by a Lookup algorithm
Ψ : (f, lk) → loc to customize the transformation of a file into its location such that the
following three properties are satisfied:
1. Given the location key of a file f , it is easy to locate the R replicas of file f .
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2. Without knowing the location key of a file f , it is hard for an adversary to locate any
of its replicas.
3. The location key lk of a file f should not be exposed to an adversary when it is used
to access the file f .
Informally, location keys are keys with location hiding property. Each file in the system is
associated with a location key that is kept secret by the users of that file. A location key
for the file f determines the locations of its replicas in the overlay network. Note that the
lookup algorithm Ψ is publicly known; only a file’s location key is kept secret.
Property 1 ensures that valid users of a file f can easily access it provided they know
its location key lk. Property 2 guarantees that illegal users who do not have the correct
location key will not be able to locate the file on the overlay network, making it harder
for an adversary to launch a targeted file attack. Property 3 warrants that no information
about the location key lk of a file f is revealed to an adversary when executing the lookup
algorithm Ψ.
Having defined the concept of location key, we present a reference model for a file system
that operates on LocationGuard. We use this reference model to present a concrete design
of LocationGuard’s three core components: the location key, the routing guard and the
location inference guards.
2.6.4 LocationGuard File System
A serverless file system may implement read/write operations by exercising access control
in a number of ways. For example, Farsite [7] uses an access control list maintained among
a small number of directory servers through a Byzantine fault tolerant protocol. CFS [23], a
read-only file system, may implement access control by encrypting the files and distributing
the file encryption keys only to the legal users of a file. In this section we show how a
LocationGuard based file system exercises access control.
In contrast to other serverless file systems, a LocationGuard based file system does not
directly authenticate an user attempting to access a file. Instead, it uses location keys to
implement a capability-based access control mechanism, that is, any user who presents the
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correct file capability (token) is permitted access to that file. Furthermore, it utilizes rout-
ing guard and location inference guards to secure the locations of files being accessed on the
overlay network. Our access control policy is simple: if you can name a file, then you can
access it. However, we do not use a file name directly; instead, we use a pseudo-filename
(128-bit binary string) generated from a file’s name and its location key (see Section 2.7 for
detail). The responsibility of access control is divided among the file owner, the legal file
users, and the file replica holders and is managed in a decentralized manner.
File Owner. Given a file f , its owner u is responsible for securely distributing f ’s location
key lk (only) to those users who are authorized to access the file f .
Legal User. A user u who has obtained the valid location key of file f is called a legal user
of f . Legal users are authorized to access any replica of file f . Given a file f ’s location key
lk, a legal user u can generate the replica location token rlti for its ith replica. Note that
we use rlti as both the pseudo-filename and the capability of f i. The user u now uses the
lookup algorithm Ψ to obtain the IP-address of node r = Ψlk(rlt
i). User u gains access to
replica f i by presenting the token rlti to node r. Note that rlti acts as a pseudo-filename
during lookup and a capability during access control.
Good Replica Holder. Assume that a node r is responsible for storing replica f i. In-
ternally, node r stores this file content under its pseudo-filename rlti. Note that node r
does not need to know the actual file name (f) of a locally stored file rlti. Also, by design,
given the internal file name rlti, node r cannot guess its actual file name (see Section 2.7).
When a node r receives a read/write request on a file rlti it checks if a file named rlti
is present locally. If so, it directly performs the requested operation on the local file rlti.
Access control follows from the fact that it is very hard for an adversary to guess correct
file tokens.
Malicious Replica Holder. Let us consider the case where the node r that stores a replica
f i is malicious. Note that node r’s response to a file read/write request can be undefined.
Note that we have assumed that the replicas stored at malicious nodes are always under
attack (recall that up to cr − 1 out of R file replicas could be unavailable or corrupted).
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Hence, the fact that a malicious replica holder incorrectly implements file read/write oper-
ation or that the adversary is aware of the tokens of those file replicas stored at malicious
nodes does not harm the system. Also, by design, an adversary who knows one token rlti
for replica f i would not be able to guess the file name f or its location key lk or the tokens
for others replicas of file f (see Section 2.7).
Adversary. An adversary cannot access any replica of file f stored at a good node simply
because it cannot guess the token rlti without knowing its location key. However, when
a good node is compromised an adversary would be able to directly obtain the tokens for
all files stored at that node. In general, an adversary could compile a list of tokens as
it compromises good nodes, and corrupt the file replicas corresponding to these tokens at
any later point in time. Eventually, the adversary would succeed in corrupting cr or more
replicas of a file f without knowing its location key. LocationGuard addresses such attacks
using a location rekeying technique discussed in Section 2.9.3.
In the subsequent sections, we show how to generate a replica location token rlti (1 ≤ i ≤ R)
from a file f and its location key (Section 2.7), and how the lookup algorithm Ψ performs
a lookup on a pseudo-filename rlti without revealing the capability rlti to malicious nodes
in the overlay network (Section 2.8). It is important to note that the ability to guard the
lookup from attacks like eavesdropping is critical to the file location hiding scheme, since a
lookup operation (using a lookup protocol such as Chord) on identifier rlti typically pro-
ceeds in plain-text through a sequence of nodes on the overlay network. Hence, an adversary
may collect file tokens by simply sniffing lookup queries over the overlay network. The ad-
versary could use these stolen file tokens to perform write operations on the corresponding
file replicas, and thus corrupt them, without the knowledge of their location keys.
2.7 Location Keys
The first and most simplistic component of LocationGuard is the concept of location keys.
The design of location key needs to address the following two questions: (1) How to choose
a location key? (2) How to use a location key to generate a replica location token − the
capability to access a file replica?
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The first step in designing location keys is to determining the type of string used as the
identifier of a location key. Let user u be the owner of a file f . User u should choose a long
random bit string (128-bits) lk as the location key for file f . The location key lk should be
hard to guess. For example, the key lk should not be semantically attached to or derived
from the file name (f) or the owner name (u).
The second step is to find a pseudo-random function to derive the replica location tokens
rlti (1 ≤ i ≤ R) from the filename f and its location key lk. The pseudo-filename rlti is
used as a file replica identifier to locate the ith replica of file f on the overlay network.
Let Elk(x) denote a keyed pseudo-random function with input x and a secret key lk and
‖ denotes string concatenation. We derive the location token rlti = Elk(f ‖ i). Given
a replica’s identifier rlti, one can use the lookup protocol Ψ to locate it on the overlay
network. The function E should satisfy the following conditions:
1a) Given (f ‖ i) and lk it is easy to compute Elk(f ‖ i).
2a) Given (f ‖ i) it is hard to guess Elk(f ‖ i) without knowing lk.
2b) Given Elk(f ‖ i) it is hard to guess the file name f .
2c) Given Elk(f ‖ i) and f it is hard to guess lk.
Condition 1a ensures that it is very easy for a valid user to locate a file f as long as it is
aware of the file’s location key lk. Condition 2a states that it should be very hard for an
adversary to guess the location of a target file f without knowing its location key. Condition
2b ensures that even if an adversary obtains the identifier rlti of replica f i, he/she cannot
deduce the file name f . Finally, Condition 2c requires that even if an adversary obtains the
identifiers of one or more replicas of file f , he/she would not be able to derive the location
key lk from them. Hence, the adversary still has no clue about the remaining replicas of
the file f (by Condition 2a). Conditions 2b and 2c play an important role in ensuring good
location hiding property. This is because for any given file f , some of the replicas of file
f could be stored at malicious nodes. Thus an adversary could be aware of some of the
replica identifiers. Finally, observe that Condition 1a and Conditions {2a, 2b, 2c} map to
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Property 1 and Property 2 in Definition 1 (in Section 2.6.3) respectively.
There are a number of cryptographic tools that satisfies our requirements specified in
Conditions 1a, 2a, 2b and 2c. Some possible candidates for the function E are (i) a keyed-
hash function like HMAC-MD5 [52], (ii) a symmetric key encryption algorithm like DES
[36] or AES [63], and (iii) a PKI based encryption algorithm like RSA [85]. We chose to use
a keyed-hash function like HMAC because it can be computed very efficiently. HMAC-MD5
computation is about 40 times faster than AES encryption and about 1000 times faster than
RSA encryption using the standard OpenSSL library [64]. In the remaining part of this
chapter, we use khash to denote a keyed pseudo-random function that is used to derive a
file’s replica location tokens from its name and its secret location key.
2.8 Routing guard
The second and fundamental component of LocationGuard is the routing guard. The design
of routing guard aims at securing the lookup of file f such that it will be very hard for an
adversary to obtain the replica location tokens by eavesdropping on the overlay network.
Concretely, let rlti (1 ≤ i ≤ R) denote a replica location token derived from the file name
f , the replica number i, and f ’s location key lk. We need to secure the lookup algorithm
Ψlk(rlt
i) such that the lookup on pseudo-filename rlti does not reveal the capability rlti to
other nodes on the overlay network. Note that a file’s capability rlti does not reveal the
file’s name; but it allows an adversary to write on the file and thus corrupt it (see reference
file system in Section 2.6.4).
There are two possible approaches to implement a secure lookup algorithm: (1) cen-
tralized approach and (2) decentralized approach. In the centralized approach, one could
use a trusted location server [47] to return the location of any file on the overlay network.
However, such a location server would become a viable target for DoS and host compromise
attacks.
In this section, we present a decentralized secure lookup protocol that is built on top of
the Chord protocol. Note that a naive Chord-like lookup protocol Γ(rlti) cannot be directly








Figure 8: Lookup Us-
ing File Identifier Obfus-
cation: Illustration
1 − prsq 2−10 2−15 2−20 2−25 2−30
srg 298 293 288 283 278
E[retries] 2−10 2−15 2−20 2−25 2−30
hardness (years) 238 233 228 223 218
Table 3: Lookup Identifier obfuscation
2.8.1 Overview
The fundamental idea behind the routing guard is as follows. Given a file f ’s location key
lk and replica number i, we want to find a safe region in the identifier space where we can
obtain a huge collection of obfuscated tokens, denoted by {OTK i}, such that, with high
probability, Γ(otki) = Γ(rlti), ∀otki ∈ OTKi. We call otki ∈ OTKi an obfuscated identifier
of the token rlti. Each time a user u wishes to lookup a token rlti, it performs a lookup on
some randomly chosen token otki from the obfuscated identifier set OTK i. Routing guard
ensures that even if an adversary were to observe obfuscated identifiers from the set OTK i
for one full year, it would be highly infeasible for the adversary to guess the token rlti.
We now describe the concrete implementation of the routing guard. For the sake of
simplicity, we assume a unit circle for the Chord’s identifier space; that is, node identifiers
and file identifiers are real values from 0 to 1 that are arranged on the Chord ring in the
anti-clockwise direction. Let ID(r) denote the identifier of node r. If r is the destination
node of a lookup on file identifier rlti, i.e., r = Γ(rlti), then r is the node that immediately
succeeds rlti in the anti-clockwise direction on the Chord ring. Formally, r = Γ(rlti) if
ID(r) ≥ rlti and there exists no other nodes, say v, on the Chord ring such that ID(r) >
ID(v) ≥ rlti.
We first introduce the concept of safe obfuscation to guide us in finding an obfuscated
identifier set OTKi for a given replica location token rlti. We say that an obfuscated
identifier otki is a safe obfuscation of identifier rlti if and only if a lookup on both rlti and
otki result in the same physical node r. For example, in Figure 8, identifier otki1 is a safe
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obfuscation of identifier rlti (Γ(rlti) = Γ(otki1) = r), while identifier otk
i
2 is unsafe (Γ(otk
i
2)
= r′ 6= r).
We define the set OTK i as a set of all identifiers in the range (rlti−srg, rlti), where srg
denotes a safe obfuscation range (0 ≤ srg < 1). When a user intends to query for a replica
location token rlti, the user actually performs a lookup on an obfuscated identifier otki
= obfuscate(rlti) = rlti−random(0, srg). The function random(0, srg) returns a number
chosen uniformly and randomly in the range (0, srg).
We choose a safe value srg such that:
(C1) With high probability, any obfuscated identifier otki is a safe obfuscation of the token
rlti.
(C2) Given a large collection of obfuscated identifiers {otki} it is very hard for an adversary
to guess the actual identifier rlti.
Note that if srg is too small condition C1 is more likely to hold, while condition C2 is more
likely to fail. In contrast, if srg is too big, condition C2 is more likely to hold but condition
C1 is more likely to fail. In our first prototype development of LocationGuard, we introduce
a system defined parameter prsq to denote the minimum probability that any obfuscation
is required to be safe. In the subsequent sections, we present a technique to derive srg
as a function of prsq. This permits us to quantify the tradeoff between condition C1 and
condition C2.
2.8.2 Determining the Safe Obfuscation Range
Observe from Figure 8 that a obfuscation rand on identifier rlti is safe if rlti−rand >
ID(r′), where r′ is the immediate predecessor of node r on the Chord ring. Thus, we have
rand < rlti−ID(r′). The expression rlti−ID(r′) denotes the distance between identifiers
rlti and ID(r′) on the Chord identifier ring, denoted by dist(rlti, ID(r′)). Hence, we say
that a obfuscation rand is safe with respect to identifier rlti if and only if rand < dist(rlti,
ID(r′)), or equivalently, rand is chosen from the range (0, dist(rlti, ID(r′))).
We use Theorem 2.8.1 to show that Pr(dist(rlti, ID(r′)) > x) = e−x∗N , where N
denotes the number of nodes on the overlay network and x denotes any value satisfying
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0 ≤ x < 1. Informally, the theorem states that the probability that the predecessor node
r′ is further away from the identifier rlti decreases exponentially with the distance. Since
an obfuscation rand is safe with respect to rlti if dist(rlti, ID(r′)) > rand, the probability
that a obfuscation rand is safe can be calculated using e−rand∗N .
Now, one can ensure that the minimum probability of any obfuscation being safe is prsq
as follows. We first use prsq to obtain an upper bound on rand: By e
−rand∗N ≥ prsq, we
have, rand ≤ −loge(prsq)
N
. Hence, if rand is chosen from a safe range (0, srg), where srg =
−loge(prsq)
N
, then all obfuscations are guaranteed to be safe with a probability greater than
or equal to prsq.
For instance, when we set prsq = 1− 2−20 and N = 1 million nodes, srg = − loge(prsq)N =
2−40. Hence, on a 128-bit Chord ring rand could be chosen from a range of size srg =
2128 ∗ 2−40 = 288. Table 3 shows the size of a prsq−safe obfuscation range srg for different
values of prsq. Observe that if we set prsq = 1, then srg = − loge(prsq)N = 0. Hence, if we
want 100% safety, the obfuscation range srg must be zero, i.e., the token rlti cannot be
obfuscated.
Theorem 2.8.1 Let N denote the total number of nodes in the system. Let dist(x, y)
denote the distance between two identifiers x and y on a Chord’s unit circle. Let node r ′ be
the node that is the immediate predecessor for an identifier rlti on the anti-clockwise unit
circle Chord ring. Let ID(r′) denote the identifier of the node r′. Then, the probability that
the distance between identifiers rlti and ID(r′) exceeds rg is given by Pr(dist(rlti, ID(r′))
> x) = e−x∗N for some 0 ≤ x < 1.
Proof Let Z be a random variable that denotes the distance between an identifier rlti and
node r′. Let fZ(x) denote the probability distribution function (pdf) that the node r
′ is at a
distance x from the identifier rlti, i.e., dist(ID(r′), rlti) = x. We first derive the probability
distribution fZ(x) and use it to compute Pr(Z > x) = Pr(dist(rlt
i, ID(r′)) > x).
By the uniform and random distribution properties of the hash function the identifier of
a node will be uniformly and randomly distributed between (0, 1). Hence, the probability
that the identifier of any node falls in a segment of length x is equal to x. Hence, with
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probability 4x, a given node exists between a distance of (x, x +4x) from the identifier
rlti (for any arbitrarily small region 4x). When there are N nodes in the system, the
probability that one of them exists between a distance (x, x +4x) is N ∗ 4x. Similarly,
the probability that none of other node N − 1 nodes lie within a distance rg from identifier
rlti is (1− x)N−1. Therefore, fZ(x) is given by Equation 8.
fZ(x) = N ∗ (1− x)N−1 (8)
Now, using the probability density function in Equation 8 one can derive the cumulative
distribution function (cdf), Pr(Z > x) = (1 − x)N ≈ e−x∗N (for small values of x) using
standard techniques in probability theory.
2.8.3 Ensuring Safe Obfuscation
Given that when prsq < 1, there is small probability that an obfuscated identifier is not
safe, i.e., 1 − prsq > 0. We first discuss the motivation for detecting and repairing unsafe
obfuscations and then describe how to guarantee good safety by our routing guard through
a self-detection and self-healing process.
Let node r be the result of a lookup on identifier rlti and node v (v 6= r) be the result
of a lookup on an unsafe obfuscated identifier otki. To perform a file read/write operation
after locating the node that stores the file f , the user has to present the location token rlti
to node v. If a user does not check for unsafe obfuscation, then the file token rlti would
be exposed to some other node v 6= r. If node v were malicious, then it could misuse this
information to corrupt the file replica actually stored at node r (using the capability rlti).
We require a user to verify whether an obfuscated identifier is safe or not using the follow-
ing check: An obfuscated identifier otki is considered safe if and only if rlti ∈ (otki, ID(v)),
where v = Γ(otki). By the definition of v and otki, we have otki ≤ ID(v) and otki ≤ rlti
(rand ≥ 0). By otki ≤ rlti ≤ ID(v), node v should be the immediate successor of the
identifier rlti and thus be responsible for it. If the check failed, i.e., rlti > ID(v), then
node v is definitely not a successor of the identifier rlti. Hence, the user can flag otki as
an unsafe obfuscation of rlti. For example, referring Figure 8, otki1 is safe because, rlt
i ∈
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2 is unsafe because, rlt
i /∈ (otki2, ID(r′)) and r′ =
Γ(otki2).
When an obfuscated identifier is flagged as unsafe, the user needs to retry the lookup
operation with a new obfuscated identifier. This retry process continues until max retries
rounds or until a safe obfuscation is found. Thanks to the fact that the probability of an
unsafe obfuscation can be extremely small, the call for retry rarely happens. We also found
from our experiments that the number of retries required is almost always zero and seldom
exceeds one. We believe that using max retries equal to two would suffice even in a highly
conservative setting. Table 3 shows the expected number of retries required for a lookup
operation for different values of prsq.
2.8.4 Strength of Routing guard
The strength of a routing guard refers to its ability to counter lookup sniffing based attacks.
A typical lookup sniffing attack is called the range sieving attack. Informally, in a range
sieving attack, an adversary sniffs lookup queries on the overlay network, and attempts to
deduce the actual identifier rlti from its multiple obfuscated identifiers. We show that an
adversary would have to expend 228 years to discover a replica location token rlti even if it
has observed 225 obfuscated identifiers of rlti. Note that 225 obfuscated identifiers would be
available to an adversary if the file replica f i was accessed once a second for one full year
by some legal user of the file f .
One can show that given multiple obfuscated identifiers it is non-trivial for an adversary
to categorize them into groups such that all obfuscated identifiers in a group are actually
obfuscations of one identifier. To simplify the description of a range sieving attack, we
consider the worst case scenario where an adversary is capable of categorizing obfuscated
identifiers (say, based on their numerical proximity).
We first concretely describe the range sieving attack assuming that prsq and srg (from
Theorem 2.8.1) are publicly known. When an adversary obtains an obfuscated identifier
otki, the adversary knows that the actual capability rlti is definitely within the range
RG = (otki, otki + srg), where (0, srg) denotes a prsq−safe range. In fact, if obfuscations
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are uniformly and randomly chosen from (0, srg), then given an obfuscated identifier otki,
the adversary knows nothing more than the fact that the actual identifier rlti could be
uniformly and randomly distributed over the range RG = (otki, otki + srg). However, if
a persistent adversary obtains multiple obfuscated identifiers {otki1, otki2, · · · , otkinid} that
belong to the same target file, the adversary can sieve the identifier space as follows. Let
RG1, RG2, · · · , RGnid denote the ranges corresponding to nid random obfuscations on the
identifier rlti. Then the capability of the target file is guaranteed to lie in the sieved range
RGs = ∩nidj=1RGj . Intuitively, if the number of obfuscated identifiers (nid) increases, the
size of the sieved range RGs decreases. For all tokens tk ∈ RGs, the likelihood that the
obfuscated identifiers {otki1, otki2, · · · , otkinid} are obfuscations of the identifier tk is equal.
In fact, the probability of observing otkij for some 1 ≤ j ≤ nid given that the actual token
is tk is Pr(otkij | tk) = 1srg , ∀ tk ∈ RGs. Also, the probability of observing the obfuscated
identifiers {otki1, otki2, · · · , otkinid} given that the actual token is tk is Pr({otki1, otki2, · · · ,
otkinid} | tk) = 1srgCnid , ∀ tk ∈ RGs. Note that
srgCnid denotes the number of ways of
choosing nid balls from a pool of srg non-identical balls. Hence, the adversary is left with
no smart strategy for searching the sieved range RGs other than performing a brute force
attack on some random enumeration of identifiers tk ∈ RGs.




. Hence, if the safe range srg is significantly larger than nid then the routing
guard can tolerate the range sieving attack. Recall the example in Section 2.8 where prsq =
1 − 2−20, N = 106, the safe range srg = 288. Suppose that a target file is accessed
once per second for one year; this results in 225 file accesses. An adversary who logs all
obfuscated identifiers over a year could sieve the range to about E[|RGs|] = 263. Assuming
that the adversary performs a brute force attack on the sieved range, by attempting a file
read operation at the rate of one read per millisecond, the adversary would have tried 235
read operations per year. Thus, it would take the adversary about 263/235 = 228 years
to discover the actual file identifier. Table 3 summarizes the hardness of breaking the
obfuscation scheme for different values of prsq (minimum probability of safe obfuscation),
assuming that the adversary has logged 225 file accesses (one access per second for one year)
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and that the nodes permit at most one file access per millisecond.
Discussion. An interesting observation follows from the above discussion: the amount of
time taken to break the file identifier obfuscation technique is almost independent of the
number of attackers. This is a desirable property. It implies that as the number of attackers
increases in the system, the hardness of breaking the file capabilities will not decrease. The
reason for location key based systems to have this property is because the time taken for
a brute force attack on a file identifier is fundamentally limited by the rate at which a
hosting node permits accesses on files stored locally. On the contrary, a brute force attack
on a cryptographic key is inherently parallelizable and thus becomes more powerful as the
number of attackers increases.
Theorem 2.8.2 Let nid denote the number of obfuscated identifiers that correspond to a
target file. Let RGs denote the sieved range using the range sieving attack. Let srg denote
the maximum amount of obfuscation that could be prsq−safely added to a file identifier.
Then, the expected size of range RGs can be calculated by E[|RGs|] = srgnid .
Proof Let otkimin = rlt
i− randmax and otkimax = rlti− randmin denote the minimum and
the maximum value of an obfuscated identifier that has been obtained by an adversary,
where randmax and randmin are chosen from the safe range (0, srg). Then, we have the




min + srg), namely, from the highest lower bound to the
lowest upper bound. The sieved range RGs can be partitioned into two ranges RGmin and
RGmax, where RGmin = (otk
i
max, rlt
i) and RGmax = (rlt
i, otkimin + srg). Thus we have
E[|RGs|] = E[|RGmin|] + E[|RGmax|].
The size of the range RGmin, denoted as |RGmin|, equals to randmin since is rlti −
otkimax = randmin. We show that the cumulative distribution function of randmin is given
by Equation 9.






Since an obfuscation rand is chosen uniformly and randomly over a range (0, srg), for
0 ≤ rg ≤ srg, the probability that any obfuscation rand is smaller than rg, denoted by
Pr(rand ≤ rg), is rg
srg
. Hence, the probability that any obfuscation rand is greater than rg
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is Pr(rand > rg) = 1 − Pr(rand ≤ rg) = 1 − rg
srg
. Now we compute the probability that
randmin = min{rand1, rand2, · · · , randnid} is greater than rg. We have Pr(randmin > rg)
= Pr((rand1 > rg) ∧ (rand2 > rg) ∧ · · · ∧ (randnid > rg)) =
∏nid





Now, using standard techniques from probability theory and Equation 9, one can derive
the expected value of randmin: E[|RGmin|] = E[randmin] ≈ srgnid . Symmetrically, one can
show that the expected size of range RGmax is E[|RGmax|] ≈ srgnid . Hence the expected size
of sieved range is E[|RGs|] = E[|RGmin|] + E[|RGmax|] ≥ srgnid .
2.9 Location Inference Guards
Location inference attacks refer to those attacks wherein an adversary attempts to infer the
location of a file using indirect techniques that exploit file metadata information such as file
access frequency, file size, and so forth. LocationGuard includes a suite of four fundamental
and inexpensive inference guards: lookup frequency inference guard, end-user IP-address
inference guard, file replica inference guard and file size inference guard. LocationGuard
also includes a capability revocation based location rekeying mechanism as a general guard
against any inference attack. In this section, we present the four fundamental inference
guards and the location rekeying technique in detail.
2.9.1 Passive Inference Guards
Passive inference attacks refer to those attacks wherein an adversary attempts to infer the
location of a target file by passively observing the overlay network. We present two in-
ference guards: lookup frequency inference guard and end-user IP-address inference guard
to guard the file system against two common passive inference attacks. The lookup fre-
quency inference attack is based on the ability of malicious nodes to observe the frequency
of lookup queries on the overlay network. Assuming that the adversary knows the relative
file popularity, it can use the target file’s lookup frequency to infer its location. The end-
user IP-address inference attack is based on assumption that the identity of the end-user
can be inferred from its IP-address by an overlay network node r, when the user requests
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node r to perform a lookup on its behalf. The malicious node r could log and report this
information to the adversary.
2.9.1.1 Lookup Frequency Inference Guard
In this section we present lookup frequency inference attack that would help a strategic
adversary to infer the location of a target file on the overlay network. It has been observed
that the general popularity of the web pages accessed over the Internet follows a Zipf-like
distribution [119]. An adversary may study the frequency of file accesses by sniffing lookup
queries and match the observed file access frequency profile with a actual (pre-determined)
frequency profile to infer the location of a target file 4. Note that if the frequency profile of
the files stored in the file system is flat (all files are accessed with the same frequency) then
an adversary will not be able to infer any information. Lemma 2.9.1 formalizes the notion
of perfectly hiding a file from a frequency inference attack.
Lemma 2.9.1 Let F denote the collection of files in the file system. Let λ′f denote the
apparent frequency of accesses to file f as perceived by an adversary. Then, the collection
of files is perfectly hidden from frequency inference attack if λ′f = c: ∀f ∈ F and some
constant c.
Corollary 2.9.2 A collection of read-only files can be perfectly hidden from frequency in-
ference attack.
Proof Let λf denote the actual frequency of accesses on a file f . Set the number replicas
for file f to be proportional to its access frequency, namely Rf =
1
c
∗ λf (for some constant
c > 0). When a user wishes to read the file f , the user randomly chooses one replica of file
f and issues a lookup query on it. From an adversary’s point of view it would seem that the






(1 ≤ i ≤ Rf for file f). By Lemma 2.9.1, an adversary would not be able to derive any
useful information from a frequency inference attack.
4This is analogous to performing a frequency analysis attack on old symmetric key ciphers like
the Caesar’s cipher [58]
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Interestingly, the replication strategy used in Corollary 2.9.2 improves the performance and
load balancing aspect of the file system as well. However, it is not applicable to read-write
files since an update operation on a file may need to update all the replicas of a file. In
the following portions of this section, we propose two techniques to flatten the apparent
frequency profile of read/write files.
Guard by Result Caching. The first technique to mitigate the frequency inference attack
is to obfuscate the apparent file access frequency with lookup result caching. Lookup result
caching, as the name indicates, refers to caching the results of a lookup query. Recall that
wide-area network file systems like CFS, Farsite and OceanStore permit nodes to join and
leave the overlay network. Let us for now consider only node departures. Consider a file f
stored at node n. Let λf denote the rate at which users accesses the file f . Let µdep denote
the rate at which a node leaves the overlay network (rates are assumed to be exponentially
distributed). The first time the user accesses the file f , the lookup result (namely, node n)
is cached. The lookup result is implicitly invalidated when the user attempts to access file f
the first time after node n leaves the overlay network. When the lookup result is invalidated,
the user issues a fresh lookup query for file f . One can show that the apparent frequency of




for λf and µdep). The probability that any given file access results is a lookup is equal to the




. Hence, the apparent file access frequency is equal to the product of
the actual file access frequency (λf ) and the probability that a file access results in a lookup
operation (Prlookup). Intuitively, in a static scenario where nodes never leave the network
(µdep  λf ), λ′f ≈ µdep; and when nodes leave the network very frequently (µdep  λf ),
λ′f ≈ λf . Hence, more static the overlay network is, harder it is for an adversary to perform
a frequency inference attack since it would appear as if all files in the system are accessed
at an uniform frequency µdep.
It is very important to note that a node m storing a file f may infer f ’s name since
the user has to ultimately access node m to operate on file f . Hence, an adversary may
infer the identities of files stored at malicious nodes. However, it would be very hard for an
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adversary to infer the identities of files stored at good nodes.
Guard by File Identifier Obfuscation. The second technique that makes the frequency
inference attack harder is based on the file identifier obfuscation technique described in
Section 2.8. Let f1, f2, · · · , fnf denote the files stored at some node n. Let the identifiers of
these replicas be rlt1, rlt2, · · · rltnf . Let the target file be f1. The key idea is to obfuscate the
identifiers such that an adversary would not be able to distinguish between an obfuscated
identifier intended for locating file f1 and that for some other file fj (2 ≤ j ≤ nf) stored at
node n.
More concretely, when a user performs a lookup for f1, the user would choose some
random identifier in the range R1 = (rlt1 − srg, rlt1). A clever adversary may cluster
identifiers based on their numerical closeness and perform a frequency inference attack on
these clusters. However, one could defend the system against such a clustering technique by
appropriately choosing a safe obfuscation range. Figure 9 presents the key intuition behind
this idea diagrammatically. As the range R1 overlaps with the ranges of more and more files
stored at node n, the clustering technique and consequently the frequency inference attack
would perform poorly. Let R1∩R2 denote the set of identifiers that belongs the intersection
of ranges R1 and R2. Then, given an identifier otk ∈ R1 ∩R2, an adversary would not able
to distinguish whether the lookup was intended for file f1 or f2; but the adversary would
definitely know that the lookup was intended either for file f1 or f2. Observe that amount
of information inferred by an adversary becomes poorer and poorer as more and more
ranges overlap. Also, as the number of files (nf) stored at node n increases, even a small
obfuscation might introduce significant overlap between the ranges of different files stored
at node n.
The apparent access frequency of a file f is computed as a weighted sum of the actual
access frequencies of all files that share their range with file f . For instance, the apparent
access frequency of file f1 (see Figure 9) is given by Equation 10.
λ′f1 =
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Figure 9: Countering Frequency Analysis Attack by file identifier obfuscation.
X1X2, Y1Y2 and Z1Z2 denote the ranges of the obfuscated identifiers of files f1, f2, f3
stored at node n. Frequency inference attacks works in scenario (i), but not in sce-
nario (ii). Given an identifier otk ∈ Y1Z1, it is hard for an adversary to guess whether
the lookup was for file f1 or f2.
The apparent access frequency of a file evens out the sharp variations between the frequen-
cies of different files stored at a node, thereby making frequency inference attack signifi-
cantly harder. We discuss more on how to quantify the effect of file identifier obfuscation
on frequency inference attack in our experimental section 2.10.
2.9.1.2 End-User IP-Address Inference Guard
In this section, we describe an end-user IP-address inference attack that assumes that the
identity of an end-user can be inferred from his/her IP-address. Note that this is a worst-
case-assumption; in most cases it may not possible to associate a user with one or a small
number IP-addresses. This is particularly true if the user obtains IP-address dynamically
(DHCP [31]) from a large ISP (Internet Service Provider).
A user typically locate their files on the overlay network by issuing a lookup query to
some node r on the overlay network. If node r were malicious then it may log the file
identifiers looked up by a user. Assuming that a user accesses only a small subset of the
total number of files on the overlay network (including the target file) the adversary can
narrow down the set of nodes on the overlay network that may potentially hold the target
file. One possible solution is for users to issue lookup queries through a trusted anonymizer.
The anonymizer accepts lookup queries from users and dispatches it to the overlay network
without revealing the user’s IP-address. However, the anonymizer could itself become a
viable target for the adversary.
A more promising solution is for the user to join the overlay network (just like other
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nodes hosting files on the overlay network). When the user issues lookup queries, it is
routed through some of its neighbors; if some of its neighbors are malicious, then they may
log these lookup queries. However, it is non-trivial for an adversary to distinguish between
the queries that originated at the user and those that were simply routed through it.
For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that q denotes the number of lookups issued per
user per unit time. Assuming there are N users, the total lookup traffic is Nq lookups per
unit time. Each lookup on an average requires 12 log2 N hops on Chord. Hence, the total
lookup traffic is Nq * 12 log2 N hops per unit time. By the design of the overlay network,
the lookup traffic is uniformly shared among all nodes in the system. Hence the number
of lookup queries (per unit time) routed through any node u is 1
N
* 12qN log2 N = q *
1
2 log2 N . Therefore, the ratio of lookup queries that originate at a node to that routed





. For N = 106, this ratio is about 0.1, thereby making it
hard for an adversary to selectively pick only those queries that originated at a particular
node. Further, not all neighbors of a node are likely to be bad; hence, it is rather infeasible
for an adversary to collect all lookup traffic flowing through an overlay node.
2.9.2 Host Compromise based Inference Guards
Host compromise based inference attacks require the adversary to perform an active host
compromise attack before it can infer the location of a target file. We present two inference
guards: file replica inference guard and file size inference guard to guard the file system
against two common host compromise based inference attacks. The file replica inference
attack attempts to infer the identity of a file from its contents. Note that an adversary can
reach the contents of a file only after it compromises the replica holder (unless the replica
holder is malicious). The file size inference attack attempts to infer the identity of a file
from its size. If the sizes of files stored on the overlay network are sufficiently skewed, the
file size could by itself be sufficient to identify a target file.
2.9.2.1 File Replica Inference Guard
Despite making the file capabilities and file access frequencies appear random to an adver-
sary, the contents of a file could by itself reveal the identity of the file f . The file f could be
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encrypted to rule out the possibility of identifying a file from its contents. Even when the
replicas are encrypted, an adversary can exploit the fact that all the replicas of file f are
identical. When an adversary compromises a good node, it can extract a list of identifier
and file content pairs (or a hash of the file contents) stored at that node. Note that an ad-
versary could perform a frequency inference attack on the replicas stored at malicious nodes
and infer their filenames. Hence, if an adversary were to obtain the encrypted contents of
one of the replicas of a target file f , it could examine the extracted list of identifiers and file
contents to obtain the identities of other replicas. Once, the adversary has the locations of
cr copies of a file f , the f could be attacked easily. This attack is especially more plausible
on read-only files since their contents do not change over a long period of time. On the
other hand, the update frequency on read-write files might guard them from the file replica
inference attack.
We guard read-only files (and files updated very infrequently) by making their replicas
non-identical; this is achieved by encrypting each replica with a different cryptographic key.
We derive the cryptographic key for the ith replica of file f using its location key lk as ki =
khashlk(f ‖ i ‖ ‘cryptkey’). Further, if one uses a symmetric key encryption algorithm in
cipher-block-chaining mode (CBC mode [63] [36]), then we could reduce the encryption cost
by using the same cryptographic key, but a different initialization vector (iv) for encrypting
different file replicas: ki = khashlk(f ‖ ‘cryptkey’) and ivi = khashlk(f ‖ i ‖ ‘ivec’).
We show in our experimental section that even a small update frequency on read-write
files is sufficient to guard them the file replica inference attack. Additionally, one could also
choose to encrypt read-write file replicas with different cryptographic keys (to make the
replicas non-identical) to improve their resilience to file replica inference attack.
2.9.2.2 File Size Inference Guard
File size inference attack is based on the assumption that an adversary might be aware of the
target file’s size. Malicious nodes (and compromised nodes) report the size of the files stored
at them to an adversary. If the size of files stored on the overlay network follows a skewed
distribution, the adversary would be able to identify the target file (much like the lookup
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frequency inference attack). We guard the file system from this attack by fragmenting files
into multiple file blocks of equal size. For instance, CFS divides files into blocks of 8 KBytes
each and stores each file block separately. We hide the location of the j th block in the ith
replica of file f using its location key lk and token rlt(i,j) = khashlk(f ‖ i ‖ j). Note that
the last file block may have to be padded to make its size 8 KBytes. Now, since all file blocks
are of the same size, it would be vary hard for an adversary to perform file size inference
attack. It is interesting to note that dividing files into blocks is useful in minimizing the
communication overhead for small reads/writes on large files.
2.9.3 Location Rekeying
In addition to the inference attacks listed above, there could be other possible inference
attacks on a LocationGuard based file system. In due course of time, the adversary might be
able to gather enough information to infer the location of a target file. Location rekeying is
a general defense against both known and unknown inference attacks. Users can periodically
choose new location keys so as to render all past inferences made by an adversary useless.
This is analogous to periodic rekeying of cryptographic keys. Unfortunately, rekeying is an
expensive operation: rekeying cryptographic keys requires data to be re-encrypted; rekeying
location keys requires files to be relocated on the overlay network. Hence, it is important
to keep the rekeying frequency small enough to reduce performance overheads and large
enough to secure files on the overlay network. In our experiments section, we estimate the
periodicity with which location keys have to be changed in order to reduce the probability
of an attack on a target file.
2.10 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we report two sets of results. The first set of results is obtained from our
prototype implementation of LocationGuard. The second of results is from simulation based

































































Figure 12: File Write
Overhead
File Type T0 T1 T2 T3
Description no cryptography integrity only confidentiality only confidentiality and integrity
Table 4: LocationGuard File Types
2.10.1 Implementation-Based Experiments
In this section we briefly sketch our implementation of LocationGuard and quantify the
overhead added by LocationGuard to the file system.
Implementation. We have implemented a prototype of LocationGuard on a publicly
available Java code for the Chord lookup protocol [92]. We used AspectJ [33] to modify the
Chord lookup protocol to include routing guard and lookup result caching. The method
obfuscate implements lookup identifier obfuscation. The method check safe obfuscation im-
plements our check for safe obfuscation; if the check fails then it calls obfuscate followed by
the Chord lookup protocol. The AspectJ compiler statically weaves the obfuscate method
and the check safe obfuscation method before and after all method calls to the Chord lookup
protocol respectively.
The file system is implemented on top of the overlay network. We split files into blocks
of 8KBytes and store each block at a location determined by the file’s location key. The
file system is assumed to be flat (no directory hierarchy). The file names are simply the 32
Byte hexadecimal representation of the 128-bit file identifier. Access control in our system
is implicit; if the file exists then the requested read/write operation is performed else an
error is returned.
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LocationGuard permits files to be any one of the four types: no cryptographic secu-
rity (T0), integrity only (T1), confidentiality only (T2), and confidentiality and integrity
(T3). To ensure file integrity, the file includes a keyed message authentication code using
the HMAC-MD5 keyed hash function. To ensure file confidentiality, the file is encrypted
using the AES-128 encryption algorithm. Finally, adding message authentication code (us-
ing MD5 [80] or SHA1 [32]) followed by encryption (using AES-128) guarantees both file
confidentiality and integrity. We assume that the file owners distribute location keys and
cryptographic keys through a secure out-of-band mechanism. Figure 10 shows our imple-
mentation architecture and Table 4 shows the four file types.
Operational Overhead. We ran our prototype implementation on eight machines each
with 8-processors (550MHz Intel Pentium III Xeon processor running RedHat Linux 9.0)
connected via a high speed LAN. In reality the nodes would be distributed on a wide-area
network. However, we believe that this setup would be equally insightful in providing us
the percentage overhead added by LocationGuard.
We first quantify the performance and storage overheads incurred by LocationGuard.
Let us consider a typical file read/write operation. The operation consists of the following
steps: (i) generate the replica location tokens, (ii) lookup the replica holders on the overlay
network, and (iii) process the request at replica holders. Step (i) requires computations
using the keyed-hash function with location keys, which otherwise would have required
computations using a normal hash function. We found that the computation time difference
between HMAC (a keyed pseudo-random function) and MD5 (a pseudo-random function)
is negligibly small (order of a few microseconds) using the standard OpenSSL library [64].
Step (ii) involves a pseudo-random number generation (few microseconds using the OpenSSL
library) and may require lookups to be retried in the event that the obfuscated identifier
turns out to be unsafe. Given that unsafe obfuscations are extremely rare (see Table 3)
retries are only required occasionally and thus this overhead is negligible. Step (iii) adds
no overhead because our access check is almost free. As long as the user can present
the correct pseudo-filename (token), the replica holder would honor a request on that file.
Figures 11 and 12 shows the overhead of LocationGuard for file read and file write operations
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respectively. Each value reported in this experiment has been averaged over 64 runs. Note
that file read/write operations of size greater than one block were parallelized, with each
file block operation proceeding in parallel. Observe that the latency for file operations in a
naive file system (FS) and LocationGuard (LGFS) is almost the same. For read operations
maximum overhead due to LocationGuard was about 1.5ms (relative overhead of 0.4%) and
that for write operation was 1.6ms (relative overhead of 0.3%).
Now, let us compare the storage overhead at the users and the nodes that are a part of
the overlay network. Users need to store only an additional 128-bit location key (16 Bytes)
along with other file meta-data for each file they want to access. Even a user who uses 1
million files on the overlay network needs to store only an additional 16MBytes of location
keys. Further, there is no extra storage overhead on the rest of the nodes on the overlay
network.
2.10.2 Simulation-Based Experiments
We implemented our simulator using a discrete event simulation [36] model. We simulate
the Chord lookup protocol [106] on the overlay network compromising of N = 1024 nodes.
In all experiments reported in this chapter, a random p = 10% of N nodes are chosen to
behave maliciously (the trends reported in this chapter apply to all values of p). We set
the number of replicas of a file to be R = 7 and vary the corruption threshold cr in our
experiments. We simulated the bad nodes as having large but bounded power based on the
parameters α (DoS attack strength), λ (node compromise rate) and µ (node recovery rate)
(see the threat model in Section 2.3). We demonstrate the effectiveness of LocationGuard
against DoS and host compromise based target file attacks.
Denial of Service Attacks. Figure 13 shows the probability of an attack for varying α
and different values of corruption threshold (cr). Without the knowledge of the location
of file replicas an adversary is forced to attack (DoS) a random collection of nodes in the
system and hope that that at least cr replicas of the target file is attacked. Observe that if
the malicious nodes are more powerful (larger α) or if the corruption threshold cr is very
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holders of a target file then a weak collection of B malicious nodes, such as B = 102 (i.e.,
10% of N) with α = R
B
= 7102 = 0.07, can easily attack the target file. Also, for a file
system to handle the DoS attacks on a file with α = 1, it would require a large number
of replicas (R close to B) to be maintained for each file. For example, in the case where
B = 10% × N and N = 1024, the system needs to maintain as large as 100+ replicas for
each file. Clearly, without LocationGuard, the effort required for an adversary to attack
a target file is dependent only on R, but is independent of the number of good nodes (G)
in the system. On the contrary, LocationGuard based techniques scale the hardness of an
attack with the number of good nodes in the system. Thus even with a very small R, a
LocationGuard based system can make it very hard for any adversary to launch a targeted
file attack.
Host Compromise Attacks. To further evaluate the effectiveness of LocationGuard
against targeted file attacks, we evaluate LocationGuard against host compromise attacks.
Our first experiment on host compromise attack shows the probability of an attack on the
target file assuming that the adversary does not collect capabilities (tokens) stored at the
compromised nodes. Hence, the target file is attacked if cr or more of its replicas are stored
at either malicious nodes or compromised nodes. Figure 14 shows the probability of an
attack for different values of corruption threshold (cr) and varying ρ = µ
λ
(measured in
number of node recoveries per node compromise). We ran the simulation for a duration
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ρ 0.5 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.5 3.0
G′ 0 0 0.05 0.44 0.77 0.96
Table 5: Mean Fraction of Good Nodes in Uncompromised State (G′)
of 100
λ
time units. Recall that 1
λ
denotes the mean time required for one malicious node
to compromise a good node. Note that if the simulation were run for infinite time then
the probability of attack is always one. This is because, at some point in time, cr or more
replicas of a target file would be assigned to malicious nodes (or compromised nodes) in the
system.
From Figure 14 we observe that when ρ ≤ 1, the system is highly vulnerable since the
node recovery rate is lower than the node compromise rate. Note that while a DoS attack
could tolerate powerful malicious nodes (α > 1), the host compromise attack cannot tolerate
the situation where the node compromise rate is higher than their recovery rate (ρ ≤ 1).
This is primarily because of the cascading effect of host compromise attack. The larger the
number of compromised nodes we have, the higher is the rate at which other good nodes
are compromised (see the adversary model in Section 2.3). Table 5 shows the mean fraction
of good nodes (G′) that are in an uncompromised state for different values of ρ. Observe
from Table 5 that when ρ = 1, most of the good nodes are in a compromised state.
As we have mentioned in Section 2.6.4, the adversary could collect the capabilities
(tokens) of the file replicas stored at compromised nodes; these tokens can be used by the
adversary at any point in future to corrupt these replicas using a simple write operation.
Hence, our second experiment on host compromise attack measures the probability of a
attack assuming that the adversary collects the file tokens stored at compromised nodes.
Figure 15 shows the mean effort required to locate all the replicas of a target file (cr = R).
The effort required is expressed in terms of the fraction of good nodes that need to be
compromised by the adversary to attack the target file.
Note that in the absence of LocationGuard, an adversary needs to compromise at most
R good nodes in order to succeed a targeted file attack. Clearly, LocationGuard based
techniques increase the required effort by several orders of magnitude. For instance, when
ρ = 3, an adversary has to compromise 70% of the good nodes in the system in order to
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ρ 0.5 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.5 3.0
Rekeying Interval 0 0 0.43 1.8 4.5 6.6
Table 6: Time Interval between Location ReKey-
ing (normalized by 1
λ
time units)
F 4K 8K 16K 32K
Smax 12 13 14 15
Szipf 7.75 8.36 8.95 9.55
Table 7: Entropy (in number
of bits) of a Zipf-distribution
µdep 0 1/256 1/16 1 16 256 4096 ∞
S 15 12.64 11.30 10.63 10.00 9.71 9.57 9.55
Table 8: Countering Lookup Frequency Inference Attack Approach I: Result Caching
(with 32K files)
increase the probability of an attack to a nominal value of 0.1, even under the assumption
that an adversary collects file capabilities from compromised nodes. Observe that if an
adversary compromises every good node in the system once, it gets to know the tokens of
all files stored on the overlay network. In Section 2.9.3 we had proposed location rekeying
to protect the file system from such attacks. The exact period of location rekeying can be
derived from Figure 15. For instance, when ρ = 3, if a user wants to retain the attack
probability below 0.1, the time interval between rekeying should equal the amount of time
it takes for an adversary to compromise 70% of the good nodes in the system. Table 6
shows the time taken (normalized by 1
λ
) for an adversary to increase the attack probability
on a target file to 0.1 for different values of ρ. Observe that as ρ increases, location rekeying
can be more and more infrequent.
2.10.3 Location Inference Guards
In this section we show the effectiveness of location inference guards against the lookup
frequency inference attack, and the file replica inference attack.
Lookup Frequency Inference Guard. We have presented lookup result caching and file
identifier obfuscation as two techniques to thwart the frequency inference attack. Recall
that our solutions attempt to flatten the frequency profile of files stored in the system (see
Lemma 2.9.1). Note that we do not change the actual frequency profile of files; instead
we flatten the apparent frequency profile of files as perceived by an adversary. We assume
that files are accessed in proportion to their popularity. File popularities are derived from



































Figure 16: Countering Lookup Fre-























Figure 17: Countering File Replica
Frequency Inference Attack: Location
Rekeying Frequency Vs File Update Fre-
quency
system is proportional to 1
iγ
with γ = 1.
Our first experiment on inference attacks shows the effectiveness of lookup result caching
in mitigating frequency analysis attack by measuring the entropy [59] of the apparent fre-
quency profile (measured as number of bits of information). Given the apparent access
frequencies of F files, namely, λ′f1 , λ
′
f2
, · · · , λ′fF , the entropy S is computed as follows. First









When all files are accessed uniformly and randomly, that is, λ′fi =
1
F
for 1 ≤ i ≤ F , the
entropy S is maximum Smax = log2 F . The entropy S decreases as the access profile be-
comes more and more skewed. Note that if S = log2 F , no matter how clever the adversary
is, he/she cannot derive any useful information about the files stored at good nodes (from
Lemma 2.9.1). Table 7 shows the maximum entropy (Smax) and the entropy of a zipf-like
distribution (Szipf ) for different values of F . Note that every additional bit of entropy,
doubles the effort required for a successful attack; hence, a frequency inference attack on a
Zipf distributed 4K files is about 19 times (212−7.75) easier than the ideal scenario where all
files are uniformly and randomly accessed.
Table 8 shows the entropy of apparent file access frequency as perceived by an adversary
when lookup result caching is employed by the system for F = 32K files. We assume that
the actual access frequency profile of these files follows a Zipf distribution with the frequency
of access to the most popular file (f1) normalized to one access per unit time. Table 8 shows
the entropy of the apparent lookup frequency for different values of µdep (the mean rate at
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which a node joins/leaves the system). Observe if µdep is large, the entropy of apparent file
access frequency is quite close to that of Zipf-distribution (see Table 7 for 32K files); and
if the nodes are more stable (µdep is small), then the apparent frequency of all files would
appear to be identically equal to µdep.
In our second experiment, we show the effectiveness of file identifier obfuscation in mit-
igating frequency inference attack. Figure 16 shows the entropy of the apparent file access
frequency for varying values of prsq (the probability that obfuscated queries are safe, see
Theorem 2.8.1) for different values of nf , the mean number of files per node. Recall that an
obfuscated identifier is safe if both the original identifier and the obfuscated identifier are
assigned to the same node in the system. Higher the value prsq, smaller is the safe obfus-
cation range (srg); and thus, the lookup queries for a replica location token are distributed
over a smaller region in the identifier space. This decreases the entropy of the apparent file
access frequency. Also, as the number of files stored at a node increases, there would be
larger overlaps between the safe ranges of different files assigned to a node (see Figure 9).
This evens out (partially) the differences between different apparent file access frequencies
and thus, increases the entropy.
File Replica Inference Guard. We study the severity of file replica inference attack with
respect to the update frequency of files in the file system. We measured the probability
that an adversary may be able to successfully locate all the replicas of a target file using the
file replica inference attack when all the replicas of a file are encrypted with the same key.
We assume that the adversary performs a host compromise attack with ρ = 3. Figure 17
shows the probability of a successful attack on a target file for different values of its update
frequency and different values of rekeying durations. Note that the time period at which
location keys are changed and the time period between file updates are normalized by 1
λ
(mean time to compromise a good node). Observe the sharp knee in Figure 17; once the file
update frequency increases beyond 3λ (thrice the node compromise rate) then probability
of a successful attack is very small.
Note that λ, the rate at which a node can be compromised by one malicious node is likely
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to be quite small. Hence, even if a file is infrequently updated, it could survive a file replica
inference attack. However, read-only files need to be encrypted with different cryptographic
keys to make their replicas non-identical. Figure 17 also illustrates that lowering the time
period between key changes lowers the attack probability significantly. This is because each
time the location key of a file f is changed all the information collected by an adversary
regarding f would be rendered entirely useless.
Inference Attacks Discussion. We have presented techniques to mitigate some popular
inference attacks. There could be other inference attacks that have not been addressed in
this chapter. Even the location inference guards presented in this chapter does not entirely
rule out the possibility of an inference attack. For instance, even when we used result
caching and file identifier perturbation in combination, we could not increase the entropy of
apparent lookup frequency to the theoretical maximum (Smax in Table 7). Identifying other
potential inference attacks and developing better defenses against the inference attacks that
we have already pointed out in this chapter is a part of our ongoing work.
2.11 Related Work
Serverless distributed file systems like CFS [23], Farsite [7], OceanStore [53] and SiRiUS
[39] have received significant attention from both the industry and the research community.
These file systems store files on a large collection of untrusted nodes that form an overlay
network. They use cryptographic techniques to secure files from malicious nodes. Unfortu-
nately, cryptographic techniques cannot protect a file holder from DoS or host compromise
attacks. LocationGuard presents low overhead and highly effective techniques to guard a
distributed file system from such targeted file attacks.
Castro et al. [17] discuss several issues on secure routing in DHT based overlay networks.
They suggest redundant routing as a solution for strengthening the routing scheme using
a routing failure test based on the density of node identifiers. In redundant routing, the
query source sends lookup query through different routes with a hope that at least one them
eventually reaches the destination node. Note that our analysis on multiple near optimal
independent paths is applicable to the case where redundant routing is used. Also note
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that having multiple independent paths improves the probability of success and lowers the
lookup cost for both repeated checking and redundant routing techniques.
The Sybil attack chapter [30] showed that entities (nodes) can forge multiple identities
for malicious intent, thereby having a set of faulty entities represented through a larger set
of identities. The chapter also suggests that one solution to the Sybil attack is using secure
node IDs that are signed by well-known certifying agents. However, requiring every node
to possess a certificate would turn out quite expensive; and may discourage even the good
nodes from joining the system in the first place. Hence, one is forced to employ weak secure
node IDs (that significantly reduce the number of identities owned by an entity). Therefore,
this chapter (Section 2.5) assessed the risks and security threats when such weak secure IDs
are deployed in a DHT-based overlay network.
The secure Overlay Services (SOS) chapter [51] presents an architecture that proactively
prevents DoS attacks using secure overlay tunneling and routing via consistent hashing.
However, the assumptions and the applications in [51] are noticeably different from that of
ours. For example, the SOS chapter uses the overlay network for introducing randomness
and anonymity into the SOS architecture to make it difficult for malicious nodes to attack
target applications of interest. LocationGuard treats the overlay network as a part of the
target applications we are interested in and introduce randomness and anonymity through
location key based hashing and lookup based file identifier obfuscation, making it difficult
for malicious nodes to target their attacks on a small subset of nodes in the system, who
are the replica holders of the target file of interest.
The Hydra OS [21] proposed a capability-based file access control mechanism. Loca-
tionGuard implements a simple and efficient capability-based access control on a wide-area
network file system. The most important challenge for LocationGuard is that of keeping a
file’s capability secret and yet being able to perform a lookup on it (see Section 2.8).
Indirect attacks such as attempts to compromise cryptographic keys from the system
administrator or use fault attacks like RSA timing attacks, glitch attacks, hardware and
software implementation bugs [65] have been the most popular techniques to attack crypto-
graphic algorithms. Similarly, attackers might resort to inference attacks on LocationGuard
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since a brute force attack (even with range sieving) on location keys is highly infeasible.
2.12 Summary
We have described LocationGuard − a technique for securing wide area serverless file shar-
ing systems from targeted file attacks. Analogous to traditional cryptographic keys that
hide the contents of a file, LocationGuard hides the location of a file on an overlay network.
LocationGuard protects a target file from DoS attacks, host compromise attacks, and file
location inference attacks by providing a simple and efficient access control mechanism with
minimal performance and storage overhead. The unique characteristics of LocationGuard
approach is the careful combination of location key, routing guard, and an extensible pack-
age of location inference guards, which makes it very hard for an adversary to infer the
location of a target file by either actively or passively observing the overlay network. Our
experimental results quantify the overhead of employing location guards and demonstrate
the effectiveness of the LocationGuard scheme against DoS attacks, host compromise at-
tacks and various location inference attacks.
Our research on LocationGuard continues along several dimensions. First, we are cur-
rently working on identifying other potential and possibly more sophisticated inference
attacks and, aiming at developing better defenses against various inference attacks. Sec-
ond, we are actively working on secure key distribution algorithms and investigating factors
that can influence the frequency and timing of the rekeying process. Furthermore, we
have started the development of LocationGuard toolkit as a value-added package that can
be plugged on top of existing DHT-based P2P systems. We believe location hiding is an
important property and that LocationGuard mechanisms are simple, secure, efficient and




Publish-subscribe (pub-sub) systems are an emerging paradigm for building large number
of distributed systems. A wide area pub-sub system is usually implemented on an overlay
network infrastructure that enables information dissemination from information publish-
ers to subscribers. Using an open overlay network raises several security concerns such
as: confidentiality & integrity, authentication, authorization and denial-of-service (DoS)
attacks. In this chapter we present EventGuard − a dependable framework system archi-
tecture for securing wide area pub-sub systems. The EventGuard architecture comprises
of two key components: (1) a suite of security guards that can be seamlessly plugged-into
a content-based pub-sub system, and (2) a resilient pub-sub network design that is capa-
ble of scalable routing, handling message dropping-based DoS attacks and node failures.
The design of EventGuard mechanisms aims at providing security guarantees while main-
taining the system’s overall simplicity, scalability and performance metrics. We describe
an implementation of the EventGuard pub-sub system to show that EventGuard is easily
stackable on any content-based pub-sub core. We report two types of experiments per-
formed to evaluate EventGuard. First, we use micro-benchmarks to quantify the overhead
of EventGuard mechanisms and measure the performance and storage overheads. Then we
use macro-benchmarks to quantify the overhead of the entire EventGuard pub-sub system
and we also quantify the resilience of EventGuard to DoS attacks.
3.1 Introduction
A growing number of emerging Internet applications requires information dissemination
across different organizational boundaries, heterogeneous platforms, and a large, dynamic
population of publishers and subscribers. A publish-subscribe overlay service is a wide-area
communication infrastructure that enables data access and data sharing across potentially
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unlimited number of publishers and subscribers, scattered geographically across the wired
and wireless Internet [16]. A wide-area publish-subscribe (hereafter refer to as pub-sub)
system is often implemented as a collection of spatially disparate computing nodes (net-
work servers) communicating with each other through content-based routing protocols on
top of a peer to peer overlay network [16]. In such an environment, publishers publish
information in the form of event notifications and subscribers have the ability to express
their interests in an event or a pattern of events by sending subscriptions to the pub-sub
overlay network infrastructure. The pub-sub overlay network uses content-based routing
schemes to dynamically match each publication to all the active subscriptions, and noti-
fies the subscribers of any publication that matches their registered interest, ensuring that
subscribers only receive notifications of those events that match their subscribed interests.
An important characteristic of pub-sub overlay services is the decoupling of publishers
and subscribers combined with content-based routing protocols, enabling a many (publish-
ers/subscribers) to many (subscribers/publishers) communication model. Such a model
presents many inherent benefits as well as potential risks. On one hand, by offloading the
task of identifying destination addresses of subscriptions (messages) from the publishers to
the pub-sub overlay network, it not only allows message routing to be handled in a way
that avoids unnecessary message replications but also enables dynamic and fine-grained
subscriptions. As a result, the pub-sub overlay services have proven to be scalable and ef-
fective for wide-area information dissemination across distinct administrative domains and
heterogeneous systems. On the other hand, many security concerns exist in such an en-
vironment regarding authenticity, confidentiality, integrity and availability of publications
and subscriptions. For example, how can we guarantee that only the genuine publications
are delivered to the subscribers (publication authenticity) and only the subscribers who
subscribe (e.g., have paid) the service will receive the publications matching their interest
(subscription authentication)? How do we prevent unauthorized modifications of pub-sub
messages in transit (service integrity, publication and subscription integrity)? How do we
perform content-based routing without publishers trusting the pub-sub network (content
confidentiality)? Can subscribers receive publications without revealing their subscriptions
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to the publishers (subscription confidentiality)? Can publishers enforce that only autho-
rized subscribers receive particular publications (publication confidentiality)? And how do
we defend the pub-sub services from publication spamming and flooding attacks, selective
and random message dropping attacks, and other Denial of Service (DoS) or Denial of
Information (DoI) attacks?
Not surprisingly, research and development of the pub-sub systems to date have been
largely dedicated to the performance and scalability of pub-sub networks as well as the
expressiveness of event publication and subscription models. Several distributed algorithms
have been documented for efficient wide-area event matching and notification through a
mesh of pub-sub overlay nodes [16, 12, 25]. Only recently, a few researchers have studied
specific security requirements of pub-sub networks [109], pointing out attacks threaten-
ing message integrity (unauthorized writes) and authenticity (fake origins) in addition to
message confidentiality (unauthorized reads), and the risks of bogus publications and fake
subscriptions. Unfortunately, most of the existing secure event distribution protocols pro-
posed so far focus only on the content confidentiality risks in pub-sub networks [76, 66]. Very
few have devoted to developing a coherent security framework that can guard the pub-sub
overlay services from multiple security problems inherent in the pub-sub overlay networks,
such as decoupling publications from subscriptions while ensuring publication and subscrip-
tion authenticity, content-aware routing while keeping the content from unauthorized reads
and writes (confidentiality and integrity), subscription-based matching without compromis-
ing subscription confidentiality, and message forwarding while preventing message flooding
and message dropping-based DoS and DoI attacks. The lack of these security guarantees
has been a major hurdle in deploying pub-sub systems at large scale for mission-critical
applications that could greatly benefit from them.
Pub-sub systems typically support two levels of event matching – topic-based and content-
based. In a topic-based matching scheme [8], every event is marked with a topic. A topic
could be a simple keyword or any unique numeric identifier. A subscriber subscribes to
one or more topics, and receives all the events published under these topics. The pub-sub
network routes events based on simple topic matching. Content-based matching schemes
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[16, 9, 12] are layered on top of topic-based matching scheme and they allow more sophis-
ticated event matching and filtering. For example, a subscriber may specify a condition on
the event (say, stock price > 100) as a part of its subscription.
In this chapter, we present EventGuard − a dependable system architecture and a set of
defense mechanisms for securing a pub-sub overlay service. EventGuard comprises of two
key components. The first key component is a suite of security guards that are designed for
protecting basic publish and subscribe operations from DoS attacks and unauthorized reads
and writes. This component can be seamlessly plugged-into a wide-area content-based pub-
sub system. The second key component is a resilient pub-sub network design that is capable
of providing secure and yet scalable message routing, countering message dropping-based
DoS attacks and node failures. A unique contribution of the EventGuard architecture is the
development of a unified security framework that meets two important design objectives.
On one hand, we aim at developing security mechanisms that are effective for guarding the
pub-sub overlay services from various vulnerabilities and threats and ensuring authenticity,
availability, confidentiality, and integrity of publications, subscriptions, and pub-sub overlay
routing. On the other hand, we want to maintain the system’s overall simplicity, scalability
and performance metrics while providing security guarantees. We also present a prototype
implementation of EventGuard on top of Siena [16] to show that EventGuard is easily
stackable on any content-based pub-sub core. With this prototype, we have conducted
experimental evaluation of the overhead added by EventGuard to the pub-sub system by
comparing EventGuard with Siena. Our experimental results show that EventGuard can
secure a pub-sub network with minimal performance penalty.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We first present a formal pub-sub system
model and a threat model, which serve as the basic system model for the design of Event-
Guard in Section 3.2 and an overview of the EventGuard architecture in Section 3.3. Section
3.4 details the design of our security guards and Section 3.6 that describes EventGuard’s
resilient network design. We present an implementation of EventGuard and evaluate it in
Section 3.7. Section 3.8 discusses some related work followed by the conclusion in Section
3.9.
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Figure 18: Basic Pub-Sub System Figure 19: EventGuard Architecture
3.2 Preliminaries
3.2.1 Reference Pub-Sub Model
In content-based pub-sub systems, publishers publish their contents in terms of event no-
tifications. An event notification is a set of attributes where an attribute is defined by
its name, type, and value [16]. Subscribers have the ability to express their interest in
an event by sending a subscription to the pub-sub overlay network infrastructure. The
subscription is a predicate containing one or more constraints (filters). The infrastructure
notifies the subscribers of any published notification that matches their subscribed interests.
This section presents a reference pub-sub model. Our model is very similar to that used
in a content-based pub-sub system like Siena [16]. Consider the stock quote dissemination
where an example event notification consisting of the following attributes − 〈exchange:
string, NYSE〉, 〈symbol: string, IBM〉, 〈price: float, 122〉 (the latest value of the
specified stock symbol), 〈volume: integer, 2500〉 (the latest volume of transactions in
thousands). An example subscription could be 〈symbol = ‘IBM’, exchange = ‘NYSE’,
price > 100〉.
A typical pub-sub system implements five important primitives: subscribe, advertise,
publish, unsubscribe and unadvertise. Subscribers specify the events in which they are
interested using the subscribe function. Publishers advertise the type of events they would
publish using advertise. Publishers publish events via the publish function. A subscription is
repeatedly matched until it is canceled by a call to unsubscribe. An advertisement remains
in effect until it is canceled by an unadvertise. We use the term messages to loosely denote
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all traffic on the pub-sub network, including publications, subscriptions, advertisements,
unsubscriptions and unadvertisements.
Publications are specified in terms of events and subscriptions are expressed in terms
of predicate filters. Formally, an event e = 〈α〉∗ = 〈name, type, value〉∗, where α is some
attribute of the form 〈name, type, value〉, name refers to some attribute name, type refers
to the data type of the attribute, value corresponds to its published value, and the notation
∗ indicates that an event may comprise of one or more attributes. A filter selects events by
specifying a set of attributes and constraints on the values of those attributes. Formally,
filter f = 〈φ〉∗ = 〈name, operator, value〉∗, where φ is some constraint of the form 〈name,
operator, value〉, name refers to some attribute name, value specifies an attribute value,
operator refers to a binary operator, and the notation ∗ indicates that a filter may comprise
of one or more constraints in a conjunctive form. Operators typically include common
equality and ordering relations (=, <, >, etc) for numeric types; and substring, prefix,
suffix operators for strings.
An attribute α = 〈 nameα, typeα, valueα 〉 satisfies a constraint φ = 〈 nameφ, operatorφ,
valueφ 〉 if and only if nameα = nameφ, valueφ is of typeα, and operatorφ(valueα, valueφ)
is true. When an attribute α satisfies a constraint φ, we say that α matches φ. Equivalently,
when α matches φ, we say that φ covers α. For example, an attribute α = 〈price, 120〉
matches the constraint φ = 〈price, ≥, 100〉. An event e matches a subscription filter f if
for all constraints φ in f , there exists some attribute α in e that matches φ. When a filter is
used in an advertisement, it defines the set of all possible notifications that can be generated
by the publisher. An event e matches an advertisement filter f if for all attributes α in e,
there exists some constraint φ in f that covers α. The notion of covers can be extended
in a straightforward manner to two subscription filters, or two advertisement filters or a
subscription filter and an advertisement filter.
Unsubscriptions and unadvertisements serve to cancel previous subscriptions and adver-
tisements respectively. Given an unsubscription unsubscribe(X, f), where X is the identity
of the subscriber and f is a filter, the pub-sub system cancels all subscriptions subscribe(X,
g) submitted by the subscriber X with subscription filter g covered by f . Similarly, an
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unadvertisement message unadvertise(Y , f) cancels all advertisements advertise(Y , g)
submitted by the publisher Y with advertisement filter g covered by f .
As illustrated in Figure 18, in a wide-area pub-sub system, publishers and subscribers are
usually outside the pub-sub network (though not required). Typically, we have a relatively
small set of known and trusted publishers and a much larger set of unknown subscribers. A
natural choice for the topology of a pub-sub network is a hierarchical topology (see Figure
18). Other plausible topologies include peer-to-peer and mixed topologies like super-peer
topology [16]. For the sake of simplicity, in this chapter we assume a hierarchical topology
for the pub-sub network. When a node n receives a subscription request subscribe(m, f)
from node m, it registers filter f with identity m. If filter f is not covered by any previously
subscribed filters at node n then node n forwards subscribe(n, f) to its parent node. Note
that node m could be a subscriber or simply another node in the pub-sub overlay network
that forwarded a subscription request to node n.
Effectively, for every pair of publisher and topic (publication), a pub-sub dissemination
tree is constructed with the publisher as the root, the subscribers as the leaves and the pub-
sub routing nodes as the intermediate nodes of the tree. The publications flow from the root
(publisher) to the leaves (subscribers) of the tree. Similarly, advertisements, unsubscriptions
and unadvertisements are propagated from the root to the leaves of the tree. Note that
a node n in the pub-sub network may belong to one or more pub-sub dissemination trees
(or so called pub-sub network channels), and each corresponds to a publisher and a topic
of events that the publisher publishes through this channel. When a node n receives a
publication notification publish(Y, e) from Y to publish the event e, it uses the pub-sub
dissemination tree to which it belongs to identify all active subscriptions whose filters {f1,
f2, · · · , fp} are matched by the event e. Then, node n identifies and forwards event e to
those of its children nodes {X1, X2, · · · , Xq} that have subscriptions with subscription
filters covered (matched) by a subset of filter fi (1 ≤ i ≤ p).
76
3.2.2 Threat Model
The pub-sub overlay service model comprises of three entities: publishers, subscribers and
routing nodes. In this section, we present our threat model for all these entities.
Publishers. EventGuard assumes that authorized publishers are honest. All publications
by authorized publishers are assumed to be valid and correct. However, one could build
a feedback mechanism wherein the subscribers rate the publishers periodically [119]. Over
a period of time, subscribers would subscribe only to high quality publishers and the low
quality publishers would eventually run out of business. However, unauthorized publishers
may masquerade as an authorized publishers and flood the network and consequently the
subscribers, with incorrect or duplicate publications, advertisements or unadvertisements.
Subscribers. EventGuard assumes that authorized subscribers may be partially dishonest.
Concretely, we assume that an authorized subscriber does not reveal publications to other
unauthorized subscribers (otherwise, this would be equivalent to solving the digital copy-
rights problem). However, unauthorized subscribers may be curious to obtain information
about publications to which they have not subscribed. Also, subscribers may attempt to
spam or flood the pub-sub network with duplicate or fake subscriptions and unsubscriptions.
Routing nodes. EventGuard assumes that some of the nodes on the pub-sub network
may exhibit dishonest behavior. However, we also assume that a significant fraction of
the pub-sub nodes are non-malicious so as to ensure that the network is alive. A pub-sub
network is alive if it can route messages and maintaining its connectivity despite the presence
of malicious nodes. Malicious nodes may eavesdrop or corrupt pub-sub messages routed
through them. Malicious nodes may also attempt to selectively or randomly drop pub-sub
messages. Further, malicious nodes may attempt to flood other nodes and subscribers.
Finally, EventGuard assumes that the underlying IP-network may be not guarantee
confidentiality, integrity or authenticity. However, we assume that the underlying domain
name service (DNS), the network routers, and the related networking infrastructure is
completely secure, and hence cannot be subverted by a malicious node. Due to space
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constraints, in this chapter we describe EventGuard mechanisms in the context of a topic-
based pub-sub system. However, EventGuard mechanisms can be extended to handle more
complex event filtering techniques that use sophisticated filtering conditions on numeric
attributes and subject (concept) hierarchies.
3.3 EventGuard Overview
3.3.1 Design Goals
EventGuard has fundamentally two sets of design goals: security goals and performance
goals. In EventGuard, providing a safeguard mechanism that defines who has what access to
which information is considered an application-level protection issue and involves publishers
and subscribers. It requires a definition of identity, authorization, and access control within
the pub-sub overlay network. However, controlling who is able to change the subscription
database maintained by the pub-sub service and to restrict channel utilization is mostly
an overlay network service level concern. We argue that it is impractical for the pub-
sub system to impose a global security policy as the one-size-fit-all solution to securely
disseminate information for every application. A major challenge in designing a secure
pub-sub service framework is the flexibility to allow diverse policies and mechanisms to
co-exist within the same pub-sub system. We below describe EventGuard’s security goals
and performance goals at both application level and overlay network level:
Authentication. In a pub-sub system a publication (or an advertisement) is sent from a
publisher (sender) to a subscriber (receiver) through the pub-sub network (channel). It is
important to make sure that all publications (and advertisements) are authentic in order to
avoid spoofed publication and spam. On the other hand, subscription authenticity is im-
portant when the application requires that subscribers should receive only the publications
to which they are authorized (paid) to access. In addition, sender authentication within the
pub-sub content routing network is critical when malicious fault arise at the pub-sub net-
work level (e.g., hosts on the network are compromised). A malicious node can insert bogus
subscriptions, or ignore the routing algorithm and route messages to arbitrary destinations.
Confidentiality and Integrity. Confidentiality and integrity of a message sent from
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party A to party B is defined with respect to the channel connecting A and B. In a pub-
sub system the concerned parties are the publishers and the subscribers, and the channel
denotes the entire pub-sub service network. We require that the pub-sub network nodes or
any observer of the pub-sub network should neither be able to gain knowledge about the
messages routed through them nor corrupt them in an undetectable manner. Concretely,
we need to guarantee three types of confidentiality and integrity.
• First, we need publication confidentiality to ensure only authorized subscribers can
read an event and content must be protected from unauthorized subscribers and
malicious users on the pub-sub network. We also need publication integrity to protect
publications from unauthorized modification in transit.
• Second, subscribers may wish to keep their subscriptions private. Concretely, the
subscriber would like the pub-sub network to compute the subscription function (fil-
ter) f(x) with respect to the publication x without revealing f to the network. We
refer to this goal as subscription confidentiality, which ensures subscribers to receive
content sensitive information without revealing their subscriptions to the publishers
or the pub-sub overlay service network. Further, we need subscription integrity to
safeguard subscriptions from unauthorized modification when routing them using the
pub-sub overlay.
• Third, we need the pub-sub network to perform content-based routing without re-
quiring publishers and subscribers to trust the network with the content. Content
confidentiality is especially important when information being published contains sen-
sitive content, thus publishers and subscribers may wish to keep information secret
from the pub-sub service network. Content integrity prevents messages in transit
from unauthorized access and modification. Authorization is a common technique for
preventing unauthorized reads and writes of messages by illegal subscribers or curious
(semi-honest) routing nodes in the pub-sub network.
Availability. EventGuard refers availability to the resilience of the pub-sub system against
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. There are three major types of DoS attacks possible on
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pub-sub systems: (i) flooding based attacks attempt to flood the pub-sub system with large
amount of bogus messages, (ii) fake unsubscribe (and unadvertise) attack attempts to send
spurious unsubscribe (and unadvertise) requests; for example, if a node X ′ (6= X) sends
unsubscribe(X, f) to node X’s parent then it would deny X of all events e that is covered
by filter f , and (iii) selective and random dropping attack attempts to drop messages either
selectively (say, based on the publication’s topic) or randomly.
In addition to the security goals, EventGuard has two important performance related
goals. Performance and Scalability: We require the EventGuard mechanisms to scale with
the number of nodes in the network. In addition, EventGuard should add minimal per-
formance overhead to a pub-sub system. Ease of Use and Simplicity: We require that
EventGuard mechanisms be simple and easy to deploy, operate and administer.
3.3.2 System Architecture
EventGuard is designed to be completely modular and operates entirely above a content-
based pub-sub core. EventGuard requires minimal coupling with the pub-sub core and
hence can be easily ported from one pub-sub core to another. Figure 19 shows EventGuard’s
architecture. EventGuard comprises of three components. The first component is a suite
of security guards that guard the pub-sub system from various security threats discussed in
Section 3.2.2 and Section 3.3.1. The second component is a resilient pub-sub network that
is capable of handling node failures and selective and random dropping-based DoS attacks.
The third component is a light-weight trusted meta-service (MS) to provide identification
and authorization control for advertisements and subscriptions in the pub-sub system.
Security Guards. EventGuard takes a unified approach to secure a pub-sub network.
EventGuard’s security guards handle one pub-sub operation against all potential attacks.
Concretely, EventGuard comprises of six guards, securing six critical pub-sub operations:
subscribe guard, advertise guard, publish guard, unsubscribe guard, unadvertise guard and
routing guard. These guards are built on top of three important building blocks: token, key
and signature. We use tokens as pseudo-names for publishing events on certain topics to
mitigate selective dropping attacks at the pub-sub network level. We protect confidentiality
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and integrity from pub-sub nodes and from unauthorized subscribers using cryptographic
keys. We prevent the pub-sub service from spam, flooding based DoS attacks and spoofed
messages using signatures. We design and develop the six security guards by composing
these three building blocks in different ways to safeguard publication, subscription, un-
subscription, advertisement and unadvertisement operations in the pub-sub system. We
describe the three basic building blocks in Section 3.4.1 and discuss how to design security
guards using these building blocks in the rest of Section 3.4.
Resilient pub-sub network. EventGuard achieves resilience to node failures and message
dropping based attacks by constructing a network topology that is richer than the popular
tree-based event dissemination topology. Although a strict tree-based topology minimizes
the communication cost in the pub-sub content routing network, it is not robust for handling
node failures and message dropping attacks [96]. We improve the resilience of the pub-sub
network by modifying the tree structure to incorporate multiple independent paths [97]
from the publisher to subscribers.
Trusted Meta-Service. EventGuard relies on a thin trusted meta-service (MS) to create
tokens and keys for controlling confidentiality of topics (publications), and create signatures
for authenticating messages, maintaining message integrity and guarding the pub-sub ser-
vice from flooding-based DoS attacks. Four of the six types of pub-sub messages, such as
subscribe, unsubscribe, advertise, unadvertised, require MS to generate tokens, keys and
signatures. However, the most common operations, publish and routing, do not require the
direct support from MS. We design the MS with the following three objectives in mind.
First, we aim at minimizing the amount of work assigned to the MS. Keeping the MS
simple enables one to ensure that the MS is relatively bug-free and thus is well-protected
from malicious nodes. Second, we would like to limit the number of secrets maintained
by the MS to at most one or two small strings (keys). Having to maintain only a few
small keys secret enables the MS’s administrator to afford physical security for those keys
in the form of, say a smart card. Third, it should be possible to easily replicate MS; the
MS replicas should be able to function independently without having to interact with one
another.
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There are other potential benefits of supporting a light-weight MS in the pub-sub sys-
tems. For instance, if the pub-sub system wants to impose a cost model on the pub-sub
system to ensure that subscribers pay the system for their subscriptions and publishers pay
the system for their advertisements (accounting), the MS should be capable of accounting
and auditing important control activities on the pub-sub network. Accounting and pricing
can be valuable means to reduce spam in wide-area distributed systems. One example is
to condone email spam by associating a cost with every email [20]. Furthermore, if the
application wishes to have the pub-sub system maintain an audit trail of subscriptions,
unsubscriptions, advertisements and unadvertisements, one can also provide auditing capa-
bility at the MS to resolve any accounting or pricing related issues regarding subscribers
and publishers.
3.4 EventGuard: Security Guards
In this section we present a high level functional overview of EventGuard. We first introduce
the three building blocks used by EventGuard: tokens, keys and signatures. Then we
describe how EventGuard uses these primitives to develop six safeguards for securing the
six important pub-sub operations: subscribe, advertise, publish, unsubscribe, unadvertise
and routing.
3.4.1 Tokens, Keys and Signatures
The first building block is the concept of per-topic token. In a topic In EventGuard,
publishers can publish and advertise events in terms of topics. We create a token for
each topic. Tokens are essential for protecting messages (e.g., subscriptions) from selective
dropping DoS attack. Concretely, by introducing tokens, nodes in the pub-sub network are
not aware of the topic names of concrete events (publications); instead they match and route
events on the pub-sub network based on tokens until the publications (event notifications)
ultimately reach the appropriate subscribers.
Token is a pseudonym for a topic name. There is a one-to-one mapping between a topic
name w and it’s token T (w). However, given a token T (w) it is computationally infeasible
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to guess the topic name w. A subscriber subscribes for a topic w by subscribing for its
token with filter f(w) = 〈topic, EQ, T (w)〉, where topic is the attribute name for topic,
EQ denotes the equality operator, and T (w) denotes the token corresponding to topic w.
The nodes in the pub-sub network are not aware of the topic names; instead they route
events on the pub-sub network based on tokens. The nodes match and route events based
on tokens until they ultimately reach the appropriate subscribers. Tokens serve are useful
for achieving confidentiality and protection from selective dropping DoS attack. Per topic
tokens are required for us to retain scalability by content-aware routing and yet achieve our
security goals.
The second building block is the concept of per-topic key. In an EventGuard pow-
ered pub-sub system, keys are fundamental for achieving confidentiality and integrity. By
encrypting message content with a random encryption key, we can prevent contents of mes-
sages (e.g., publications, subscriptions) from unauthorized reads and writes. Every topic w
in the pub-sub system has an associated key K(w). The MS is responsible for providing
K(w) to a subscriber when the subscriber subscribes for topic w and to publishers when
they advertise for topic w. The encryption key K(w) enables the publisher to encrypt events
that belong to topic w. Now only a legal subscriber to topic w would be able to decrypt the
message. The publication of content pbl under a topic w would be constructed as e = 〈α1,
α2〉, where α1 = 〈topic, T (w)〉 and α2 = 〈content, EK(w)(pbl)〉, where content denotes
the attribute name for the published message. Note that EK(pbl) denotes the encryption
of pbl with encryption key K and some symmetric key encryption algorithm E (e.g., DES
[36] or AES [63]). The nodes in the pub-sub system are not aware of keys. The nodes
would be able to route the event based on token T (w). Keys are fundamental for achieving
authorization, confidentiality and integrity. Per topic keys are required to guarantee fine
grained authorization.
The third building block in EventGuard is the concept of signature. Signatures play a
fundamental role in achieving message authentication and protecting the pub-sub services
from flooding-based DoS attacks. EventGuard uses a probabilistic signature algorithm
for achieving authenticity. A signature scheme is probabilistic if there are many possible
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valid signatures for each message and the verification algorithm accepts any of the valid
signatures as authentic. In the first prototype of EventGuard, we use ElGamal [34] as the
probabilistic signature algorithm. A signature on any message M using ElGamal yields
a tuple 〈r, s〉. The r-component of the signature is guaranteed to be unique (with high
probability). Further, if the same message M is signed twice by the same entity x, we get
two different, but valid ElGamal signatures of M . All messages originating at entity x are
signed using its private key rk(x); and all its signatures are verified using its corresponding
public key pk(x). EventGuard uses the trusted meta-service MS to create signatures for
advertisements and subscriptions. Subscriptions and advertisements are authenticated using
signatures, ensuring that malicious nodes cannot flood the pub-sub network with bogus
publications or phony subscriptions.
There are at least two alternative approaches to signatures. One apparent alternative is
to use keyed message authentication codes (MACs). Shared MAC keys between a publisher
and a subscriber allow the subscriber to authenticate all publications it receives. There is
a dilemma with this approach. On one hand, we cannot afford to give away MAC keys
to pub-sub network nodes since a malicious node may flood publications on the pub-sub
network. On the other hand, without these MAC keys, nodes on the pub-sub network could
neither verify the authenticity of messages nor control flooding based DoS attacks.
The second alternative to signatures is to use a Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) informa-
tion dissemination protocol [57]. Let m denote an upper bound on the number of malicious
nodes in the pub-sub network. The publisher initiates a publication message P by sending
it to 2m + 1 seed nodes. Any non-seed node u would consider the message P authentic
if and only if it received m + 1 identical copies of the message P from other nodes in the
system. Note that if m + 1 copies of a message are identical, then at least one of the copy
is guaranteed to have originated from a non-malicious node. Node u continues propagating
the message P (usually by broadcast) until all subscribers receive the message P . However,
this solution does not directly address confidentiality and integrity. Techniques similar to
the ones we propose in EventGuard can be used to handle them. An obvious advantage of
BFT techniques is that BFT does not pay the overhead of using a PKI based signature.
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On the flip side however, BFT techniques incur much higher communication cost. This
makes BFT techniques suitable only for environments that inherently support broadcast
communication (e.g., local area networks) and for scenarios where information dissemina-
tion is required to be absolutely lossless. For wide-area Internet applications like pub-sub
systems wherein one can tolerate lossy channels, it is important to keep the communication
cost very low.
We have introduced tokens, keys and signatures as fundamental building blocks of Event-
Guard. The next challenge is to design and construct the six concrete safeguards for the
following six essential operations: subscribe, advertise, publish, unsubscribe, unadvertise
and routing.
3.4.2 Subscribe Guard
Subscribe guard is designed for achieving subscription authentication, subscription confi-
dentiality and subscription integrity, and preventing DoS attacks based on spurious sub-
scriptions. Suppose that a subscriber S wishes to subscribe for a topic w. In EventGuard,
subscriber S sends the topic w to the EventGuard trusted meta service MS indicating that
it wishes to subscribe for topic w. At this point, the MS may act as the authority for
implementing a cost model for the pub-sub system. For example, the MS may collect a
subscription fee for every subscription; the subscription fee may be dependent on the topic
w. Let φ′(w) be the original subscription filter for topic w sent to MS by the subscriber S,
sb(w) denote the subscription permit issued by MS upon receiving an subscription φ′(w)
from subscriber S, and φ(w) denote the legal subscription transformed from φ′(w) by MS
in two steps: (1) replacing topic w with token T (w) and (2) signing the subscription with
the subscription signature provided by MS. Both are included in the subscription permit
sb(w) generated by MS. They are defined as follows:
φ′(w) = 〈topic, EQ, w〉
sb(w) = 〈K(w), T (w), sigSMS(T (w)), UST S(w)〉
φ(w) = 〈topic, EQ, T (wi)〉, 〈sig, ANY, sigSMS(T (wi))〉
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The MS sends a subscription permit sb(w) to the subscriber S. The key K(w) for topic
w is derived as K(w) = KHrk(MS)(w), where rk(MS) denotes the MS’s private key and
KHK(w) denotes a keyed hash of string w using a keyed-hash function KH (say HMAC-
MD5 [52]) and a secret key K. The token T (w) for topic w is derived as T (w) = H(K(w)),
where H(x) denotes a hash of string x using a one-way hash function H (say, MD5 [80] or
SHA1 [32]). UST S(w) is a special token given to the subscriber to enable safe unsubscription
(discussed later under unsubscribe guard). Observe that if any two subscribers subscribe
for topic w, they get the same encryption key K(w) and the same token T (w).
The signature sigSMS(T (w)) is an ElGamal signature by the MS on the token T (w) in
the subscription permit sb(w) provided to subscriber S. The signature has two parts sigSMS
(T (w)) = 〈r, s〉. Note that the r-component of the signature is always unique. Therefore,
we use r-component of the signature as the subscription identifier. This signature serves
us three purposes. First, it enables nodes in the pub-sub network to check the validity of a
subscription. Second, we use the subscription identifier (the r-component of the signature)
to detect and condone DoS attacks based on subscription flooding. Note that even if two
subscribers S and S ′ subscribe for the same topic w, sigSMS(T (w)) 6= sigS
′
MS(T (w)) (discussed
later under routing guard). Third, it is used to construct the special token UST S(w) =
KHrk(MS)(r) where r denotes the r-component of the MS’s signature. We use UST
S(w)
to prevent DoS attacks based on fake unsubscription (discussed later under unsubscribe
guard).
Upon receiving a subscription permit sb(w) from the MS, subscriber S transforms its
original subscription filter φ′(w) to a legal subscription filter φ(w) by signing the subscrip-
tion using token T (w) and subscription signature sigSMS(T (w))). The subscriber S could
then submit and deploy the signed subscription on the pub-sub network. Consequently,
any publication that includes the token T (w) is routed to S. Routing nodes on the pub-
sub network are not able to perform unauthorized reads or writes on the content of any
subscription message, thus guaranteeing subscription confidentiality and integrity. Further,
nodes compromised due to DoS attacks, even though malicious, are not able to attack the
pub-sub network by flooding fake subscriptions.
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A subscriber S may restrict the number of publications it would like to receive. For
example, a subscriber may use sb(w1) and sb(w2) to construct a subscription filter that is a
conjunction of filters f(w1) and f(w2). In general a subscription filter f = 〈φ(w1), φ(w2),
· · · , φ(wm)〉, where φ(w) described above.
3.4.3 Publish Guard
Publish guard is designed to safeguard the publication from publication confidentiality
and integrity, publication authenticity, and DoS attacks based on bogus publications and
spam. Suppose a publisher P wishes to publish a publication pbl under topics w1, w2,
· · · , wm. The topics are used to categorize the content pbl. The content pbl could be any
arbitrary sequence of bytes including text, multimedia, and so on. For each topic wi, the
publisher fetches the topic’s token T (wi) and its encryption key K(wi) from the MS. A
publication event e is constructed as follows. Let e′ denote the original publication message,
e denote a legal event publication transformed from e′ using tokens and content encryption
of publication messages. We formally define them as follows:
e′ = 〈〈publisher, P 〉, 〈content, pbl〉, 〈topic, w1〉, · · · , 〈topic, wm〉〉
e = 〈〈publisher, P 〉, 〈content, EKr(pbl)〉, 〈topic, T (w1)〉, 〈T (w1), EK(w1)(Kr)〉, · · · ,
〈topic, T (wm)〉, 〈T (wm), EK(wm)(Kr)〉〉
The key Kr is a random encryption key generated each time a publisher needs to publish
an event. P sends the event e along with its signature, namely, sigP (e). Observe that
any subscriber for topic wi possesses the key K(wi). An authorized subscriber uses the
key K(wi) to decrypt the random key Kr, and uses the random key Kr to decrypt the
publication pbl.
Note that a publisher uses an ElGamal signature to sign its publications. The first
component of the signature is used as the publication identifier. The signature serves
two purposes. First, it enables nodes in the pub-sub network to check the validity of a
publication. Second, we use the publication identifier (the r-component of the signature)




Advertise guard is designed for achieving advertisement authentication, advertisement con-
fidentiality and integrity, and preventing DoS attacks based on bogus advertisement. Sup-
pose a publisher P wishes to publish events under topic w. Publisher P sends w and its
public-key pk(P ) to the MS. At this point the MS may charge a publication fee to the
publisher that is some arbitrary function of w. φ′(w) is the original advertisement filter for
topic w.
φ′(w) = 〈publisher, EQ, P 〉, 〈topic, EQ, w〉
ad(w) = 〈K(w), T (w), sigPMS(T (w) ‖ P ‖ pk(P )), UAT P (w)〉
φ(w) = 〈publisher, EQ, P 〉, 〈topic, EQ, T (w)〉, 〈sig, ANY, sigPMS(T (w) ‖ P ‖ pk(P ))〉
The MS sends an advertisement permit ad(w) to the publisher P . The key K(w), the token
T (w) and the signature sigPMS(T (w) ‖ P ‖ pk(P )) is computed in the same manner as that
for subscriptions. The special token UAT P (w) is used for unadvertisements (discussed in
unadvertise). The publisher then constructs the advertisement filter φ and propagates it
to the pub-sub network. Note that the public-key pk(P ) is essential for the pub-sub nodes
and the subscribers to verify the authenticity of publications.
3.4.5 Unsubscribe Guard
Unsubscribe guard is designed to prevent unauthorized unsubscribe messages, flooding of
unsubscribe messages, and spam. When a subscriber S wishes to unsubscribe from a topic
w, S sends 〈T (w), sigSMS(T (w)), UST S(w)〉 to the MS. The MS checks if sigSMS(T (w)) is
a valid signature on T (w). The MS uses the special token UST S(w) to ensure protection
from DoS attacks based on fake unsubscription. The MS checks if UST S(w) is indeed
equal to KHrk(MS)(sbId), where sbId denotes the subscription identifier, namely, the r-
component of the signature sigSMS(T (w)). Note that the signature sig
S
MS(T (w)) and the
token T (w) are sent to the pub-sub network nodes when the subscriber S subscribes for the
topic w. However, the subscriber S is never required to reveal the special token UST S(w)
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to the pub-sub network. Hence, no malicious node in the pub-sub network would be able
to fake an unsubscribe request. Moreover, the use of UST S(w) prevents some subscriber
S′ (6= S) who has subscribed for topic w (and thus possesses signature sigS′MS(T (w)), token
T (w) and key K(w)) from unsubscribing subscriber S from topic w. We use φ′(w) to denote
the original unsubscription message for topic w.
φ′(w) = 〈topic, EQ, w〉
usb(w) = 〈sigMS(T (w) ‖ sbId)〉
φ(w) = 〈topic, EQ, T (w)〉, 〈sig, ANY, sigMS(T (w) ‖ sbId)〉
The MS sends an unsubscription permit usb(w) to the subscriber S. Note that the signature
includes the token T (w) and the original subscription’s identifier sbId. Subscriber S would
unsubscribe from topic w by sending φ(w) to the pub-sub network. Nodes in the network
use the MS’s signature to check the validity of an unsubscription and use the unsubscription
identifier usbId (the r component of signature sigMS(T (w) ‖ sbId)) to detect and condone
DoS attacks based on unsubscription flooding.
3.4.6 Unadvertise Guard
Unadvertised guard is designed to prevent the pub-sub network from unadvertisement flood-
ing. When a publisher P wishes to unadvertise for a topic w, P sends 〈T (w), sigPMS(T (w) ‖
P ‖ adId), UAT P (w)〉 to the MS. Similar to those illustrated in unsubscribe guard, the spe-
cial token UATP (w) is computed as follows: UAT P (w) = KHrk(MS) (adId), where adId de-
notes the advertisement identifier, namely, the r-component of the signature sigPMS(T (w)).
Note that the use of UAT P (w) ensures DoS attacks based on phony unadvertisements. Let
φ′(w) denote the original unadvertisement message for topic w.
φ′(w) = 〈publisher, EQ, P 〉, 〈topic, EQ, w〉
uad(w) = 〈sigMS(T (w) ‖ P ‖ adId)〉
φ(w) = 〈publisher, EQ, P 〉, 〈topic, EQ, T (w)〉, 〈sig, ANY, sigMS(T (w) ‖ P ‖ adId)〉
Upon receiving an unadvertise request from publisher P , the MS generates an unadver-
tisement permit uad(w) and send it back to the publisher P . The publisher P uses the
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advertisement signature sigPMS(T (w) ‖ P ‖ adId) included in the permit to create a legal
unadvertise request and submit it to the pub-sub overlay network. This signature (similar
to unsubscription) is used by the routing nodes to check its authenticity and detect DoS
attacks based on unadvertisement flooding.
3.4.7 Routing Guard
The pub-sub network nodes route messages based on tokens − the pseudonym for topics.
Besides performing the functionality of a regular pub-sub node, we require the nodes to
perform additional checks to ensure safety from DoS attacks. Now, we discuss the checks
implemented by nodes to protect the pub-sub network from flooding-based DoS attacks.
EventGuard requires nodes on the pub-sub network to perform two security checks. The
first check is based on signatures for maintaining sender authenticity and the second check is
based on detecting duplicate messages. Subscriptions, unsubscriptions, advertisements and
unadvertisements are verified for the MS’s signature. The publications are verified for its
publisher’s signature. Duplicates are checked using the r-component of the signature. Recall
that we designate the r-component of the ElGamal signature as the message’s identifier.
When a node receives two subscriptions with the same identifier, it blocks the later one.
With the guarantee of sender authenticity and the prevention of duplicate messages, no
flooding attack could propagate beyond one good pub-sub node. Figure 20 illustrates this
point. In Figure 20, a malicious (bad) node B1 attempts a flooding based DoS attack
to all its neighbor nodes. Observe that no invalid message (incorrect signatures) and no
duplicate message from node B1 would propagate beyond the non-malicious (good) nodes
G1, G2, G3 and G4. More importantly, none of the nodes marked X would be hit by this
DoS attack. Thus, by deploying routing guards in the pub-sub network, EventGuard can
effectively isolate the effect of flooding attacks.
We implement the routing guard (i.e., the two security checks on each routing node) in
three steps. First, we require a node to maintain the history of identifiers previously seen
by it. Second, we augment each EventGuard message with a timestamp that is signed by
the MS (for advertisement, subscription, unadvertisement and unsubscription) or signed
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Figure 20: Handling Flooding based
DoS attacks in EventGuard
Figure 21: Constructing Resilient Net-
works: Thick lines represent links in the
binary tree network and the dashed lines
represent additional links added to bi-
nary tree network to make its ind = 2
by the publisher (for a publication). Third, a non-malicious node blocks any message if the
condition |ct− ts| > max delay is met, where ct is the current time, ts is the timestamp on
a message, and max delay is a system defined parameter. Nodes only need to maintain a
history of identifiers for a time duration of max delay. Note that max delay must account
for time skew between nodes and routing and communication delays on the pub-sub network.
3.4.8 Rekeying
Authorization keys are capabilities issued to authorized subscribers. Hence, when a sub-
scriber unsubscribes its subscriptions, an authorization is revoked, the authorization key
needs to be changed and the new key has to be communicated to all authorized subscribers.
We observe that changing the per topic authorization key each time when an authorized
subscriber unsubscribes can be very expensive. As a result, EventGuard resorts to periodic
rekeying.
We periodically change all per topic authorization keys by changing rk(MS). Note
that changing rk(MS) changes all the keys in the pub-sub system. More specifically, we
perform a periodic rekeying operation as follows. We divide time into epochs of epoch
time units (say, one month). All subscriptions and advertisements need to be renewed at
the beginning of every time epoch. We number epochs with consecutive integers starting
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from epoch number 0. The secret key used by the MS in the T th epoch is derived from
the primary secret key rk(MS) as rk(MS, T ) = KHrk(MS)(T ). The MS uses rk(MS, T )
to replace rk(MS) during the T th epoch for generating authorization keys. Hence, if a
subscriber S unsubscribes for topic w in epoch T , it would still be able to read the contents
of publications under topic w till the end of epoch T (but not after epoch T ).
Note that rk(MS, T ) is used only for generating authorization keys. The MS always
uses rk(MS) for signing subscriptions and advertisements. Also, all topic tokens, unsub-
scribe and unadvertise tokens are derived using the original secret key rk(MS). Hence,
tokens and special tokens do not change across epochs. Therefore, none of the subscrip-
tion and advertisements disseminated into the pub-sub network needs to be changed every
epoch. Our rekeying technique requires only the subscribers and publishers to obtain new
keys from the MS every epoch. Thus periodic rekeying additionally facilitates the MS to
bill the subscribers and the publishers for the next epoch.
3.5 EventGuard: Scalable Key Management
Most existing key management solutions for pub-sub networks use group key management
protocols to manage subscriber grouped based on their subscriptions. However, given a
flexible subscription filter based authorization model, every event can potentially go to
a different subset of subscribers. In the worst case, for NS subscribers, there are 2NS
subgroups, thereby making it infeasible to setup static groups for every possible subgroup.
Although some optimizations have been proposed for dynamic groups such as key caching
[66], the worst case key management cost remains at O(2NS) due to its inherent design.
In this chapter, we propose to improve past solutions to the key management problem
using a completely different design philosophy. Our key management algorithms disassociate
keys from subscriber groups and ensure that the key management cost is independent of
the total number of the subscribers (NS) in the pub-sub system. We achieve this in two
steps: (i) First, we associate an authorization key K(f) with a subscription filter f and an
encryption key K(e) with an event e. We use the encryption key K(e) to encrypt the secret
attributes in an event e and the authorization key K(f) to decrypt the secret attributes
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in a matching event e. (ii) We use hierarchical key derivation algorithms [118] to map
the authorization keys and the encryption keys into a common key space. The mapping
ensures that a subscriber can efficiently derive an encryption key K(e) for an event e using
an authorization key K(f) for the subscription filter f if and only if the event e matches
the subscription filter f . In this chapter, we present a detailed quantitative analysis of
our approach and show that it incurs a small computation, communication and storage
cost that is independent of the number of subscribers, thereby making our approach very
efficient and scalable.
We have developed hierarchical key derivation algorithms for constructing key spaces
for different types of publication-subscription matching, including: topic or keyword based
matching, numeric attribute based matching, category or ontology based matching, and
string prefix/suffix matching. For example, in a numeric attribute based key space con-
struction algorithm, an authorization key K(f1) associated with the filter f1 = 〈〈topic,
EQ, cancerTrail〉, 〈age, >, 20〉〉 and an authorization key K(f ′1) associated with the filter
f ′1 = 〈〈topic, EQ, cancerTrail〉, 〈age, >, 30〉〉 must be capable of deriving the encryption
key K(e1) used for encrypting the message msg in event e1 = 〈〈topic, cancerTrail〉, 〈age,
35〉, 〈message, msg〉〉. On the other hand, key K(f1) should be capable of decrypting the
message msg in event e′1 = 〈〈topic, cancerTrail〉, 〈age, 25〉, 〈message, msg〉〉, but the
key K(f ′1) should not. In this section, we illustrate our approach using numeric attribute
based matching.
3.5.1 Numeric Attribute Based Matching
Numeric attribute based matching supports range conditions on numeric attributes. Given
a numeric attribute, say age, we can construct a subscription filter f = 〈age, ∈, (l, u)〉
such that the filter f matches any event e = 〈age, v〉 if and only if l ≤ v ≤ u, that is, the
attribute age takes a value v that belongs to the range (l, u) (both end points inclusive). To
enable secure publication-subscription matching, we associate an authorization key K(f)
with every subscription filter f and an encryption key K(e) with every event e that satisfy
the following properties:
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• Given K(f) it should be computationally easy to derive a key K(e), if v ∈ (l, u).
• Given K(f) it should be computationally hard to derive a key K(e), if v /∈ (l, u).
We construct keys that satisfy the above mentioned properties as follows. We map the
authorization keys and encryption keys to the common key space using a numeric attribute
key tree (NAKT). Given a subscription filter 〈age, ∈, (l, u)〉, we use the NAKT to derive
a small set of authorization keys that corresponds to the attribute num with the range
(l, u), denoted by Knum(l,u) , where num denotes the name of the numeric attribute. The
NAKT enables one to easily (computationally) derive a key Knum(l′,u′) from K
num
(l,u) if and only
if l ≤ l′ ≤ u′ ≤ u. For any event e = 〈age, v〉, we derive the encryption key K(e) = Knum(v,v)
and encrypt the event e with K(e). By the construction of the numeric attribute key tree
it follows that K(e) is efficiently derivable from K(f) if and only if l ≤ v ≤ u.
Constructing Numeric Attribute Key Tree (NAKT). Now we need to discuss how to
build the NAKT tree for a given numerical attribute num using hierarchical key derivation
algorithms. Without loss of generality, we assume that the actual range of the numeric
attribute num is (0, |R(num)| − 1), where |R(num)| denotes the size of range R(num).
Given a numeric value v ∈ (0, |R(num)| − 1), we map it to a key tree identifier ktid(v)
which is a m-bit binary representation of the number b v
lc(num)c and m = log2(
|R(num)|
lc(num) ).
Note that lc(num) denotes the smallest size of a subscription on numeric attribute num.
Later in the section, we use lc(num) to trade-off performance and expressiveness of the
numeric attribute based matching algorithm. The key tree identifiers are arranged in the
form of a binary tree with depth m. Figure 22 shows a numeric attribute key tree for R(num)
= (0, 31) and lc(num) = 4. Each element in the tree labeled ktid has two attributes: a key
Knumktid and a range of numeric values v such that ktid(v) share the prefix ktid. The key tree
is designed such that given a parent key all its children keys can be easily derived; but the
converse is computationally infeasible.
Let the symbol Ø (null) be used to label the root element of a NAKT. We derive
the authorization key for the root element corresponding to the key tree as KnumØ =
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KHK(w)(num), where KH is a keyed pseudo-random function (approximated by HMAC-
MD5 or HMAC-SHA1 [52]), K(w) = KHrk(KDC)(w) is the authorization key for the topic
w, and rk(KDC) denotes the secret key of the KDC. An example topic would be w =
cancerTrail and numeric attribute num = age. For example, the key for the root el-
ement for the age numeric attribute is derived as K
age
Ø = KHK(cancerTrail)(age), where
K(cancerTrail) = KHrk(KDC)(cancerTrail). Then, we derive the key for an internal
element with ktid = ξ ‖ b recursively as Knum
ξ‖b = H(K
num
ξ ‖ b), for some ξ ∈ (0 + 1)∗,
b = 0 or 1 and H is a one-way hash function (approximated by MD5 [80] or SHA1 [32]).









Ø ‖ 1). Having described how to construct the
numeric attribute key tree, we now describe techniques to select an encryption key K(e)
for an event e and an authorization key K(f) for a filter f .
Encryption Key. A publisher P constructs the encryption key for a numeric attribute in
a given event e as follows:
e = 〈〈publisher, P 〉, 〈topic, w〉, 〈num, v〉, 〈message, msg〉〉
K(e) = Knumktid(v)
For example, a publisher P encrypts an event e = 〈〈publisher, P 〉, 〈topic, cancerTrail〉,
〈age, 22〉, 〈message, msg〉〉 is encrypted as follows. First, P identifies that the leaf node in
the NAKT, which contains v = 22 has an identifier ktid(22) = 101 (see Figure 22). Then
the publisher P encrypts the event e with the encryption key K(e) = K
age
101 .
Authorization Key. A subscriber can subscribe for any range over the numeric attributes
(limited by the least count lc(num)). The subscription range may span one or more elements
in the NAKT. Given a range (l, u) we identify the smallest set of elements in the NAKT SS
that spans the range (l, u) using a simple depth first search starting from the root of the
NAKT. Then, we divide the subscription for the range (l, u) into multiple subscriptions, one
for each sub-range in the set SS. For example, the smallest set of elements in the NAKT
that spans the range (8, 19) is SS = {(8, 15), (16, 19)}; hence, we split a subscription on the
range (8, 19) into two subscription ranges (8, 15) and (16, 19). Without loss of generality,
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we discuss how to generate authorization keys for subscriptions whose range spans exactly
one element in the NAKT. The subscription f and its the authorization key K(f) are as
shown below.
f = 〈〈topic, EQ, w〉, 〈num,≥, l〉, 〈num,≤, u〉〉
K(f) = Knumktid(l,u)
For example, a subscriber S subscribes for a filter f = 〈〈topic, EQ, cancerTrail〉, 〈age,
≥, 16〉, 〈age, ≤, 31〉〉 as follows. First, the authorization service identifies that element
in the NAKT that matches the subscription range (16, 31) as ktid(16, 31) = 1. Then the
authorization service sends S the authorization key K(f) = K
age
1 .
Matching Publications with Subscriptions using the NAKT. Given a publication
with key tree identifier equal to ktidα a subscriber who has subscribed for key tree identifier
equal to ktidφ does the following. The subscriber checks if ktidφ is a prefix of ktidα. If




Note that the generation of children keys from its parent’s key is computationally efficient
because it uses a fast one-way hash function. However, it is computationally infeasible for
a subscriber to derive the keys corresponding to its ancestors or its siblings. For example,
given a publication with ktidα = 101, a subscriber who has subscribed for ktidφ = 1 decrypts
the message msg in a publication as follows. Given ktidα = 101 and ktidφ = 1, the subscriber









Now, S can use K
age
101 to decrypt the secret attributes in the event.
Number of Authorization Keys. In general, if one uses a a-ary numeric attribute
key tree (a ≥ 2), any subscription range can always be subdivided into no more than
2(a−1) loga( |R(num)|lc(num) )−2 sub-ranges. One can show that this is a monotonically increasing
function in a (for a ≥ 2) and thus has a minimum value when a = 2. Thus, a binary tree
is optimal and it it requires no more than 2 log2
|R(num)|
lc(num) − 2 authorization keys for any
given subscription range. In addition, one can also show that the average number of sub-
ranges for a uniformly and randomly chosen subscription range of length φR is log2
φR
lc(num) .
Observe that the number of keys is at most logarithmic in |R(num)|; additionally one can
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control the number of keys by tuning the parameter lc(num).
The key distribution center (KDC) expends computing power to generate keys for sub-
scribers during the authorization phase. One can show that the maximum and the av-
erage cost of generating authorization keys for a subscription is (4 log2
|R(num)|





lc(num − 1) hash operations respectively. The publishers and the sub-
scribers expend computing power to derive keys for encrypting/decrypting events. One can
show that the maximum and the average cost of deriving the encryption/decryption keys
is (log2
|R(num)|
lc(num ) and (log2
φR
lc(num) hash operations respectively. Note that these average
assume that the subscription range is chosen uniformly and randomly over R(num).
Tables 9 and 10 shows the maximum and the average number of keys, key generation
cost and key derivation cost for different values of |R(num)| assuming lc(num) = 1. Observe
that the number of authorization keys is very small. The key generation cost at the KDC
is only of the order of few tens of microseconds and thus allowing the KDC to handle large
subscription traffic. The key derivation cost is only a few microseconds, thereby adding
minimal overhead to the throughput and latency of the published events.
We have described the design of our key derivation algorithm using numeric attribute
based matching. We refer the readers to our technical report [5] for other types of publication-
subscription matching and the techniques we have developed to handle complex subscrip-
tions that include one or more of the above matching constraints combined using ∧ and ∨
Boolean operators.
Unsubscription by Rekeying. In EventGuard, an authorization key K(f) act like a
capability issued to authorize subscribers to read all events e that match the filter f . As
described in our subscription model (see Section 3.2.1), all subscriptions are accompanied
by a payment and are valid for one time epoch. We use a rekeying algorithm that is similar
to the lazy revocation (epoch based periodic rekeying) algorithms used in several group key
management protocols [121]. At the beginning of a new epoch, if the subscribers need to
refresh their subscriptions then they must obtain new authorization keys from the KDC.
To avoid flash crowds attempting to subscribe at the beginning of a new epoch, we evenly
space out the epoch intervals on a per-topic basis. We also adaptively vary the length of the
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R # Keys Key Gen (µs) Key Derive (µs)
102 12 23.66 6.37
103 18 34.58 9.10
104 26 49.14 12.74
Table 9: Max Cost
φR # Keys Key Gen (µs) Key Derive (µs)
10 3.32 14.20 3.02
102 6.64 17.22 6.04
103 9.97 20.25 9.07
Table 10: Avg Cost: R = 104
epoch on a per-topic basis using the subscription history. Detailed discussion on choosing
the per-topic epoch length is outside the scope of this chapter.
Multiple Publishers. When multiple publishers publish on a common topic, it might be
essential to ensure that the publications from a publisher P is not readable by another pub-
lisher P ′. EventGuard handles this problem using a small modification to the authorization
key K(w) for topic w. Instead of having a topic key shared across all users the KDC can
generate per publisher authorization key for topic w as KP (w) = KHrk(KDC)(P ‖ w). The
KDC distributes KP (w) to a publisher. The KDC uses KP (w) to derive authorization keys
for subscribers that subscribe to a topic w from publisher P . This only incurs almost no
additional key generation cost. On the other hand, the subscriber group approach has to
maintain separate groups for every publisher P .
3.5.2 Comparison with Subscriber Group Approach
3.5.2.1 Overview
In this section, we first illustrate (using examples) there important benefits of our approach
over the traditional subscriber group based approach in terms of the key management
cost. We then use a formal quantitative analysis to derive theoretical lower bounds on the
performance and scalability benefits offered by our approach.
Number of Keys. First, let us suppose that a subscriber S has subscribed for a range
(0, R−1). Using the subscriber group based approach the number of keys is bounded by the
number of possible subscription ranges and the number of subscription groups: min(R(R−1)2 ,
2NS). In contrast, EventGuard uses efficient key derivation algorithms to ensure the number
of authorization keys is independent of the number of subscribers. Using the EventGuard
approach the key server maintains only one key. The number of keys maintained by a
subscriber S is at most logarithmic in R.
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Communication Cost. Second, the subscriber group based approach would require
changes to the groups and group keys whenever a new subscriber joins the system. For
example, let subscriber S1 subscribe for a range (20, 30). We have one group G = {S1}.
Let us suppose that a new subscriber S2 subscribes for a range (25, 40), then we have three
groups: G1 = {S1} (for the range (20, 25)), G2 = {S1, S2} (for the range (25, 30)), and G3
= {S2} (for the range (30, 40)). Observe that the group key server has to not only maintain
more keys (computing and storage cost), but also update subscriber S1 with new group
keys (communication cost). On contrary, our approach requires no key updates and thus
incurs much lower communication costs. We use a quantitative analysis to show that the
EventGuard can offer 2-3 orders of magnitude reduction in communication costs.
KDC Scalability. Third, in the subscriber group approach, the key server has to maintain
all subscriptions made by all active subscribers in order to determine the key updates
(as illustrated above). The EventGuard approach allows the key server to be stateless
and ensures that the cost of handling a subscription request is very small (independent of
NS). In the EventGuard approach, the key server does not have to maintain information
about active subscriptions and active subscribers or update any authorization key as more
subscribers join the pub-sub network. The stateless nature of our key server allows us to
distribute and on-demand replicate the key server it to handle bursty loads. Note that the
key server replicas need no consistency and concurrency control since they share no common
state other than the master key rk(KDC); recall that all authorization keys are derivable
from rk(KDC).
3.5.2.2 Quantitative Analysis
We now use an analytical model to compare the cost (messaging, computation and storage)
of our approach versus the subscriber group approach (using lazy revocation). In order to
make a fair comparison we assume that the time interval for lazy revocation in the subscriber
group approach equals the length of one time epoch T . We assume an M/M/N model for
subscribers [121] with λ denoting the arrival rate per inactive subscriber and µ denoting
the departure rate per active subscriber and N denotes the total number of subscribers
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(active + inactive). One can show that the average number of active subscribers at any
point in time is NS = N* λ
λ+µ . In steady state, the average rate of subscribers joining the
system = the average rate of subscribers leaving the system = N* λµ
λ+µ . Let us assume that
we have only one topic and one numeric attribute whose range is of size R. Without loss
of generality we assume that the least count parameter is set to one. Let φR denote the
average size of a subscription range. We assume that the subscription ranges are chosen
uniformly and randomly over (0, R− 1).
In the subscriber group approach, when a new subscriber S joins the system the KDC
has to determine the number of active subscribers NSoverlap who have an overlapping sub-
scription range with S. A subscription for (xs, xs + φR) by S overlaps with (xs′ , xs′ + φR)
by some other subscriber S ′ overlaps if |xs − xs′ | ≤ φR, that is, if xs′ lies beteween xs − φR
and xs + φR, the subscription ranges are guaranteed to overlap. Since subscription ranges
are chosen uniformly, the probability that the subscription range of S overlaps with that
of some active subscriber S ′ is 2φR
R
. Since, the susbcriptions of any two subscribers are
independently chosen, NSoverlap ∼ binomial(2φRR , NS) (if, φR < R2 ). Note that if φR ≥
R
2 the probability of overlap is one. Hence, the average number of overlapping subscribers
NSoverlap = NS * min(
2φR
R
, 1). In the following portions of this section, we assume that
φR <
R
2 to estimate NSoverlap (if φR ≥ R2 , then NSoverlap = NS).
For every overlapping subscriber S ′, the number of keys that need to be updated is:
zero if S subscribes for a superset of S ′, three to four if S subscribes to a subset of S ′ and
two otherwise. The average number of keys that need to be updated per active subscriber
with an overlapping range is two. This incurs a messaging cost of 2 ∗ NSoverlap keys. In
addition, the new subscriber S has to be sent NSoverlap keys. Hence, the total messaging
cost is 3 ∗ NSoverlap = 3 ∗ NS ∗ 2φRR . Given a subscriber join rate of N*
λµ
λ+µ and a time
interval of length T , the total messaging cost is Csubscribergroup = N*
λµ




In EventGuard the average number of authorization keys for a uniformly and randomly
chosen subscription range φR (> 1) is log2 φR. Note that this cost is independent of the
number of active subscribers NS. The total messaging cost for one time epoch is CEventGuard
= N* λµ





if φR  R, that there is very little or almost no overlap between the subscription ranges
from any two subscribers) then the subscriber group approach may perform better than
the EventGuard approach. Observe that if φR = R = 1 presents the worst case scenario
for the subscriber group approach since this would result in 100% overlap between any two
subscription ranges.
One should observe that the uniform and random distribution for subscription ranges
presents the best case scenario for the subscriber group approach since it increases the
likelihood of smaller subscriber groups that contain mutually disjoint sets of subscribers.
However, in most applications, subscriber interest follows auto-correlated heavy tailed dis-
tribution that allows a group of subscribers to share common interests. Formally, let us
suppose that f(x) denotes a probability density function that a subscriber susbcribes for a






f(y)). For the sake of simplicity let us suppose that φR  R such
that f(x) can be approximated to linear function over the small range (x− φR, x + φR). In






x f(x) = 1, one can show that op is minimal when f(x) =
1
R
for all x, that is, if f(x)
follows a uniform and random distribution. On the other hand, the EventGuard approach
is agnostic to the distribution of subscriber interests. Hence, Csubscribergroup : CEventGuard
= 6*NS∗ φR
R∗log2 φR
represents an absolute minima for the cost ratio.
Tables 11 and 12 summarizes an analytical comparison of our EventGuard approach
against the subscriber group approach. Note that H denotes the computation cost for
a one-way hash function and D denotes the cost of a decryption operation. Tables 13
and 14 shows the lower bound on cost ratio for varying subscription range φR and the
number of subscribers NS respectively. Table 13 shows that the subscriber group approach
incurs at least 2-3 orders of magnitude higher cost than the EventGuard approach, clearly
demonstrating the lack of scalability in the susbcriber group approach. Table 14 indicates
that for NS ≤ 100, the group key management approach may perform better; although
it does not scale well for higher values of NS. However, in our experimental section we
use a more realistic heavy tailed distribution (to model groups of subscribers with common
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Join Message Join Compute Storage Stateless
EventGuard log2 φR H ∗ 2 log2 φR 1 Yes
Subscriber Group 6 ∗NS ∗ φR
R
- 2 ∗NS No
Table 11: KDC Costs
Join Message Join Message Storage Event Processing
New Subscriber Active Subscribers
EventGuard log2 φR - log2 φR D + H ∗ log2 φR
Subscriber Group 2 ∗NS ∗ φR
R
4 ∗NS ∗ φR
R
2 ∗NS ∗ φR
R
D
Table 12: Subscriber Costs
interests) and show that the group key management approach may offer marginally better
performance only when NS ≤ 8.
3.5.2.3 Performance Enhancement
In our implementation and experiments, we have used a key caching mechanism to further
decrease the computational overhead in the EventGuard approach. When a subscriber S
derives an encryption key Knum
ktidα)
from an authorization key Knumφ (ktidφ is a prefix of ktidα)
it caches all the intermediate keys computed in this process in its local key cache. Now, the
subscriber S can compute an encryption key Knumktidα′
from a cached key Knumktidφ′
such that
ktidφ is a prefix of ktidφ′ which in turn is a prefix of ktidα′ . Observe that computing K
num
α′
from Knumφ′ costs H*(|ktidα′ |−|ktidφ′ |) and that from Knumφ costs H*(|ktidα′ |−|ktidφ|) and
|ktidφ| ≤ |ktidφ′ |, where |ktid| denotes the number of bits in ktid. Indeed Knumktidφ′ would be
the optimal cached key to derive Knumktidα′
if ktidφ′ is a prefix of ktidα′ and |ktidα′ |−|ktidφ′ |
is minimal. One should note that such optimizations are more meaningful when the events
exhibit temporal locality. For example, let us consider stock quotes. Assuming that the
stock price changes only nominally over small periods of time, two consecutive stock quote
events are likely to carry prices that are numerically very close to one another.
3.6 EventGuard: r-Resilient Network Guard
The six security guards discussed so far can achieve message authenticity, confidentiality,
integrity, and protect the pub-sub network from flooding-based DoS attacks. In addition,
per topic token helps to alleviate selective message dropping attacks. However, they are
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Table 13: Theoretical Lower Bound:
NS = 103 and R = 104





Table 14: Theoretical Lower Bound: φR
= 100 and R = 104
Figure 22: Key Tree: Range Queries on
Numeric Attributes
incapable of handling random message dropping based attacks. In this section, we present
techniques to restructure the pub-sub network in way that can effectively handle random
message dropping based DoS attacks. We first define a r-resilient network.
Definition r-resilient pub-sub network: A pub-sub network is said to be r-resilient (0 <
r < 1) if r ∗ 100% of the messages are resilient to dropping attack.
There are two important design goals in constructing a r-resilient pub-sub network: (i) the
pub-sub network must be resilient to message dropping attacks, and (ii) the communica-
tion cost should be minimal. We first discuss two network topologies that represent two
extremities of the spectrum and then describe the EventGuard solution. The first network
topology is a a−ary tree topology. The second network topology mirrors the propagation
scheme used in Byzantine fault tolerant information dissemination [57]. The a−ary tree
topology incurs minimum communication cost but is not strongly resilient to message drop-
ping attacks. The BFT propagation algorithm incurs very high communication cost and is
100% resilient to message dropping attacks.
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In this section, we proceed in three steps. First, we compare the communication cost
between these two pub-sub network architectures. Second, we study the resilience of a−ary
trees towards message dropping attacks. Third, we propose EventGuard network archi-
tectures that strike a trade-off between resilience to message dropping attacks and the
communication cost.
3.6.1 Communication Cost
Let NS denote the number of subscribers in the system and N(w) denote the number of
subscribers who have subscribed to topic w. In a a−ary tree network, we assume that
each publisher corresponds to one a−ary tree and a publisher is the root of the tree, the
subscribers who have matching subscriptions are the leaves of the tree and the pub-sub
nodes are intermediate elements of the tree. The height h of the tree is given by dloga NSe.
For simplicity we compute h by h = loga NS and assume that h is rounded up to an
integer. Let M tree(w) denote the communication cost (in terms of the number of messages)
of propagating a publication on topic w from the publisher to the subscribers. Since the
cost of sending the publication to any individual subscriber is lesser than or equal to h, the
total cost M tree(w) ≤ hN(w). Also, the publication message is never required to traverse
any link of the tree more than once. Hence, M tree(w) ≤ Σhi=1ai = aa−1(NS−1). Combining
the two constraints, we have M tree(w) ≤ min(hN(w), a
a−1(NS − 1)). Observe that the
maximum communication cost for an a−ary tree occurs when N(w) = NS and M treemax(w)
= a
a−1(NS − 1). M treemax(w) is minimum when a = NS, that is, the publisher is directly
connected to all the subscribers. In general, as the parameter a increases the expected
communication cost decreases. However, the communication load on the publisher and
pub-sub nodes increases with a since the publisher and the pub-sub nodes may have to
forward an event to a children nodes.
The BFT propagation algorithm assumes that the number of malicious nodes (m) is
known. A non-malicious node accepts an event e as an authentic event if and only if it
receives m+1 identical copies of e from distinct m+1 nodes. The key idea is that in any set
of m+1 nodes there is at least one non-malicious node, and thus if m+1 distinct nodes report
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an event e then e has to be authentic. In a BFT propagation scheme, irrespective of the
network topology (grid, tree) used for propagation each subscriber has to minimally receive
m+1 identical publication messages. Hence the communication cost, denoted by M bft(w),
satisfies the following condition: M bft(w) ≥ (m + 1)N(w). Assuming that NS = 1000 and
about 10% of the nodes are malicious, m = 100, we have M tree(w) ≤ min(5N(w), 1332)
(assuming a 4−ary tree: a = 4 and h = log4 1000 ≈ 5 and aa−1NS = 1332) and M bft(w) ≥
101N(w). This implies that the communication cost in any BFT dissemination algorithm
would be at least 20 times (≈ 101N(w)5N(w) ) the a−ary tree based algorithm. However, one should
note that the BFT dissemination is completely resilient to message dropping attacks and is
unconditionally secure (requires no digital signatures). In a wide-area network with node-
to-node latency in the order of 70ms [125], it might be advisable to limit the communication
cost while incurring addition signature verification cost (1-2ms per verification).
3.6.2 Resilience to Message Dropping Attacks
We have discussed the BFT propagation scheme and its complete resilience to message
dropping attacks. In comparison, a simple a−ary tree-based network is vulnerable to a
message dropping attack. A publication from the publisher successfully reaches a subscriber
only if all the nodes on the routing path from the publisher to the subscriber are non-
malicious. Assuming p denotes the fraction of nodes that are malicious and assuming
that malicious nodes are randomly distributed on the network. The probability that a
publication reaches a subscriber is Pr(succ) = (1−p)h. Even when p = 10%, with h = 5 we
find that the probability of a successful delivery of a publication is only 0.59. This implies
that 10% malicious nodes are able to harm about 41% of the subscribers. One way to
increase Pr(succ) is to increase a (consequently decrease h). However, as we have pointed
out earlier, as a increases the load on the publisher and the nodes on the pub-sub network
increases, thereby harming the scalability of the system.
The key problem with the tree-based topology is that there is only one independent path
from a publisher to a subscriber [97]. Informally, two paths Q1 and Q2 are independent
if they share no node other than their source and their destination node. If we have ind
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independent paths between a publisher P and a subscriber S, then ind malicious nodes
(one per independent path) could completely block any communication between P and S.
The BFT propagation scheme uses m + 1 independent paths to propagate the publication
thereby ensuring that at least one independent path is devoid of malicious nodes. Note that
using an arbitrary peer-to-peer topology for the pub-sub network does not directly entail
the existence of multiple independent paths [97].
3.6.3 Low Cost Resilient Networks
In pub-sub systems one may not require absolute guarantee of message delivery at all time.
This permits us to trade-off resilience with communication cost. We modify a a−ary tree
such that it has ind independent paths while increasing the communication cost by not more
than a factor of ind (ind ≤ a). For simplicity, we illustrate our technique by modifying a
binary tree network to yield a network with ind = 2.
Figure 21 shows the key idea behind constructing a resilient event dissemination net-
works G2. Note that d refers to the depth of a node, with root (publisher) at depth 0 and
the leaves (subscribers) at depth h. For any node n, let parent(n) denote the parent of
node n and sibling(n) denote an immediate left or right sibling of node n. EventGuard’s
resilient network adds one additional edge to every subscriber and every node in the system.
Concretely, for every node n we add an additional edge from n to sibling(parent(n)). We
now claim that the resilient network G2 has the following property.
Claim 3.6.1 The resilient network G2 has ind = 2 independent paths from the publisher
P to every subscriber in the system.
We prove Claim 3.6.1 using Theorem 3.6.2 which explicitly constructs two independent
paths from the publisher (root) to any subscriber (leaf) on the resilient network.
Theorem 3.6.2 Let Q = 〈P , n1, n2, · · · , nd, S〉 denote a path from the publisher P
to some subscriber S in the original tree based network. Then, Q1 = Q and Q2 = 〈P ,
sibling(n1), sibling(n2), · · · , sibling(nd), S〉 are two independent paths from P to S in the
resilient network.
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Proof First, we show that the path Q2 exists (path Q1 = Q exists trivially). We show that
for any 1 ≤ i ≤ d, there exists an edge from sibling(ni) to sibling(ni+1). From path Q1 we
know that ni is the parent of node ni+1. Hence, ni is the parent of node sibling(ni+1). By the
construction of our resilient network, we add an edge from any node n to sibling(parent(n)).
Hence, sibling(ni+1) is connected to sibling(ni) (since, ni = parent(sibling(ni+1))).
Second, we show that {n1, n2, · · · , nd} ∩ {sibling(n1), sibling(n2), · · · , sibling(nd)}
= ∅. First, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ d, ni 6= sibling(ni). Second, for any two nodes ni and nj
1 ≤ i, j ≤ d such that i 6= j, ni 6= nj since the node ni is at depth i from the root, while nj
is at depth j from the root (i 6= j). Hence, the paths Q1 and Q2 are independent.
One can easily extend this network construction scheme for any ind ≤ a. Construct a
resilient nework Gind by connecting any node n to parent(n) and ind − 1 distinct siblings
of parent(n) (these siblings indeed exist since ind ≤ a).
Claim 3.6.3 The resilient network Gind has ind independent paths from the publisher P
to every subscriber in the system.
Proof The proof for Claim 3.6.3 follows the same lines as that for Claim 3.6.1.
Claim 3.6.4 The resilient network Gind incurs ind times the communication cost of G1.
Proof The proof follows from the construction of independent paths in Theorem 3.6.2.
Due to space constraint we omit the full proof for Claims 3.6.3 and 3.6.4. As we increase
ind, the communication cost increases by a factor ind. However, we believe that ind = 2
would suffice for most practical pub-sub networks. Assuming p denotes the fraction of nodes
that are malicious and assuming that the malicious nodes are randomly distributed on the
network. The probability that publication reaches a subscriber is Pr(succ) = 1 − (1 −
(1 − p)h)ind. With p = 0.1 and ind = 2 we would require h ≤ 3.66 for Pr(succ) ≥ 0.9.
For a pub-sub network with each publisher having 1000 subscribers as the upper bound,
this would translate to a = 7 (7-ary tree). On the other hand, achieving the same level of
resilience with ind = 1 would require h ≤ 1 and thus a = NS. Recall that as a increases,
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MS (ms) publisher (ms) subscriber (ms) node (ms)
subscribe 1.44 + 0.00117 ∗ |w| - 1.7 1.7
unsubscribe 3.14 - 1.7 1.7
publish - 1.4 + (|pbl| 1.7 + (|pbl| 1.7
+16m) ∗ 0.0001 +16) ∗ 0.0001
advertise 1.4 + 0.00117 ∗ |w| 1.7 - 1.7
unadvertise 3.14 1.7 - 1.7
Table 15: Computation Overheads for EventGuard Operations: w is some topic, pbl
is a publication, and m denotes the number of topics marked on message pbl
the load on the publisher and the nodes on the pub-sub routing path increases and affects
the system’s scalability. In general, our technique can be employed to construct a r-resilient
network with Pr(succ) = r by carefully choosing ind and a.
3.7 EventGuard Evaluation
We have implemented EventGuard on top of the Siena pub-sub core [16]. We used a Java
based implementation of Siena [15] and added EventGuard extensions to it in the form of
an EventGuard package. No changes were made as such to the Siena pub-sub core (e.g., the
content-based routing and event matching algorithms).
We evaluate our EventGuard prototype implemented on the Siena pub-sub core in two
steps. We first present some micro-benchmarks to quantify the overhead of EventGuard
mechanisms and measure the performance and storage overheads at the MS, a publisher, a
subscriber and a node. Then we present macro-benchmarks to quantify the overhead of the
entire system. We measure changes in throughput, latency of the pub-sub network as an
effect of EventGuard mechanisms. We also quantify the effect of EventGuard’s resilience
to DoS attacks.
3.7.1 Micro-Benchmarks
In this section, we analytically estimate the amount of computational and storage overhead
due to EventGuard on the pub-sub system. All our measurements were made on a 900MHz
Intel Pentium III running RedHat Linux 9.0 using Sun Java 1.5.0.
We perform an analytical estimate on the computational time for subscriptions, pub-
lications and unsubscriptions. The cost for an advertisement is very similar to that of
subscriptions and the cost for unadvertisement is equivalent to that of an unsubscription.
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subscription (Bytes) unsubscription (Bytes) publication (Bytes) advertisement (Bytes) unadvertisement (Bytes)
128 128 128 + 16m 128 128
Table 16: Message Size Overhead due to EventGuard including only those mes-
sages sent on the pub-sub network: m denotes the number of topics marked on the
publication
MS (Bytes) publisher (Bytes) subscriber (Bytes) node (Bytes)
64 180 per adv + HTsize 180 per sub + HTsize HTsize
Table 17: EventGuard Storage Overhead: HTsize denotes the total size of the
hashtable maintained for detecting flooding based DoS attacks (HTsize is at most
a few tens of KBs)
We analyzed the cost of these operations at all four entities: a publisher, a subscriber, the
MS and a pub-sub node. We also analyzed the messaging and storage cost at these four
entities. Tables 15, 16 and 17 summarizes the results obtained in this section. Sub-
scription. The cost of a subscription at the MS includes the computation of key K(w),
token T (w), special token UST (w) and an ElGamal signature on T (w) and the current
timestamp ts. Since, the topic w is typically a short string, the cost of computing the
key K(w) (using HMAC-MD5) is 0.67 ∗ |w|µs. The cost of computing token T (w) from
K(w) (using MD5) is 0.5 ∗ |w|µs. The cost of computing special token UST (w) (using
HMAC-MD5) is 0.67 ∗ |sigr|µs = 42.9µs, where sigr denotes the r-component of the MS’s
ElGamal signature (note that |sigr| = 512 bits = 64 Bytes). The cost of computing an
ElGamal signature is 1.4ms. Hence, the total cost per subscription topic (dominated by the
signature computation time) is about 1.44ms + 1.17 ∗ |w|µs.
The cost of a subscription at the subscriber includes only the signature verification time.
The cost of verifying an ElGamal signature is about 1.7ms. The cost of a subscription at a
node in the pub-sub network is the cost required to process this subscription, which equals
to the sum of the cost of verifying the MS’s signature and the cost of detecting duplicate
identifiers to protect the pub-sub network from subscription-flooding based DoS attacks.
Our experiments show that the cost of verifying duplicates is negligible (< 10µs) when
compared to the signature verification time (1.7ms). Further, our experiments show that
the cost of processing a subscription at a node in EventGuard is only marginally higher
than basic Siena (< 50µs). Note that a publisher incurs no direct cost for a subscription.
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Unsubscription. The cost of an unsubscription at the MS includes the verification of
special token UST (w), the verification of MS’s signature on the corresponding subscription
token and the generation of an unsubscription permit. The cost of verifying the special token
requires the computation of one keyed hash on the r-component of the MS’s signature. As
shown in the case of subscription, this costs 42.9µs. The cost of verifying an MS’s signature
adds 1.7ms and the cost of generating an unsubscription permit adds 1.4ms. Hence, the
total cost of an unsubscription at the MS is 3.14ms.
The cost of an unsubscription at a subscriber includes only the signature verification
time, which costs 1.7ms. The cost of a unsubscription at a node in the pub-sub network
is the cost required to process an unsubscription, which can be computed by the sum of
the cost of verifying the MS’s signature and the cost of detecting duplicate identifiers to
protect the network from DoS attacks based on unsubscription-flooding. Our experiments
show that the cost of verifying duplicates is negligible when compared to the signature
verification time.
Publication. The cost of a publication at its publisher includes the cost of encrypting
the publication pbl with some random key Kr and the cost of encrypting Kr with K(wi)
for every topic wi (1 ≤ i ≤ m) marked on the publication. The total encryption time is
(|pbl| + m ∗ |Kr|) ∗ 0.1µs = (|pbl| + 16m) ∗ 0.1µs (note that |Kr| = 16 Bytes). Computing
the publisher’s signature adds an additional 1.4ms.
The cost of a publication at a subscriber includes the cost of checking the publisher’s
signature, the cost of decrypting the random key Kr and the cost of decrypting the message
using key Kr. The total decryption time is (|pbl|+ |Kr|) ∗ 0.1µs = (|pbl|+ 16) ∗ 0.1µs (note
that |Kr| = 16 Bytes). Verifying the publisher’s signature adds an additional 1.7ms.
The cost of a publication at a node includes only the signature verification time. Similar
to subscription, our experiments show that the cost of processing a publication at a node
in EventGuard is only slightly higher than the cost of using basic Siena. Note that the
MS is not involved directly in the publication process. This largely reduces the aggregate
load on the MS as publications are considered by many applications as the most common
operation on a pub-sub network.
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Messaging Overhead. We now study the overhead added in terms of the length of a
message due to EventGuard. For subscriptions and advertisements, the primary overhead
is due to the MS’s signature which is about 128 Bytes.
For publications, EventGuard adds the following overheads. First, the publisher’s signa-
ture costs 128 Bytes. Second, the encrypted random key costs 16 Bytes. Third, the random
key is encrypted by the topic’s encryption key. This adds 16 Bytes for every topic included
in the publication. The aggregate publication overhead may turn out to be quite significant
if the published message is itself very small. On the other hand even if the published mes-
sage is of the order of a few KBytes, the relative overhead added due to EventGuard turns
out to be extremely small.
Storage Overhead. EventGuard requires publishers, subscribers and the MS to store
additional information such as keys and tokens. The MS has the least storage overhead as
it is required to store only the secret key rk(MS) (about 64 Bytes).
A subscriber has to store the key K(w) (16 Bytes), the token T (w) (16 Bytes), the special
token UST (w) (16 Bytes), subscription time stamp ts (4 Bytes) and the MS’s signature
(128 Bytes) for each subscription token w. Thus, the total per topic storage overhead is
180 Bytes. Further, the subscriber maintains a hashtable to store the publication identifiers
(the r-component of the publisher’s signature) in the near past (max delay) to detect
flooding based DoS attacks. The size of this hashtable obviously depends on the number of
publications received by the subscriber in the last max delay time units. Our experiments
show that this hashtable is typically small, with its size ranging from 100 Bytes to a few
KBs.
The storage overhead at a publisher is very similar to the storage overhead at a sub-
scriber. However, the subscription identifier based hashtable maintained at the publisher
is typically much smaller (< 1 KB) than the publication identifier based hashtable at the
subscribers, since we have number of subscriptions  number of publications. A node in
the pub-sub network maintains two hash tables, one for subscriptions and one for publica-
tions for detecting flooding based DoS attacks. Our experiments show that the size of the






































































Figure 25: KDC Load
publication identifier based hashtable is at most a few tens of KBs.
In summary, the performance overhead added by EventGuard is mostly dominated by
digital signatures (2ms). However, in a wide-area network where the network latencies are
in the order of 70ms [125] the percentile overhead added by EventGuard is significantly
smaller.
3.7.2 Key Management
This section compares our key management algorithms with the subscriber group based ap-
proach in terms of the number of keys, communication and computation cost. We simulated
128 topics, with the popularity of each topic varying according to a Zipf-like distribution
[74]. Each subscriber subscribed for 32 topics chosen from the set of 128 topics using the
Zipf distribution. Amongst 128 topics, 32 were numeric attributes, 32 were category at-
tributes, 32 were string attributes and the rest 32 were simple topics (see Section 3.5.1 for
examples). Numeric attributes had a range of size 256 units and a least count of 4 units; the
subscription range was chosen using a Gaussian distribution with mean 128 and a standard
deviation 32. Hence, the number of elements in the numeric attribute tree was 127 and
the height of the numeric attribute tree was 6. Category trees were for height 4 and the
number of children for each non-leaf element was chosen uniformly and randomly between
2 to 4. The average number of elements in a category tree was 82. The length of the string
attributes were Zipf distributed between 1 and 8. Each publication message was assumed
to be 256 Bytes long.
Number of Keys. Figure 23 shows the average number of keys maintained per subscriber
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as the number of subscribers NS varies. Recall that the SubscriberGroup approach uses
group key management techniques on subscriber groups [66] that require 2NS keys in the
worst case. PSGuard requires a small and constant number of keys per subscriber that
is independent of NS. Even for 32 subscribers, the number of keys per subscriber using
the SubscriberGroup approach is about 40 times larger than the PSGuard approach. PS-
Guard achieves significant reduction in the number of keys, while incurring a computational
overhead for running the key derivation algorithms on the publisher and the subscribers.
In our later experiments we show that the cost of key derivation is very small compared
to wide-area network latencies thereby making it easily affordable. Figure 24 shows the
average number of keys maintained per publisher as NS the number of subscribers varies.
The trends shown in Figure 24 are very similar to that in 23.
KDC Load. Figure 25 shows the computing and network cost on the key server using
SubscriberGroup based approach and PSGuard. Computing cost (measured in millisec-
onds) shows the average cost of group key management in SubscriberGroup and the cost
of key derivation algorithm in PSGuard when a new subscriber joins the system. The cost
incurred by the SubscriberGroup increases dramatically with NS, while that incurred by
the PSGuard approach is a small constant that is independent of NS. Networking cost
(measured in KBytes) shows the average cost of communicating the updated group key in
SubscriberGroup and the cost of delivering the authorization keys in PSGuard. Similar
to computing cost, PSGuard incurs a small and constant networking cost, while that of
SubscriberGroup explodes with NS.
3.7.3 Macro-Benchmarks
In this section, we present two sets of macro-benchmarks for EventGuard. The first set
of experiments is simulation based. The second set of experiments is obtained from our
prototype implementation of EventGuard on Siena pub-sub core.
3.7.3.1 Simulation based Experiments
In this section, we present performance numbers from simulation based experiments on
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Figure 28: MS Load
through EventGuard. Second, we measure the throughput of the system in the presence of
malicious nodes. Third, we show the average load on the MS, the publisher, the subscriber
and the nodes as we vary the subscription and publication rate. Fourth, we demonstrate
the resilience of the pub-sub network architecture used in EventGuard against message
dropping-based DoS attacks.
Simulation Setup. We used GT-ITM [125] topology generator to generate an Internet
topology consisting of 4K nodes. We linked these nodes using open TCP connections to
form a binary tree based hierarchical topology. The latencies for links were obtained from
the underlying Internet topology generated by GT-ITM. The round trip times on these links
varied from 24ms to 184ms with mean 74ms and standard deviation 50ms. We simulated
32 publishers and NS=8K subscribers. The publishers and subscribers were randomly
connected to one leaf node in the pub-sub network. We used discrete event simulation
[36] to simulate the function of the pub-sub network. All experimental results presented in
this section were averaged over 5 independent simulation runs. We simulated 128 topics,
with the popularity of each topic varying according to a Zipf-like distribution [74]. Each
publisher publishes on 16 topics (randomly picked from the set of 128 topics) and each
subscriber subscribes for 4 topics.
Confidentiality and Integrity. Figure 26 shows the fraction of messages that violate
their confidentiality and integrity when in transit between a publisher and its subscribers
with different fractions of malicious nodes (p) and different values of NS (number of sub-
scribers). We assume that a message looses its confidentiality and integrity as soon as it
transits one bad node in the pub-sub network. Observe that when p is small, even a small
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increase in p results in a heavy loss of message confidentiality and integrity. Note that as
NS increases, the height of the binary tree network increases and so does the probabil-
ity that at least one bad node appears on a path from a publisher to its subscribers. On
the contrary, EventGuard is capable of preserving the confidentiality and integrity of all
messages irrespective of the number of malicious nodes in the system.
Flooding-based DoS Attack. Figure 27 shows the fraction of network bandwidth ex-
pended on flooded messages as the fraction of malicious nodes (p) varies with NS=8K
subscribers. We assume that every malicious node performs a publication flooding-based
DoS attack at the rate of 100 messages per unit time. We assume that each publisher
publishes at the rate of 25 publications per unit time. We consider two cases: Case one
wherein the malicious nodes are uniformly distributed throughout the pub-sub network
(EventGuard-sparse in Figure 27); and Case two wherein malicious nodes form k clusters
in the pub-sub network (EventGuard-cluster-k in Figure 27). When malicious nodes are
clustered together on the pub-sub network, we found that the loss in throughput for Event-
Guard is relatively much smaller. This is because EventGuard ensures that no flooding
attack propagates beyond one non-malicious pub-sub node. Hence, if the malicious nodes
are bunched together, they cannot significantly affect other non-malicious nodes in the sys-
tem. Recall Figure 20, no flooding by either of the two malicious nodes B1 or B2 propagates
beyond non-malicious nodes G1, G2, G3 and G4. Observe that if B2 were attached to some
other part of the pub-sub network, then it could perform a flooding based DoS attack on a
different set of non-malicious neighbor nodes that does not overlap with that of B1.
Load. Figure 28 shows the relative computational load on the MS, the publisher, the
subscriber and a pub-sub node as we vary the rate of subscriptions, unsubscriptions and
publications keeping the aggregate rate a constant (we do not consider advertisement and
unadvertisement costs in this experiment). The computation load for basic operations were
obtained from Table 15. We set the subscription rate to be equal to unsubscription rate
so as to ensure that the average number of active subscriptions in the system is almost
a constant. Note that only the control operations on subscriptions and unsubscriptions




















































Figure 30: Resilience Vs





















Figure 31: Resilience Vs
ind with a = 6
is true in most cases) then the relative load on the MS would be very small. If the load
on a MS is not acceptable, EventGuard mechanisms easily permits one to add additional
meta-servers. The fact that the meta-servers do not have to interact with one another
makes it possible for one to build an efficient load balancing system to handle the MS load
and vary the number of active meta-servers on-demand.
Observe that the load on a node remains almost a constant as it depends only the
aggregate rate of subscriptions, unsubscriptions and publications. On the other hand the
relative load on a publisher decreases as the publication rate decreases; this is because
a publisher is not involved in subscribe and unsubscribe operations. Subscriber load is
typically much smaller than the average node load because the number of publications
delivered to a subscriber is very small when compared to the total number of publications
sent on the pub-sub network. Recall that only those publications that match a subscriber’s
subscriptions are delivered to the subscriber.
Selective and Random Dropping Attack. We now report the experimental results on
the effectiveness of using the r-resilient pub-sub networks against message dropping attacks.
Our first experiment measures communication cost versus a (for an a−ary tree network).
The second and third experiments measure the network resilience as a function of p (the
fraction of malicious nodes in the network).
Figure 29 shows communication cost for publishing an event under topic w versus N(w)
for different values of a with ind = 1, where N(w) denotes the number of subscribers for
topic w. Note that a resilient network constructed by modifying an a−ary tree increases
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the communication cost by a factor ind (for some 1 < ind ≤ a). Hence, the communication
cost for an a−ary ind independent path network can be obtained by simply multiplying
the corresponding cost for an a−ary tree network by ind. Observe that the communication
cost decreases as a increases. Also note that a = NS minimizes the communication cost
but imposes heavy load on the publisher and the pub-sub nodes (load is proportional to a).
Figure 30 and 31 shows the resilience of the pub-sub network versus p (fraction of
malicious nodes) for different values of a and ind respectively. Resilience is measured
in terms of the ratio of the number of susbcribers that receive an event on topic w to
N(w), averaged over all topics. Observe from Figure 30 that one can improve resilience by
increasing a at the cost of publisher load. This is equivalent to decreasing the network’s
height h thereby, making the network shallow and broad. Figure 31 shows that one can
improve resilience by increasing ind at the cost of the overall communication cost. A
careful selection of parameters ind and a is required to strike a balance between resilience,
communication cost and publisher load.
3.7.3.2 Implementation based Experiments
In this section, we present performance measurements from our prototype implementation
of EventGuard on Siena pub-sub core. First, we present measurements on the loss in
throughput and the increase in latency in publications due to EventGuard. Second, we
measure the effectiveness of EventGuard against flooding based DoS attacks.
Experimental Setup. Our implementation of EventGuard is built on top of Siena pub-sub
core. We ran this implementation of EventGuard on eight machines each with 8-processor
(550 MHz Intel Pentium III Xeon processors running RedHat Linux 9.0) connected via a
high speed LAN. We simulate the wide-area network delays obtained from the GT-ITM
topology generator. We ignored the LAN delays as they measured only a few tenths of a
millisecond.
We used GT-ITM [125] topology generator to generate an Internet topology consisting
of 63 nodes. The latencies for links were obtained from the underlying Internet topology


























































Figure 34: Resilience to
Flooding-based DoS At-
tacks
mean 74ms and standard deviation 50ms. The tree’s root node acts as the publisher and its
leaf nodes act as subscribers for this pub-sub network (32 subscribers and one publisher).
We constructed complete binary tree topology using different number of nodes (0, 2, 6, 14,
30) and linked these nodes using open TCP connections to form the pub-sub network. The
subscribers were uniformly distributed among all the leaf nodes.
Throughput. We measured the throughput in terms of the maximum number of publica-
tions per second that can be handled by the pub-sub system with and without EventGuard
(EventGuard-nosig). We measured the maximum throughput as follows. We engineered
the publisher to generate publications at the rate of q publications per unit time. In each
run of this experiment, the rate q was fixed. We monitored the number of outstanding pub-
lications required to be processed at every node. If at any node the number of outstanding
publications monotonically increased for five consecutive observations, then we conclude
that the node is saturated and the experiment aborted. We iteratively vary q across differ-
ent experimental runs to identify the minimum value of qmin = throughput such that some
node in the pub-sub network is saturated.
Figure 32 shows the maximum throughput versus the number of nodes in the pub-sub
network for EventGuard and basic Siena for simple subscriptions. The increase in through-
put with the number of nodes shows the scalability of EventGuard. Note that as the number
of nodes increases, the number of subscribers connected to one leaf node decreases, thereby
increasing the effective throughput. However, as the number of nodes becomes increasingly
larger than the number of subscribers the throughput does not increase any further, since
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this simply results in underutilized nodes. The main overhead in EventGuard arises due
to the verification of ElGamal signatures (1.7ms). We also measured the overhead in the
absence of this signature verification at every node in the pub-sub network (EventGuard-
nosig in Figure reftab-thruput). We found that the overhead was lesser than 5%. We are
currently exploring faster signature algorithms to replace ElGamal.
Latency. We measured latency in terms of the amount of time it takes from the time
instant a publication is published till the time it is available to the subscriber (in plain-
text). The latency was measured keeping the throughput at its highest (see Figure 32).
Figure 33 shows latency Vs number of nodes for EventGuard and basic Siena.
Observe that the latency first decreases and then increases. Initially, as the number
of nodes increases, the number of subscribers assigned to each leaf node decreases. This
consequently decreases the load on a node and thus decreases the latency. However, as
the number of nodes increases, so does the height of the dissemination tree. An increase in
height by one incurs an additional latency of 70ms (network latency), thereby increasing the
overall latency. While the throughput always increases (until it saturates) with the number
of nodes the latency will begin to increase. This requires a careful choice of the number of
pub-sub nodes in order to achieve high throughput with acceptable latencies. Observe from
Figure 33 that the increase in latency due to EventGuard is very small. This is because
the wide-area network latencies are of the order of 70ms; while the overhead added at every
node by EventGuard is about 2ms. None the less the maximum increase in latency due to
EventGuard is lesser than 4%.
Flooding-based DoS Attacks. We measured the effect of flooding-based DoS attacks on
the throughput of the pub-sub network. We picked one of the leaf nodes to flood the pub-
sub network. We vary fl, the rate that which the malicious node floods messages on the
pub-sub network. Figure 34 shows the throughput as fl increases both in the presence and
absence of EventGuard mechanisms to guard the system from flooding-based DoS attacks.
Observe from Figure 34 that in the absence of our guards, the pub-sub system deteri-
orates drastically with the injection of flooding-based DoS attack. In comparison Event-
Guard shows a much graceful drop in throughput as the flooding rate fl increases. Note
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that although our guard against flooding-based DoS attacks involves an expensive ElGamal
signature check (1.7ms), it restricts the attack into a small neighborhood surrounding the
malicious node (see Figure 20). This ensures that the effect of a flooding-based DoS attack
is localized and that the rest of the pub-sub network is not affected by it.
3.8 Related Work
Pub-sub systems can be categorized into two types − direct channel and pub-sub network
depending on the mechanism used for delivering publications from a publisher to relevant
subscribers. In a direct channel scheme, a publisher directly delivers a publication to its
relevant subscribers. The communication mechanism used in a direct channel could be mul-
tiple unicasts or a multicast (if supported by the underlying networking infrastructure). In
the absence of wide-area network IP-multicast, the publishers tend to become a performance
bottle-neck in the direct channel scheme. In contrast, the pub-sub network delivery model
is driven by removing such duplicate messages and performance bottlenecks and improv-
ing the system scalability. In a pub-sub network model the publishers and the subscribers
communicate via an overlay network (see Figure 18) of nodes connected to one another on
top of an existing IP network infrastructure. The publisher sends a publication only to a
relatively small subset of nodes in the pub-sub network. The pub-sub network decouples
the publishers from the subscribers such that a publisher does not need to be aware of the
IP-addresses of all the subscribers. Instead, the pub-sub network is responsible for efficient
routing of the publications to the relevant subscribers.
Several pub-sub systems [16, 12, 25] have been developed to provide highly scalable and
flexible messaging support for distributed systems. Siena [16] and Gryphon [12] are large
pub-sub system capable of content-aware routing. Scribe [25] is an anonymous P2P pub-
sub system. Most work on pub-sub systems have focused on performance, scalability and
availability. Unfortunately, very little effort has been expended on studying the security
aspects of these systems.
It is important to note that both performance and security of pub-sub systems are closely
related to the intended usage models. For example, in a scenario where all the subscribers
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wish to receive all the event notifications, broadcast is a more economical scheme than
content-based pub-sub in terms of messaging cost. Similarly, in a scenario where subscribers
can be divided into groups, group addresses and memberships are statically bound, it may
be cost-effective to create multicast groups, as each static subset of subscribers is interested
in the same notifications. However, when the set of subscribers interested in an event
notification is big in size, changes frequently, and geographically disparate, the eligibility of
group membership is evaluated dynamically and across multiple administrative domains, a
content-based pub-sub overlay service infrastructure is a less costly scheme.
Significant amount of work has been done in the field of secure group communication on
multicast networks (survey [75]). Such systems can leverage secure group-based multicast
techniques and group key management techniques to provide forward and backward security,
scalability and performance. The key problem in such systems arise due to the fact that
IP multicast does not provide any mechanisms for preventing non-group members to have
access to group communication. A significant restriction with secure group communication
is that the group membership has to be predefined. In contrast, EventGuard permits
flexible membership at the granularity of subscriptions. Second, EventGuard uses an overlay
network and does not rely on IP multicast technology primarily because there have not been
Internet scale deployment of the IP multicast protocol.
Wang et al. [109] analyze the security issues and requirements in a content-based pub-
sub system. This chapter identifies that the general security needs of a pub-sub application
includes confidentiality, integrity and availability. More specifically they identify authenti-
cation of publications, integrity of publications, subscription integrity and service integrity
as the key issues. The chapter presents a detailed description of these problems in the
context of a content-based pub-sub system, but fails to offer any concrete solutions.
Opyrchal and Prakash [66] analyze secure distribution of events in a content-based
pub-sub network from a group key management standpoint. They show that previous
techniques for dynamic group key management fail in a pub-sub scenario since every event
can potentially have a different set of interested subscribers. They use a key caching based
technique that relies on subscription popularity to reduce the number of encryptions and to
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increase message throughput. However, their approach requires that the pub-sub network
nodes (brokers) are completely trustworthy. EventGuard aims to providing security to the
subscribers while maintaining confidentiality even from the pub-sub network nodes.
3.9 Summary
We have presented EventGuard, a dependable system architecture for protecting pub-sub
services from various attacks. EventGuard offers security features that are critical to pub-
sub overlay services, such as authenticity, confidentiality, integrity, and resilience to flood-
ing based DoS attacks. We have described the two key components of EventGuard: The
first component is a suite of security guards that secure the basic publish and subscribe
operations from DoS attacks and unauthorized reads and writes. These guards can be
plugged-into a wide-area content-based pub-sub system in a seamless manner. The second
component is a resilient pub-sub network design that is capable of providing secure and yet
scalable message routing, countering message dropping-based DoS attacks. A unique feature
of EventGuard is its unified security framework that meets both security goal for safeguard-
ing the pub-sub overlay services from various vulnerabilities and threats and performance
goal for maintaining the simplicity and scalability of the overall system while providing
security guarantees. We have reported a series of experimental evaluations, showing that
EventGuard can secure a pub-sub overlay service with minimal performance penalty. Our
prototype implementation on top of Siena [16] also demonstrates that EventGuard is easily




Peer-to-Peer VoIP (Voice-over-IP) networks, exemplified by Skype, have become increas-
ingly popular because they offer significant cost advantage and richer call forwarding features
than traditional public switched telephone networks (PSTN). One of the most important
features of a VoIP network is its ability to provide privacy for VoIP clients. The VoIP
network uses a peer-to-peer infrastructure (like KaZaa in the case of Skype) to lookup
VoIP clients and route voice traffic. This chapter investigates the problem of protecting
the identity of a caller from malicious nodes in the VoIP network. We describe two attacks
on a VoIP network: a timing analysis attack on the session initiation protocol and a flow
analysis attack on the voice session. We have developed solutions to defend a VoIP network
against these attacks. We describe an implementation of our caller identification guards as
pluggable modules into an open source peer-to-peer Phex client. We present a detailed ex-
perimental evaluation to demonstrate the performance and scalability of our guards, while
protecting caller identity on a VoIP network.
4.1 Introduction
Voice over IP (VoIP), also known as Internet telephony or IP telephony, is emerging as a ma-
ture and practical technology alternative to traditional public switched telephone networks
(PSTN). VoIP technology enables people to make phone calls through public Internet. As
audio quality, bandwidth usage, and setup convenience are reaching acceptable levels, many
organizations have switched to VoIP. According to TeleGeography Research [3], world wide
VoIP’s share of voice traffic has grown from 12.8% in 2003 to an estimated 75% in 2007.
One of the most prevailing reasons for such rapid VoIP deployment is reduced costs [4].
Another indisputable reason is the fact that VoIP represents a significant step towards the
integration of voice and data networks.
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As organizations begin to combine voice and data traffic into a single network, they must
ensure manageability, performance, and security, including authorization, authentication,
confidentiality and integrity, as well as privacy of phone conversations. Preserving privacy
means not only hiding the content of voice traffic, but also hiding who is talking to whom.
VoIP security has attracted attentions from both academics and industry in the recent
years. Much of the research and development in VoIP security has concentrated on end
to end encryption techniques [2]. Such techniques assume that the VoIP network makes it
easier to provide anonymity because most VoIP calls are typically made between computers;
and these computers have no phone numbers associated with them. Therefore, voice traffic
can be protected using end-to-end encryption and routed through low latency anonymizing
networks, such as Onion Routing [40], Tor [28], Tarzan [37], or Freedom [11].
Only recently, some researchers have reported vulnerabilities that enables tracking en-
crypted VoIP flows between two VoIP clients (or so called end point or user agent) [110],
and denial of service (DoS) attacks [89]. Surprisingly, very few have studied the potential
timing analysis attacks on the network of VoIP relay nodes (proxy nodes) and their detri-
mental threats to the caller identification problem. This chapter investigates the problem
of protecting the identity of a caller (say, its IP-address) from malicious nodes in the VoIP
network. For our study, we use the popular Skype [2] VoIP system (used by several millions
of users world wide).
The Skype VoIP system uses two main protocols for call control and data delivery.
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [81] is used to control call setup and termination, while
Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) [88] is used for media delivery. A VoIP call in Skype
is processed in two phases. In the lookup phase, the caller searches for the receiver node
(identifier by a SIP URL, e.g., sip:my-db.research.ibm.com) and sets up a voice path
between the caller and the receiver on the VoIP network. The voice path is a sequence of
nodes starting with the caller and ending with the receiver such that any two consecutive
nodes are neighbors in the VoIP overlay network. In the voice phase, the caller and the
receiver send voice packets along the established bi-directional voice path. Once the voice
path is set up, low latency anonymizing networks may be used to protect the identity of
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the caller and the receiver in the voice phase [110]. VoIP networks use a peer-to-peer
infrastructure (like KaZaa [50] in the context of Skype) to lookup VoIP clients (identified
by their SIP URL) on the network. The Skype lookup protocol use a Breath First Search
(BFS) based broadcast mechanism to search for a SIP URL on the network and identifies
the shortest path on the VoIP network between a caller and a receiver.
4.2 Preliminaries: Skype Lookup Protocol
A Skype like VoIP system uses the two main protocols: Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) for
call setup and termination, and Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) for media delivery. As
we mentioned in the introduction, a VoIP call in Skype is processed in two phases. In the
session initiation phase, the caller searches for the receiver node identified by a SIP URL
using a peer-to-peer lookup mechanism and sets up a voice path between the caller and
the receiver on the VoIP network. In the voice delivery phase, the caller and the receiver
send voice packets along the established bi-directional voice path. SIP architecture uses
two basic types of components: SIP clients and SIP proxy servers. Each SIP client is a
combination of two entities, the SIP phone and the SIP location server. Each SIP proxy
server is either an edge proxy or a relay proxy node. The focus of this chapter is to study
the timing attacks on the VoIP flow in the VoIP network rather than the VoIP flow between
a SIP client and its edge proxy node.
The Skype VoIP network is based on the KaZaa peer-to-peer technology which employs
a super-peer topology to classify peers into two classes: strong peers (VoIP proxies) and
weak peers (VoIP clients). Every peer p in the VoIP network has a set of neighbors ngh(p)
on the Skype overlay network. The VoIP proxies are connected with one another using a
power-law like topology [50]. Each of the VoIP clients is connected to exactly one VoIP
proxy. Figure 35 illustrates a Skype-like VoIP network topology.
A VoIP call is initiated from a source peer (caller) by issuing a lookup request on the
VoIP network using the SIP URL of the destination peer (receiver). The Skype search
protocol operates in four steps. First, the initSearch initiates a route set up the request
from a VoIP client src. Second, the processSearch processes a search request at some
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Figure 36: Shortest Path
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peer on the VoIP network. Third, the processResult processes the results of a search
request at some peer on the VoIP network. Fourth, the finSearch concludes the route set
up procedure. We below describe these four operations in detail, which are important for
understanding the triangulation based timing attacks to be discussed in the next section.
initSearch. A VoIP client src initiates a search for a receiver dst by broadcasting
search(searchId, sipurl = dst.sipurl, ts = curT ime) to all peers p ∈ ngh(src). The
search identifier searchId is a long randomly chosen unique identifier and ts denotes the
time stamp at which the search request was initiated.
processSearch. Let a peer p receive search(searchId, sipurl, ts) from its neighbor q. If
peer p has seen searchId in the recent past then it drops the search request. Otherwise,
peer p checks if sipurl is the URL of a VoIP client connected to p. If yes, peer p returns its
IP address using result(searchId, p) to peer q. If not, peer p broadcasts search(searchId,
sipurl, ts) to all peers p′ ∈ ngh(p)−{q} and caches the search identifier 〈searchId, sipurl,
q〉 in its recently seen list. Note that p′ has no knowledge of where the search request is
initiated.
processResult. Let a peer p receive result(searchId, q) from peer q. Peer p looks up
its cache of recently seen search queries to locate 〈searchId, sipurl, prev〉. Peer p adds a
routing entry 〈sipurl, q〉 and forwards result(searchId, p) to peer prev.
finSearch. When the peer src receives result(searchId, q) from peer q, it adds a routing
entry 〈dst, q〉 to its routing table.
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4.3 Attacks on the Session Initiation Protocol
The first contribution of the chapter is to identify attacks on the lookup phase (SIP) of the
VoIP protocols that attempt to compromise caller identity on the VoIP networks. These
attacks allow a malicious node on the VoIP network to passively observe the time instants
at which they receive search requests and use the VoIP network topology information to
determine the caller. We describe three timing attacks on the VoIP network lookup proto-
col with increasing sophistication: deterministic triangulation, stochastic triangulation and
differential triangulation. All of the three attacks exploit the broadcast nature of the search
protocol and its shortest path properties to identify the caller with high probability. First,
we illustrate triangulation based timing attacks in a simplified setting to highlight the key
properties of such attacks. Concretely, we make two assumptions: (i) the network link la-
tencies are deterministic, and (ii) all nodes in the network have a tightly synchronized clock.
Second, we relax the first assumption by showing how statistical triangulation attacks can
operate on stochastic link latencies (for arbitrary probability distributions) using the notion
of stochastic shortest paths. Third, we further relax the second assumption by developing
differential analysis techniques to show how differential triangulation attacks can operate
solely on relative time instants at which the search request was received by the malicious
nodes. The differential triangulation attack can tolerate arbitrary clock skews and is thus
agnostic to clock synchronization.
The second main contribution of this chapter is the security mechanisms we have de-
veloped to defend against such attacks. Our caller identification guards are designed based
on two important observations. First, our triangulation-based attacks have shown that
the broadcast nature of the Skype lookup protocol along with its shortest path properties
are the primary vulnerabilities that make it susceptible to the caller identification attacks.
Second, it is widely acknowledged that a one-way latency of 250ms in a VoIP network is
nearly unperceivable to a human user and one-way latency up to 400ms is considered accept-
able [95]. Hence, instead of identifying the shortest path between the caller and the receiver,
we identify a voice path whose one-way latency is smaller than maxLat = 250ms. We first
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construct a random walk based search algorithm that is resilient to triangulation based
timing attacks. However, the voice paths constructed using this lookup algorithm exhibit
large path latency ( maxLat), thereby making it infeasible for practical deployment.
We develop three security guards that alleviate caller identification attacks and yet
satisfy the one-way latency constraint of maxLat = 250ms. Our caller identification guards
implement two key ideas. First, we introduce uncertainty into timing information by adding
stochastic perturbations to the network latencies. Second, we propose two search algorithms
that combine random walk and broadcast algorithms with the goal of reducing lookup
latency and yet providing better protection against triangulation based timing attacks. We
describe an implementation of our caller identification guards as pluggable modules into an
open source peer-to-peer Phex client [1]. We present a detailed experimental evaluation that
demonstrates the performance and scalability of our security guards against triangulation
based timing attacks in the VoIP proxy networks, while protecting caller identity on a VoIP
network.
4.3.1 Caller Identification Attacks
The caller identification attacks we consider here are timing analysis based attacks [107].
Timing attacks are serious threats to the low latency network systems [28, 40, 11] and are
easy to exploit by well placed malicious attackers [114]. In this section we present three
types of triangulation based timing attacks. We assume that the VoIP network topology
is publicly known and that some of the network nodes (VoIP proxies) may be malicious.
Malicious nodes may collude with one another and use the triangulation based timing
attacks descried in this section to mount caller identification attacks. In the remaining of
this section, we describe the basic model and three representative types of triangulation
based timing attacks on the VoIP lookup protocol.
4.3.1.1 Triangulation Attacks: the Basic Model
Triangulation based timing attack is a type of timing analysis wherein a malicious node
logs the time instants at which it received a search request, find a candidate set of nodes
that have a high probability of being the caller, and utilize high correlations to infer the
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origin of a call request by aggregating the timing analysis results from multiple malicious
nodes. In principle, a triangulation based timing attack operates in three steps: candidate
caller detection, candidate caller ranking, and triangulation. In the candidate
caller detection step, malicious nodes passively observe the time instants at which they
receive the search requests. Each malicious node (independently) uses this information and
the topology of the VoIP network to deduce a set of candidate callers. In the candidate
caller ranking step, malicious nodes associate a score with each such candidate caller s
that denotes the likelihood of s being the actual caller. In the triangulation step, two or
more malicious nodes combine their sets of candidate callers to obtain a much more concise
and yet precise list of candidate callers.
Concretely, we have identified three triangulation attacks, aiming at compromising the
identity of the caller, with increasing sophistication. The first one is called deterministic
triangulation attack, which illustrates the effect of the attack using a simplistic model of the
VoIP network. We assume that the overlay network latencies are deterministic and that the
clocks on all nodes in the network are tightly synchronized. Then we describe the stochastic
triangulation attack, which relaxes the first constraint and operates on arbitrary probabil-
ity distribution functions over the network latencies. Finally, we present the differential
triangulation attack, which further removes the tight clock synchronization requirement
between all the nodes in the network. It assumes that only the colluding malicious nodes
use synchronized clocks, while the clock skew between any two good nodes or a good node
and a malicious node can be arbitrarily large.
4.3.1.2 Deterministic Triangulation Attacks
By considering triangulation attack in a deterministic latency model of VoIP networks, it
allows us to gain a better understanding of both the properties of the Skype lookup protocol
and the essence of triangulation inference in the context of VoIP network. In this section,
we first use an ideal setup of VoIP network with deterministic latencies to derive some useful
properties about the Skype lookup protocol. Then we show how these properties can be
exploited to construct caller identification attacks.
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4.3.1.3 Skype Lookup Protocol Properties
By assuming deterministic latencies of the VoIP network, we observe two important prop-
erties of the Skype broadcast based lookup protocol: First, the search protocol identifies
the shortest path from a caller proxy src to a receiver proxy dst. Second, every node p that
receives the search request knows the length of the shortest path from src to p. Formally,
Lemma 4.3.1 Let us suppose that the overlay link latencies are deterministic and that
all the network nodes have tightly synchronized clocks. Let dist(x, y) denote the length of
the shortest path between nodes x and y. The Skype lookup protocol satisfies the following
properties:
(i) The protocol establishes the shortest route between the two nodes src and dst.
(ii) Any node p on the network that receives the search request originated from node src
knows dist(src, p).
Proof A sketch of the proof is provided here. When a peer p first receives a search re-
quest, that request must have traversed the shortest route between src and p. In step
processSearch, a peer p can estimate dist(src, p) using the time stamp ts on the search
request and time instant at which the request was received by peer p. Also, if the peer p
received the first search request from its neighbor q, then the shortest route from src to p is
via q. Using mathematical induction on the number of hops traversed by a search request,
one can show that the route set up step (processResult) builds the fastest overlay network
path from src to dst.
Figure 36 illustrates the Skype lookup protocol with src = p1 and dst = p7. The links in
the VoIP network are labeled with link latencies (assumed to be deterministic). We label
each node with the time instant at which it received the first lookup request starting with
peer p1 at time t = 0. Evidently, the protocol establishes the shortest route p1 ↔ p3 ↔ p6
↔ p7.
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4.3.1.4 Deterministic Shortest Path Triangulation Attack
To simplify the discussion, we first discuss the deterministic triangulation attack under the
shortest path assumption, that is, a node on the network does not exploit the fact that it
may receive multiple copies of a search request. We will discuss multi-path deterministic
triangulation attack in the next subsection.
The deterministic shortest path triangulation attack exploits the properties of the
Skype lookup protocol and constructs the attack in three steps. The candidate caller
detection step operates as follows. Let p be a malicious node that received a search re-
quest originating from src at time t = 0. The malicious node p can compute dist(s, p) for
all nodes s in the network using Dijkstra’s shortest path algorithm in O(|E|) time (where,
|E| is the number of edges in the network). Given the time instant t at which the request
was received by peer p, p can estimate dist(src, p) = tp. Node p compiles a list of potential
callers, denoted by S(p), such that for any s ∈ S(p), |dist(s, p)− tp| < ε holds, where ε is a
system supplied control parameter.
In the candidate caller ranking step, the peer p computes the score for every node
s ∈ S(p) as scorep(s) = 1|dist(s,p)−tp| , and sorts all nodes in S(p) in the descending order of
their scores. The top ranked node s has the highest likelihood of being the caller.
The triangulation step aims at reducing the size of the candidate suspect sets gener-
ated by the n malicious peers (n ≥ 2). Concretely, a set of colluding malicious nodes, say p1,
p2, · · · , pn, can reduce the number of suspects by computing an intersection (triangulating)
over S(p1), S(p2), · · · , S(pn). The caller is the node s that resides in the intersection and
has the highest score scorepi(s) for every i ∈ [1, n]. Figure 37 illustrates a triangulation
with two malicious nodes p1 and p2. Note that assuming deterministic network latencies
makes this attack error free, that is, the caller src is guaranteed to be a member of the
suspect set S.
To illustrate the effectiveness of deterministic triangulation attacks under different pa-
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Figure 39: Caller Identi-






















Figure 40: Caller Identi-
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nodes [86]. The topology is constructed using the standard GT-ITM topology genera-
tor [125] with node-to-node round trip latencies varying from 24ms-150ms with a mean of
74ms.
Figure 38 shows the distribution of the number of nodes at a distance d from a randomly
chosen node p. Observe that if dist(src, p) is either very small or very large then the size of
the set S(p) is likely to be very small. However, without triangulation the attack is largely
ineffective in identifying a small and yet accurate suspect set. Figure 39 shows the number
of suspects as we vary the number of malicious nodes in the network with ε = 10ms. Observe
that the number of suspects with one malicious node is 343; with 10 malicious nodes, the
number of suspects is reduced drastically to 1.17 (almost uniquely identifying the caller
with high probability). This demonstrates the effectiveness of this attack even with a small
number of malicious nodes.
Figure 40 shows the number of suspects as we vary the parameter ε with 10 malicious
nodes. A small value for ε yields the best results. However, when ε is set too small, even
introducing a small uncertainty in the network link latencies (say, small jitters) may result
in either an empty suspect set or an incorrect suspect set (src /∈ S). On the other hand,
a large value for ε identifies a huge candidate set, thereby making the attack less effective.
We use the notion of stochastic shortest paths in Section 4.3.1.5 to handle uncertainties in
network latencies.
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4.3.1.5 Stochastic Triangulation Attack
In this section, we relax the deterministic link latency assumption by modeling the link
latencies by independent probability distribution functions. Let us suppose that latency
of an edge e in the network graph is described using a mean µe and variance σ
2
e . There
are several distributions that are exactly described using only mean and variance, including
Gaussian, uniform, binomial, exponential distribution, etc. The mean and the variance serve
as a good approximation for arbitrary random variables. We extend Dijkstra’s shortest path
algorithm to operate on stochastic link latencies. The primary idea here is as follows:
• Let Z = X + Y , where X and Y are independent random variables. Then, µZ = µX







• We say that the relationship (µ1, σ21)  (µ2, σ22) holds if µ1 ≤ µ2 ∧ σ21 ≤ σ22, and the
relationship (µ1, σ
2
1) ‖ (µ2, σ22) holds if µ1 ≤ µ2 ∧ σ21 ≥ σ22 or µ2 ≤ µ1 ∧ σ22 ≥ σ21.
Unlike the deterministic setting, the length of a path on the VoIP network is described as
a two tuple (µ, σ2), where µ is the mean path length and σ2 is the variance of the path
length. A path of length (µ1, σ
2
1) is shorter than a path of length (µ2, σ
2





2). A path of length (µ1, σ
2
1) is neither shorter nor longer than a path of length (µ2,
σ22) if (µ1, σ
2
1) ‖ (µ2, σ22). Figure 41 describes a stochastic shortest path algorithm that
computes a list of Pareto-optimal shortest path lengths from a node p to all the other nodes
on the network. A set of path lengths d1 = (µ1, σ
2
1), d2 = (µ2, σ
2
2), · · · , dm = (µm, σ2m) is
Pareto-optimal if di ‖ dj for all i and j such that i 6= j and 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m.
Now we sketch a stochastic triangulation attack in terms of the three step process. Simi-
lar to deterministic triangulation attacks, the first step is the candidate caller detection,
which identifies a candidate suspect set for a given request. Let p be a malicious node that
received a search request from src. For every node v in the network, p computes the shortest
stochastic distance distp[v] using the algorithm in Figure 41. Recall that distp[v] is a set
of Pareto-optimal stochastic distances between node v and node p. The node p estimates
dist(src, p) = tp (a scalar), where tp denotes the time instant at which node p received the
first search request (assuming the request was initiated by the caller src at time t = 0). A
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node v is added to the suspect set S(p) if there exists d ∈ distp[v] such that d = (µd, σ2d)
and |tp − µd| < ε.
The second step is to compute ranking score for each node v ∈ S(p) in terms of the
likelihood that v is the caller. If the link latency distributions were Gaussian, then one can
show that the distribution of all distances d ∈ distp[v] are Gaussian. Given d = (µd, σ2d) ∈
distp[v], one can use the Gaussian distribution to determine the likelihood that d matches
the observation dist(src, p) = tp as ld = Gaussµd,σ2d
(tp), where Gauss denotes a Gaussian
distribution.
For other probability distribution functions, we compute an approximation to this like-
lihood using Chebyshev inequality:
Pr(|X − µ| ≥ kσ) ≤ 1
k2
(11)
Hence, given dist(src, p) = tp and d = (µd, σ
2
d) ∈ distp[v], we determine the likelihood that
d matches tp as ld =
1
k2




Therefore, one straightforward method to compute this ranking score, denoted by scorep(v),
is to use the maximum likelihood ld over all d ∈ distp[v].
The third step is to perform the triangulation analysis in order to reduce the number
of the candidate suspect nodes. Given a set of n malicious nodes, say p1, p2, · · · , pn, we




. Now, the adversary
sorts all the nodes in the descending order of their aggregated scores. The caller is very
likely to have a high score and thus appear within the top few entries.
Figure 42 shows that the stochastic triangulation attack is more effective than a deter-
ministic triangulation attack when there are uncertainties in link latencies. We assume that
there are ten malicious nodes in the network. The figure shows the probability that the
caller appears in the top-10 entries using a Gaussian distribution for link latencies (σe:µe
on x-axis). The figure shows the results for the deterministic triangulation attack using
the best setting for the parameter ε. Note that initially as ε increases the probability of
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Stochastic Shortest Path(Graph G, Peer p)
(1) for each vertex v ∈ V (G)
(2) dist[v] = {(∞, ∞)}
(3) label[v] = false
(4) end for
(5) dist[p] = (0, 0)
(6) label[p] = true
(7) while pick a labeled vertex v
(8) label[v] = false
(9) for each neighbor u ∈ ngh(v)
(10) label[u] = true
(11) for each distance (µv, σ
2
v) ∈ dist[v]






(13) remove any d′ ∈ dist[u] if d  d′
(14) add d to set dist[u] if for every d′ ∈




Figure 41: Stochastic Shortest Path Algorithm
the deterministic triangulation attack increases; however, after a critical value, increasing ε
decreases the effectiveness of the attack.
Figure 43 shows the probability that the caller appears in the top-10 entries in the ranked
list for three different link latency distributions: Gaussian, Weibull and Pareto distributions
[82], by varying the number of malicious nodes. We set the σe:µe = 0.25. Even for a
small number of malicious nodes increases, the probability of a successful attack increases





































































Figure 44: 10 Malicious
Nodes
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it does not use Chebyshev inequality to compute an approximate score. Pareto distribution
reduces the efficacy of the attacks the most because of its higher order moments [83] are
larger than the Weibull distribution. Thus, the Chebyshev inequality based approximation
for the Weibull distribution is better than that for the Pareto distribution.
Figure 44 shows the probability that the caller appears in the top-κ entries in the
ranked list for varying κ under three types of link latency distributions. There is more than
a 25% chance that the caller is the top most entry in the suspect list, thereby making the
attack highly effective. Similar to Figure 43 the attack is most effective against a Gaussian
distribution and least effective against a Pareto distribution.
4.3.1.6 Differential Triangulation Attack
The differential triangulation attack removes the tight clock synchronization requirement
between all the nodes in the network. It requires that only the colluding malicious nodes use
synchronized clocks. Thus, the time stamp ts in the search request could be some randomly
generated number thereby making it hard for a malicious node p to estimate dist(src, p).
The key idea behind differential triangulation attack is that, two colluding malicious nodes p
and q can estimate the difference dist(src, p)−dist(src, q)=tp−tq based on the time instants
(tp and tq) at which the first broadcast packet was received by the nodes p and q.
The differential triangulation attack follows the same steps of a stochastic triangulation
attack and estimates the stochastic distance of every node v from node p: distp[v]. Recall
that distp[v] is a set of Pareto-optimal stochastic shortest path lengths from node v to node
p. We approximate distp[v] by computing a mean over all stochastic distances d ∈ distp[v]






∗∑d∈distp[v] σ2d). One can now compute the stochastic
distance distpq[v] = d̂istp[v]−d̂istq[v] as (µp[v] − µq[v], σ2p[v] + σ2q [v]), where d̂istp[v] =
(µp[v], σ
2
p[v]) and d̂istq[v] = (µq[v], σ
2
q [v]). Finally, we add a node v to the candidate caller
set if |(tp − tq)− (µp[v]− µq[v])|<ε, where ε is a system supplied parameter.
We assign a score to a node v (scorepq(v)) based on the likelihood that the stochastic
distance distpq[v] matches the observation tp−tq. The likelihood computations are similar to












































































Figure 47: 10 Malicious
Nodes
the link latency distribution is Gaussian scorepq(v) = Gaussµp[v]−µq [v],σ2p[v]+σ2q [v](tp−tq). For
all other distributions we use an approximation based on Chebyshev inequality scorepq(v)
= 1
k2






When there are more than two colluding malicious nodes p1, p2, · · · , pn, the triangulation
step operates as follows. First, we use one arbitrarily chosen malicious node (say p1) as
the reference node. We compute scorepip1(v) for all nodes v and i > 1. We compute the
average score for a node v as
∑n
i=2 scorepip1 (v)
n−1 . The nodes are sorted in decreasing order of
their scores. Similar to stochastic triangulation attack, the caller is likely to have a high
score and thus appear within the top few entries.
Figure 45 compares the differential triangulation attack against the stochastic triangula-
tion attack. Assuming that the clock on all nodes is synchronized, the stochastic triangula-
tion attack performs slightly better. On the other hand, the stochastic and the deterministic
triangulation attacks are completely ineffective when the clocks are out of synch. Figures 46
and 47 shows the probability of a successful attack using three types of link latency distri-
butions. These results are similar to that for stochastic triangulation attack, albeit a small
decrease in the probability of success. Nonetheless, the differential triangulation attack can
operate even when the time stamp ts is substituted with some randomly generated number.
4.3.2 Countering Triangulation based Timing Attacks
4.3.2.1 Design Overview
A careful study of triangulation timing attacks leads us to believe that the shortest path
nature of the broadcast search algorithm is a fundamental source that gives the attackers
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an opportunity to mount the caller identification attacks. Even though we have identified
deterministic, stochastic, and differential triangulation based timing attacks, we conjecture
that other types of statistical inference attacks on distributed shortest path algorithms may
exist. Thus solutions to countering statistical timing attacks should fundamentally change
the search algorithm by introducing uncertainty into the search protocol.
Interestingly, it is widely acknowledged that a one-way latency of 250ms is nearly unper-
ceivable to a human user and one-way latency up to 400ms is considered acceptable [95] in
all VoIP systems in practice. In fact, these are the baselines for setting the system-supplied
timeout for messages on the VoIP networks. Therefore, in a VoIP network one does not
need to identify the shortest path between the caller and the receiver. We exploit this fact
to device a more secure and yet efficient search protocol that can identify a voice path while
preserving real-time latency constraint.
One approach to countering caller identification attacks is to add random noise to both
link latencies and the VoIP lookup algorithm. We can introduce random noise into link
latencies in the Skype lookup protocol by having each node add some stochastic perturbation
before broadcasting a search request to all its neighbors. The first mechanism implemented
in our caller identification guard is to add a Gaussian noise (µnoise, σ
2
noise) with a low
mean and high variance. A low µnoise ensures that the latency of the VoIP path is near
optimal. A high σ2noise adds uncertainty into triangulation based timing analysis, thereby
reducing its effectiveness. Nonetheless, this is equivalent to replacing the latency of each
edge e described by link latency (µe, σ
2





Clearly, the stochastic and differential analysis attacks apply even in the presence of latency
perturbations.
Another approach is to use a random walk based search algorithm that is resilient to
triangulation based timing attack. However, the random walk approach may set up highly
sub-optimal voice paths, thereby violating the one-way latency constraint. To guarantee
the real-time property and yet provide resilience to triangulation based timing attacks, we
propose a deferred shortest path broadcast search algorithm with two control knobs: γ
for controlling the random walk path length and ω for controlling the number of random
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walkers a node may support. By carefully tuning these two control knobs, we can provide
an effective combination of the random walk and the broadcast algorithm with the goal
of reducing lookup latency and yet providing better protection against caller identification
attacks.
In the rest of this section, we first discuss the random walk search algorithm and study
its lookup efficiency and its resilience to caller identification attacks. Then, we present our
deferred shortest path broadcast algorithm that carefully combines the random walk search
with broadcast search. We report our experimental evaluation results and demonstrate the
effectiveness of these algorithms against triangulation based timing attacks described in
Section 4.3.
4.3.2.2 Random Walk Search Algorithm
Similar to the Skype protocol the random walk search algorithm operates in four steps.
initSearch. A VoIP client src initiates a search for a receiver dst (identified by its SIP
URL) by sending search(searchId, sipurl = dst.sipurl) to a uniformly and randomly
chosen neighbor q ∈ ngh(src). The search identifier searchId is a long randomly chosen
unique identifier.
processSearch. Let a peer p receive search(searchId, sipurl) from its neighbor q. Peer
p checks if sipurl is the URL of a VoIP client connected to p. If yes, peer p returns its
IP address result(searchId, p) to peer q. If not, peer p uniformly and randomly chooses a
neighbor q ∈ ngh(p). The peer p sends search(searchId, sipurl) to all peers q. If the peer
p has not previously seen the search identifier searchId, it caches 〈searchId, sipurl, q〉 in
its recently seen list.
processResult. Let a peer p receive result(searchId, q) from peer q. Peer p looks up
its cache of recently seen search queries to locate 〈searchId, sipurl, prev〉. Peer p adds a
routing entry 〈sipurl, q〉 and forwards result(searchId, prev) to peer prev.
finSearch. When the peer src receives result(searchId, q) from peer q, it adds a routing
entry 〈dst, q〉 to its routing table.
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There are two interesting properties of the random walk based search algorithm that
makes it resilient to triangulation based timing attacks. First, the Markovian property
(memoryless) of the random walk algorithm makes it resilient to triangulation based timing
attacks. Let us suppose that a random walker visits two malicious nodes p1 and p2 in
time t1 and t2 (respectively) with t1 < t2. The Markovian property of the random walk
algorithm ensures that the time instants at which the request reaches p2 nodes do not leak
any additional information to the adversary. Formally, given the fact that a random walker
visited node p1 first, the probability that it would visit node p2 in the future is independent
of the caller src.
Pr(visit p2 | visit p1 ∧ caller = src) = Pr(visit p2 | visit p1)
Hence, neither the time instant t2 or the difference t2−t1 provides any additional information
to the adversary. In fact, the above argument holds for any number malicious nodes visited
by the random walker. Hence, when a random walker visits a set of malicious nodes p1, p2,
· · · , pn (in that order), the only useful information is the fact that the random walker first
visited node p1. Formally,
Pr(src = v | visit p1, p2, · · · pn) = Pr(src = v | visit p1 first)
Second, the random walk algorithm is not vulnerable to shortest path based timing attacks
because a random walker does not essentially traverse the shortest path between any two
nodes. We use random walk distance based timing attacks to study the resilience of the
random walk algorithm. We define random walk distance between two nodes u and v
(rwdistu[v]) as the expected number of hops required for a random walker to reach node v
starting from node u. Unlike the shortest path distance, the random walk distance between
two nodes u and v may not be symmetric, that is, rwdistu[v] 6= rwdistv[u].
Let p be the first malicious node that received a search request originating from caller
src. If there exists no such node p then the search was completely secure. For every node
v, we compute the probability a random walk starting from node v reaches malicious node
p before it reaches any other malicious node in the network. Using standard Markov model
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theory, we model the random walk using a transition probability matrix M . An entry Mij
= 1|ngh(i)| if j ∈ ngh(i); 0 otherwise, where ngh(i) denotes the set of neighbors of peer i. Mij
denotes the probability that a random walker will visit node j given the walker is currently
in node i. We determine the probability that a random walker starting from node v reaches
node u in step d prdv [u] from πM
d, where π is a row vector with π[i] = 1 if i = v; 0 otherwise.











While theoretically the summation extends up to infinity, in practice prdv [p] tends to converge
to a steady state value for all d > O(N log N), where N is the number of nodes in the
network.
A set of colluding malicious nodes p1, p2, · · · , pn where p1 received the first random walk
request operate as follows. For every node v the adversary compiles rwdistv[pi] for all 1 ≤ i
≤ n and sort them in increasing order. Let us suppose that p1 is the ηth smallest element in
the sorted list. Then, we associate a score with node v as scorep1 [v] = η. We sort the nodes
by their score as follows: v1 ≺ v2:= (scorep1 [v1] < scorep1 [v2]) ∨ (scorep1 [v1] = scorep1 [v2]
∧ rwdistv1 [p1] < rwdistv2 [p1]). Similar to the triangulation based timing attacks, the true
caller is more likely to appear in the top few entries of this sorted list.
Figure 48 shows the efficacy of caller identification as the number of malicious nodes
increases. Figure 49 shows the probability that the actual caller appears in the top−κ
nodes of the sorted list. Even though the random walk algorithm is susceptible to caller
identification attacks, the probability of success in such an attack is significantly smaller
than that of triangulation based attacks on the Skype broadcast search protocol (see Section
4.3). For example, when the VoIP network has 10 malicious nodes, the probability that a
caller appears in the top-10 list is 0.05 using the random walk algorithm and 0.75 using the
broadcast search algorithm.
Figure 50 shows the search time and the one-way latency of the paths set up by a
random walk search algorithm. The major drawback with the random walk search algo-


























































approach infeasible for practical deployment. In the following sections, we present hybrid
techniques that attempt to combine triangulation attack resilience from the random walk
search algorithm and optimal (shortest) path setup using the broadcast search algorithm.
4.3.2.3 Deferred Shortest Path Broadcast Algorithms
In this section, we propose two hybrid techniques that combine random walk and broadcast
algorithms with the goal of reducing lookup latency and yet providing good protection
against caller identification attacks. We present detailed experimental results on these
algorithms in Section 4.3.3.
γ-Controlled Random Walk
In this section, we propose a controlled combination of the random walk search algorithm
and the broadcast search algorithm. We use a global system wide parameter γ which
limits the length of random walk. In this protocol, the search algorithm operates in two
phases: random walk search phase (RW) and broadcast search phase (B). The algorithm
starts operating at node src in phase RW. In phase RW, when a node p receives a search
request, with probability γ it continues to operate using the random walk search algorithm;
with probability 1 − γ the algorithm changes to phase B. In phase B, it uses the Skype
broadcast search algorithm to broadcast the search request. Once the request enters phase
B, it continues to operate in that phase.
This algorithm ensures that the average number of hops in the random walk phase is
1
1−γ and the probability that the length of the random walk exceeds d hops is γ
d. Starting
at node src, let us suppose that at the end of phase RW the request reaches node q. The
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broadcast algorithm identifies the shortest path between node q to node dst. Evidently, a
small value for γ ensures that the latency of the VoIP path is near optimal.
A triangulation based timing attack may identify q (broadcast initiator) with high prob-
ability. However, identifying the caller src would be non-trivial to the attackers. Let the
earliest malicious nodes that participated in phase RW be node p. If there exists no such
malicious node then we set p to the broadcast initiator q. Hence, node p is the first node
known to the adversary that received the random walk search request. Now, one can use a
similar statistical inference attack described in Section 4.3.2.2 to determine the caller. The
key difference in the inference attack is that the parameter γ reduces the probability that
a random walker starting from node v reaches node u in d hops (prdv [u]) by a factor γ
d (in
Equation 12). Clearly, a small value for γ indicates that the actual caller is close to node p
and thus improves the efficacy of a statistical inference attack.
ω-Controlled Multi-Agent Random Walk
The second solution is to use a multi-agent random walk search algorithm. This solution
is very similar to the random walk search algorithm except that the caller src sends out ω
random walkers. Sending out a large number of random walkers reduces the search time and
helps src discover a shorter path to node dst. Clearly, as ω increases the expected one-way
latency of the VoIP path decreases. Indeed one can show that as ω tends to infinity, the
path latency asymptotically decreases to the shortest path.
However, if all the random walkers were sent out by src at time t = 0, then this algorithm
is vulnerable to triangulation based timing attack. Let p(rw) denote the first malicious
node visited by random walker rw. The key idea here is that two colluding malicious nodes
p(rw1) and p(rw2) can estimate rwdistsrc[p(rw1)]−rwdistsrc[p(rw2)] when receive their first
random walk request from two different random walkers rw1 and rw2. As discussed earlier,
if the same random walker rw visits both p1 and p2 (in that order), then the adversary
does not again any additional information from p2 because of the Markovian property of
the random walk algorithm. Given an estimate of rwdistsrc[p(rw1)]−rwdistsrc[p(rw2)], this
attack is very similar to the differential triangulation attack wherein we use random walk
distance rwdist instead of the shortest distance dist (see Section 4.3).
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Obviously, rwdist has more uncertainty built into it because of the probabilistic nature
of the random walk search algorithm; thus a triangulation attack on rwdist is likely to be less
effective than a triangulation attack on dist. As the number of random walkers ω increases,
we may have ω malicious nodes p(rwi) (1 ≤ i ≤ ω) such that random walker rwi visited
malicious node p(rwi) first. Hence, a large ω improves the efficacy of the triangulation
based timing attack.
Fortunately, one can mitigate such triangulation based timing attacks using concurrent
search requests. The key idea is to ensure that a malicious node cannot associate two
random walkers with the same search request. One simplistic approach is to assign a
different searchId for each of the ω random walkers; however, since they carry the same
destination sipurl, the malicious nodes may temporally correlate all requests on the same
sipurl. We use a solution proposed by Song et al. [94] for searches on encrypted data to
ensure that the sipurl is not revealed to none other to peer dst on the VoIP network. The
peer src replaces searchId and sipurl in the search request by 〈searchId, FsearchId(sipurl)〉,
where F is a keyed pseudo-random function (PRF) and searchId is a long randomly chosen
nonce for a random walker. A peer p on the VoIP network checks whether a search request
for 〈searchId, match〉 matches sipurl by checking if FsearchId(sipurl) = match. One can
show that a peer p who does not know sipurl does not obtain any additional information
from the search request. For a detailed proof refer to [94].
4.3.3 Experimental Evaluation
4.3.3.1 Implementation Sketch
In this section, we describe a brief implementation of our algorithms using Phex [1]: an
open source Java based implementation of peer-to-peer broadcast search protocol. A VoIP
protocol like Skype operates on top of the peer-to-peer infrastructure. We have implemented
our algorithms as pluggable modules that can be weaved into the Phex client code using
AspectJ [33]. Our implementation is completely transparent to the VoIP protocol that
operates on top of the peer-to-peer infrastructure. Also, our implementation does not
require any changes to topology construction and maintenance algorithms (as nodes join,
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leave, fail or recover) and the underlying TCP/IP or UDP based communication libraries.
Below we sketch our implementation of three algorithms: latency perturbation, con-
trolled random walk and multi-agent random walk. As described in Section 4.2, a broad-
cast search protocol has four parts: initSearch, processSearch, processResult and
finSearch. Our algorithms require changes only to the processSearch part. This part is
implemented in Phex using several methods of which we are interested in only the following:
receiveRequest, checkDuplicate, matchQuery, and requestForward.
Latency perturbation requires that we add (µnoise, σ
2
noise) for every edge on the network.
This is accomplished by intercepting an outgoing search request at a Phex client using the
requestForward method. We buffer and delay the request for delay ∼ Gaussµnoise,σ2noise
time units before processing the request. The random walk search algorithm requires a
request to be processed even if its searchId has been seen in the past. We bypass the
call from the receiveRequest method to duplicateCheck method when using the random
walk search algorithm. Note that processing a request and setting up VoIP path is iden-
tical for both the controlled random walk algorithm and the broadcast search algorithm.
However, for the multi-agent random walk algorithm we intercept the method matchQuery
and substitute a simple hash table based matching operation to a PRF based matching
operation (see Section 4.3.2). Finally, we need to change the request forwarding step. We
intercept request forwarding using the requestForward method. In the broadcast algo-
rithm the requestForward method on node p returns all the nodes in ngh(p); instead, we
return only one randomly chosen neighbor.
4.3.3.2 Experimental Results
In this section we present experimental results on our algorithms for mitigating caller iden-
tification attacks: latency perturbation, controlled random walk and multi-agent random
walk. Our experiments are divided into two parts. The first part measure the performance
of these algorithms using two metrics: search time and path latency. These performance
numbers are intrinsically related to the parameters used by these algorithms: (µnoise, σ
2
noise)






















































































































































and the number of random walkers (ω) for multi-agent random walk. Using the perfor-
mance results we determine parameter settings for these algorithms such that 99% of VoIP
calls have a one-way path latency smaller than maxLat = 250ms. The second part of our
evaluation uses these parameter settings to evaluate the efficacy of these algorithms in de-
fending against caller identification attacks. We use the probability of a successful attack
as the metric for measuring the effectiveness of the attack. We study this probability as the
number of malicious nodes varies in the network.
4.3.3.3 Performance Results
Figures 51, 52 and 53 show the search time under various parameter settings for our caller
identity protection algorithms described in Section 4.3.2. Search time determines the time
period between a caller initiating a VoIP call and the establishment of a voice session
between the caller and the receiver. Larger search time causes an initial delay in session
set up but does not affect the quality of the voice conversation. Figures 54, 55 and 56
show the path latency under various parameter settings of our caller identity protection
algorithms. As described earlier, path latencies below 250ms is unperceivable to human
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99% 95% 90%
σnoise 14 15 20
γ 0.76 0.79 0.83
ω 20 18 12








































beings. However, higher path latencies are known to significantly deteriorate the quality of
voice conversations.
4.3.3.4 Optimal Parameter Setting
We randomly chose 1024 pairs of callers and receivers. We vary algorithm parameters:
increase σ2noise, γ and decrease w until X% of the pairs have a path latency under maxLat.
We use a binary search strategy to identify the optimal parameter values. For instance,
we determine σ2noise that satisfies X% latency constraint as follows. We start with a range
(0, 100), where σnoise = 0 satisfies the X% latency constraint, while σnoise = 100 does not
satisfy the constraint. Given a range (l, u) we experiment with σnoise set to
l+u
2 . If σnoise
= l+u2 satisfies X% latency constraint then the new range is set to (
l+u
2 , u); otherwise the
new range is set to (l, l+u2 ). We repeat this binary search until the size of the range (u− l)
is acceptably small. When the search terminates, we have the optimal parameter setting
σoptnoise = l.
Figure 57 summarizes our parameter settings for different percentile latency constraints.
Our goal is to study the resilience of these algorithms under the constraint that the path
latency is smaller than maxLat. Note that the resilience to caller identification attack
monotonically increases with σ2noise and γ; and monotonically decreases with ω. Hence,




In this section we compare the attack resilience of our algorithms: latency perturbation (lp),
controlled random walk (crw) and multi-agent random walk (marw). We use ω = 1 random
walker for base line comparison (rw). Giving at most importance to the quality of the voice
session, we use the 99% optimal parameter setting from figure 57 in this experiment. Of
course, one should keep in mind that the random walk search algorithm (rw) violates the
latency constraint. Figure 58 shows the probability that the actual caller appears in the top-
10 nodes of the sorted list as the number of malicious nodes increases using different attack
resilient algorithms. Figure 59 shows the probability that the actual caller appears in the
top−κ nodes of the sorted list with 10 malicious nodes in the network using different attack
resilient algorithms. These figures indicate that the latency perturbation does not offer
much resilience to caller identification attacks. The multi-agent random walk algorithm
performs the best though not matching the ω = 1 random walk algorithm. Recall that
unlike the random walk algorithm, the multi-agent random walk algorithm is vulnerable to
triangulation attacks on random walk distances.
As discussed in Section 4.3.2 the resilience of multi-agent random walk algorithm im-
proves as the number of concurrent searches increases. Note that concurrent searches make
it hard for the attackers to associate two random walkers with the same caller. Figures
58 and 59 study multi-agent random walk assuming there are no concurrent searches. A
detailed analysis on the multi-agent random walk algorithm with concurrent searches is
outside the scope of this chapter.
4.4 Attacks on Voice Session
In the first half of this section, we focus on flow analysis attacks on VoIP networks. A
flow (sufficiently long lasting packet stream) analysis attack measures the volume of flow
(packets per unit time) between two nodes on the VoIP network and uses this information in
conjunction with the VoIP network topology to determine a caller & recipient pair. Figure
60 shows the traffic volume between two Skype peers a and b as the number of VoIP flows
between a and b increases. The constant packet rate of VoIP flows makes it easier for an
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external observer to trace a flow from a caller to a receiver. Figure 61 presents a simple
scenario with two callers (s1 and s2) and two receivers (d1 and d2). Evidently an adversary
can track the volume of VoIP flow from the caller s1 to node p2 to node p5 to the recipient
d1. We describe three statistical inference based flow analysis attacks on VoIP networks
with increasing sophistication. These attacks help an adversary to identify a small list of
potential recipients for a given VoIP call.
In the second half of this section, we develop practical techniques to achieve quantifiable
and customizable privacy on VoIP networks. We reduce the efficacy of flow analysis attacks
by mixing one or more VoIP flows. The constant packet rate nature of VoIP places makes
it easy for one or more VoIP flows to be mixed without leaking much information to an
external observer. Figure 62 shows a simple example mixing two VoIP flows as against
mixing two flows with different packet rates. Indeed an external observer can infer nothing
more than the number of VoIP flows between two Skype peers a and b. Figure 63 illustrates
this approach using the two caller and two receiver scenario in Figure 61. The node p4 mixes
the two VoIP flows thereby making it hard for the adversary to determine the recipient for
a call originating from caller s1. Observe that this provides k = 2 anonymity for both the
voice calls. Intuitively, if a VoIP flow from src to dst is routed through a Skype peer that
processes a large number of flows then the caller anonymity set is likely to be large.
We propose an anonymity-aware session initiation protocol (AASIP). The AASIP pro-
tocol allows a caller src to specify a personalized and customizable anonymity parameter
k for every VoIP call. The AASIP protocol intelligently sets up a route for a VoIP flow
from src to dst on the peer-to-peer VoIP network such that the recipient anonymity set
(number of possible recipients inferred by the adversary) is at least as large as k. There
are at least two important challenges in designing the AASIP protocol. First, the real time
nature of voice conversations mandate that the end-to-end one-way latency is no larger
than a threshold maxLat; typically, delays up to 250ms is unperceivable to a human user,
while delays up to 400ms is considered acceptable [95]. Second, the resource constraints on
a Skype peer limit the total number of VoIP flows maxFlow that can be routed through it.
In the final portion of this section, we discuss potential attacks on the AASIP protocol
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Num VoIp Flows 1 4 16 64
IP Bandwidth (Kbps) 24 96 384 1536
Figure 60: VoIP Flow Bandwidth: G.729A (CS-CELP)










Figure 61: Flow Analysis
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Figure 63: Resisting Flow
Analysis Attack
assuming that the nodes in the VoIP network may be malicious. We use a semi-honest (hon-
est but curious) model for the malicious Skype peers. For instance, a malicious Skype peer
may reveal the mapping between its in-flows and out-flows thereby reducing the anonymity
of a VoIP flow. We discuss two other inference attacks on the AASIP protocol and sketch
solutions to mitigate them.
4.4.1 Flow Analysis Attacks
In this section, we describe three statistical inference based flow analysis attacks on VoIP
networks. These attacks exploit the flow information and the shortest path nature of the
voice paths to identify pairs of caller and receiver on the VoIP network. We assume that the
adversary is aware the VoIP network topology. We represent the VoIP network topology
as a weighted graph G=〈V , E〉, where V is the set of nodes and E ⊆ V×V is the set
of undirected edges. The weight of an edge e = (p, q) (denoted by w(p, q)) is the latency
















Figure 65: Shortest Path Tracing
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of voice flows between two nodes p and q on the VoIP network such that (p, q) ∈ E.
4.4.1.1 Tracing Algorithm
Let us consider a caller src. We use a Boolean variable f(p) ∈ {0, 1} to denote whether
the node p is reachable from src using the measured flows on the VoIP network. One can
determine f(p) for all nodes p in O(|E|) time as follows. The base case of the recursion is
f(src) = 1. For any node q, we set f(q) to one if there exists a node p such that (p, q) ∈ E
∧ f(p) = 1 ∧ nf(p→ q) > 0.
Trace(Graph G=〈V , E〉, Caller src)
(1) for each vertex v ∈ V
(2) f [v] = 0; label[v] = false
(3) end for
(4) f [src] = 1; label[src] = true
(5) while pick a labeled vertex v
(6) label[v] = false
(7) for each node u such that (u, v) ∈ E
(8) if (f [u] = 0)




Figure 66: Tracing Algorithm
Let us consider a sample topology shown in Figure 64. For the sake of simplicity assume
that each edge has unit latency. The label on the edges in Figure 64 indicates the number
of voice flows. A trace starting from caller p1 will result in f(p1) = f(p2) = f(p3) = f(p4)
= f(p5) = 1. Filtering out the VoIP proxy nodes (p5) and the caller (p1), the clients p2, p3
and p4 could be potential destinations for a call emerging from p1.
However, this tracing algorithm did not consider the shortest path nature of voice routes.
Considering the shortest path nature of voice paths leads us to conclude that p2 is not a
possible receiver for a call from p1. If indeed p2 were the receiver then the voice flow would
have taken the shorter route p1 → p2 (latency = 1), rather than the longer route p1 → p5
→ p2 (latency = 2) as indicated by the flow information. Hence, we now have only two
possible receivers, namely, p3 and p4.
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4.4.1.2 Shortest Path Tracing Algorithm
Evidently a simple flow based tracing algorithm may be result in a large number of potential
receivers for a voice call. In this section, we describe techniques to generate a directed sub-
graph G′ = 〈V ′, E′〉 from G which encodes the shortest path nature of the voice paths.
Given a graph G and a caller src, we construct a sub-graph G′ that only contains voice
paths that respect the shortest path property. Figure 67 uses a breadth first search on G
to compute G′ in O(|E|) time.
One can formally show that the directed graph G′ satisfies the following properties: (i)
If the voice traffic from src were to traverse an edge e /∈ E ′, then it violates the shortest
path property. (ii) All voice paths that respect the shortest path property are included
in G′. (iii) The graph G′ is acyclic; additionally, if there is no node v that two alternate
shortest path from src, the graph G′ is a spanning tree.
Shortest Path Tracing(Graph G=〈V , E〉, Caller
src)
(1) for each vertex v ∈ V
(2) dist[v] =∞; label[v] = false; prev[v] = null
(3) end for
(4) dist[src] = 0; label[src] = true
(5) while pick a labeled vertex v with minimum
dist[v]
(6) label[v] = false
(7) for each node u such that (u, v) ∈ E
(8) if (dist[u] < dist[v] + w(u, v))
(9) dist[u] = dist[v] + w(u, v)
(10) prev[u] = {v}; label[u] = true
(11) end if
(12) if (dist[u] = dist[v] + w(u, v))




(17) G′ = 〈V ′, E′〉: V ′ = V , E′ = (u → v) ∀u ∈
prev[v], ∀v ∈ V
Figure 67: Shortest Path Tracing Algorithm
















Figure 68: Shortest Path

















Figure 69: Precision and















Figure 70: F -measure
with κ = 2
the trace algorithm (Figure 66) on graph G′, we get f(p2) = 0, f(p3) = f(p4) = 1. Figure
68 compares the effectiveness of shortest path tracing algorithm with the naive tracing
algorithm on a 1024 node VoIP network. On the x-axis we plot the call traffic measured
in Erlang (calls per unit time) [46]. We use two parameters to quantify the efficacy of an
attack: precision, recall and F-measure defined below. An attack is very effective if its
precision and recall is high. We use S to denote the set of nodes such that for every p ∈
S, f [p] = 1. Recall denotes the probability of identifying the true caller dst and precision
is inversely related to the size of candidate receiver set. One trivially improve recall by
including all VoIP clients in the set S; however, this would adversely affect the precision
metric. F -measure is harmonic mean of recall and precision scores.






|S| if dst ∈ S
0 otherwise
F-measure =
2 ∗ recall ∗ precision
recall + precision
In a deterministic network setting, the receiver dst is guaranteed to be marked with f [dst]
= 1, that is, recall = 1 for both the naive tracing algorithm and the shortest path tracing
algorithm. However, the shortest path tracing algorithm is significantly more precise (see
Figure 68) than the naive tracing algorithm.
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4.4.1.3 Stochastic Shortest Path Tracing Algorithm
In a realistic setting with uncertainties in network latencies the shortest path tracing algo-
rithm may not identify the receiver. We handle such uncertainties in network link latencies,
by using the top-κ shortest path algorithm to construct Gκ from G. An edge e is in Gκ if it
is permissible to appear on the top-κ shortest paths originating from src in graph G. One
can accommodate this change by simply maintaining top-κ distance measurements dist1[v],
dist2[v], · · · distκ[v] instead of only the shortest (top-1) distance measurement. Evidently,
as κ increases, the tracing algorithm can accommodate higher uncertainty in network laten-
cies, thereby improving recall. On the other hand, as κ increases, the number of candidate
receivers become larger, thereby decreasing the precision metric.
One can formally show that the directed graph Gκ satisfies the following properties:
(i) If the voice traffic from src were to traverse an edge e /∈ E ′, then it violates the top-κ
shortest path property. (ii) All voice paths that respect the top-κ shortest path property
are included in Gκ. (iii) Unlike G1, the graph Gκ (for κ ≥ 2) may contain directed cycles.
We used the GT-ITM [125] topology generator to construct a 1024 node VoIP network
topology. Figure 69 shows the precision, recall and F -measure of the stochastic shortest
path tracing algorithm with 128 Erlang call volume and varying κ. These experiment lead
us to conclude that κ = 2 yields a concise (high precision) and yet precise (high recall) list
of potential receivers. Figure 70 compares the F -measure for the stochastic shortest path
tracing algorithm and the naive tracing algorithm using κ = 2 and varying call volume.
4.4.1.4 Flow Analysis Algorithm
We have so far used a Boolean variable f(p) to denote whether a VoIP client p can be a
potential receiver for a VoIP call from src. We use the flow measurements to construct a
probability distribution over the set of possible measurements. Let Gκ be a sub-graph of
G obtained using the top-κ shortest path tracing algorithm with caller src. Let nf(p→ q)
denotes the number of flows on the edge p → q. Let in(p) denote the total number of flows
into peer p. Note that both nf(p → q) and in(p) are observable by an external adversary.
Assuming a peer p in the VoIP network performs perfect mixing, the probability that some
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incoming flow is forwarded on the edge p → q as observed by an external adversary is
nf(p→q)
in(p) . Let f(p) denote the probability that a VoIP flow originating at src flows through





f(p) ∗ nf(p→ q)
in(p)
(13)
with the base case f(src) = 1 and in(src) = 1. Now, every VoIP client p (p 6= src) is a
possible destination for the VoIP flow originating from src if f(p) > 0. Consistent with
other work in this research area [70] one can use entropy E = −∑p f(p) ∗ log2 f(p) as a
metric for anonymity. In addition, one might use the top-m probability metric, namely,
the probability that the receiver dst appears in the top-m entries when f(p) is sorted in
descending order.
Computing the probabilities f(p) for G1 (top-1 shortest paths) is very efficient. Observe
that since G1 is a directed acyclic graph, it can be sorted topologically. Let p1 = src, p2,
· · · pN be a topological ordering of the nodes in G1 such that f(pi) depends on f(pj) only
if j < i. Hence, one can efficiently evaluate the probabilities by following the topological
order, namely, compute f(p1), f(p2), · · · f(pN ) in that order. However, Gκ (for κ ≥ 2)
contains cycles and thus cannot be topologically sorted. In this case, we represent the set
of equations in 13 as π = πM , where π is a 1×N row vector and M is a N×N matrix,
where πi = f(pi) and Mij =
nf(pi→pj)
in(pi)
if there exists a directed edge pi → pj in Gκ; and
Mij = 0 otherwise. Hence, the solution π is the stationary distribution of a Markov chain
whose transition probability matrix is given by M . We compute π iteratively: πt+1 = πtM
starting with π0i = 1 if pi = src; π
0
i = 0 otherwise. Assuming M is irreducible, π converges
to a steady state solution for the equation π = πM in about O(N log N) iterations.
4.4.1.5 Distance and Hop Count Prior
In this section, we enhance the efficacy of flow analysis algorithm using hop count and
distance prior. Let us suppose that ghop(x) denotes a probability density function over the
number of overlay network hops (along the shortest path) between a randomly chosen pair

















































Figure 72: Top-m Prob-
ability with κ = 2 and La-
tency Prior







the one-way latency (along the shortest path) between a randomly chosen pair of caller
src and receiver dst. One can use a priori information about distance and hop count to
compute f(p), namely, the probability that a VoIP flow originating from src flows through
peer p. Using the hop count prior, the probability that a node p forwards an incoming flow
on the edge p → q is nf(p→q)
in(p) ∗Pr(hop ≥ hopdist(src, p) + 1 | hop ≥ hopdist(src, p)), where
hopdist(src, p) denotes the number of hops along the shortest path between src and p on
graph G′. Pr(hop ≥ hopdist(src, p) + 1 | hop ≥ hopdist(src, p)) = Pr(hop≥hopdist(src,p)+1)
Pr(hop≥hopdist(src,p))
denotes the probability that the receiver dst could be one more hop away given that dst is
at least hopdist(src, p) hops away from src.
Using the distance prior, the probability that a node p forwards an incoming flow on
the edge p → q is nf(p→q)
in(p) ∗Pr(lat ≥ latdist(src, p) + w(p, q) | lat ≥ latdist(src, p)), where
latdist(src, p) denotes the latency of the shortest path between src and p on graph G′ and
w(p, q) denotes the one-way latency between nodes p and q. Pr(lat ≥ latdist(src, p) +
w(p, q) | lat ≥ latdist(src, p)) = Pr(lat≥latdist(src,p)+w(p,q))
Pr(lat≥latdist(src,p)) denotes the probability that the
receiver dst could be w(p, q) time units further away given that dst is at least latdist(src, p)
time units away from src. As in the flow analysis algorithm, the function f is defined on




f(p) ∗ nf(p→ q)
in(p)
∗ Pr(hop ≥ hopdist(src, p) + 1)




f(p) ∗ nf(p→ q)
in(p)
∗ Pr(lat ≥ latdist(src, p) + w(p, q))
Pr(lat ≥ latdist(src, p))
We compute the probability that number of hops is greater than x by Pr(hop ≥ x) =
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∑∞




glat(y)dy. We estimate the probability distributions ghop and glat by measuring the
distances between two randomly chosen pair of src and dst nodes on the VoIP network.
Similar to the flow analysis attack, we can compute f(p) using a topological sort on acyclic
directed graph G1 and the Markov chain model for Gκ (κ ≥ 2).
Figure 71 shows the entropy of an attack versus call volume using κ = 2. Note that
smaller the entropy better is the efficacy of the attack in identifying a precise and concise set
of potential receivers. We observe that the flow analysis algorithm with latency prior offers
the best results. This is primarily because the Skype lookup protocol always constructs
voice paths that have minimum one-way latency. The latency prior reflects the latency
based shortest path nature of the Skype lookup protocol and thus performs best.
Figure 72 shows the top-m probability, namely, the probability that the true receiver dst
appears in the top-m entries when f(p) is sorted in descending order using the flow analysis
algorithm with latency prior and κ = 2. With a call volume of 64 Erlangs, there is 86%
chance that the true receiver dst appears in the top-10 entries. This clearly demonstrates
the efficacy of our attacks in identifying the receiver under low to moderate call volume.
Under very high call volume the attack (512 Erlangs) the top-10 probability drops to 0.17.
Figure 73 shows the computation cost (in time units) incurred in computing the prob-
abilities f(p) for all potential receivers p. In practice, we observed that the number of
iterations is much smaller that the theoretical bound O(N log N). We attribute this to the
sparse nature of matrix M . The overall running time is of the order of few tens of mil-
liseconds making the attack feasible in real-time. In summary, the flow analysis algorithm
allows an external observer to deduce a reasonably concise and yet precise set of potential
receivers for a voice call. One could additionally incorporate other prior knowledge such as
the geographical location of the receiver, duration of the call, etc.
4.4.1.6 Compromised Proxies
In addition, to passive observation based attacks, the adversary could compromise some of
the nodes in the VoIP proxy. A compromised proxy node reveals its mixing information to
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an adversary. The adversary can use this information from one or more compromised to
enhance the efficacy of its attack as follows. A malicious proxy node may reveal the routing
information that relates its incoming VoIP flows to out going VoIP flows. We use f(p→ q)
to denote the probability that a VoIP call from src traverses the edge p → q. For a non-
malicious node p, f(p→ q) = f(p)∗nf(p→q)
in(p) , where f(p) is the probability that the VoIP call
from src traverses node p. For a malicious node p, f(p→ q) = ∑r→pf(r → p)∗
nf(r→p→q)
nf(r→p) ,
where nf(r → p → q) denotes the number of voice flows that were routed from r to q by
the malicious node p. Observe that a good proxy p, nf(r → p → q) is neither revealed
by p nor observable (using traffic analysis) to an external adversary. Hence, the new flow















One should note that these equations are identical to Equation 13 when there are no com-
promised proxies in the VoIP network. We can compute f(p) (for all nodes p) using a
topological sort on acyclic directed graph G1 and the Markov chain model for Gκ (κ ≥
2). Figure 74 shows the effectiveness of the attack as we vary the fraction of nodes that
is compromised by the adversary. We use a call volume of 128 Erlangs and κ = 2 in this
experiment. For instance, when 20% of the nodes are compromised the top-1 probability
improves from 0.23 to 0.50.
4.4.2 VoIP Privacy using k-Anonymity
In this section, we focus on developing a distributed and decentralized algorithm to better
protect the identity of a receiver from a flow analysis attack. First, we observe that the
efficacy of our attacks drops significantly under high call volume. This is primarily because
larger call volume facilitates better mixing of VoIP flows and thus better protects the
identity of a receiver from flow analysis attacks. In this chapter, we propose solutions to















































proposal is based on the following observation. In a VoIP network, one-way latency up
to 250ms is not even perceived by the clients, while latencies in the range 250-400ms is
acceptable for voice conversations [95]. Hence, one could construct sub-optimal voice paths
whose one-way path latency is smaller than maxLat = 250ms without affecting the quality
of voice conversations.
Figures 75 illustrate a simple scenario with two VoIP flows between clients (s1, d1) and
(s2, d2). Figure 76 shows how one can modify VoIP routes to achieve 2-anonymity. In the
figures, each edge on the VoIP network is marked with the number of flows it carries. We
say that a voice call is k-anonymous, if the voice flow is mixed with at least k − 1 other
flows. One can show that given a voice route p1 = src, p2, · · · pm = dst, the number of
flows mixed with the VoIP call from src to dst is bounded by Equation 15.
maxi{in(pi)} ≤ k ≤ 1 +
m∑
i=2
in(pi)− nf(pi−1 → pi) (15)
Observe that routing all the VoIP calls through one peer would provide very high anonymity
(assuming the peer is honest). However, peers need to maintain per-flow state to handle
routing information, handle peer failures, joins and leaves, and support several advanced
calling features [2]. In the rest of this section, we modify the Skype lookup protocol to
set up anonymity-latency-capacity-aware routes assuming that all the proxies are honest
and uncompromised. We study potential attacks on our protocol by malicious peers and
propose defenses to mitigate them in Section 4.4.2.3.
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4.4.2.1 AASIP: Anonymity-Aware Session Initiation Protocol
In this section, we present our AASIP protocol. We accept the anonymity parameter k as an
input for the lookup protocol, on a per-client per-call basis. The AASIP protocol modifies
the basic Skype search protocol such that it simultaneously satisfies three conditions: (i)
we have at least one peer p ∈ route(src, dst) such that in(p) ≥ k (k-anonymity), (ii) the
end-to-end one-way latency on the route from src to dst is smaller than maxLat (typically
set to 250ms), and (iii) the total call volume on every peer p ∈ route(src, dst) is smaller
than its capacity maxFlow(p). We assume that all search traffic between peers p and q
are encrypted with a symmetric key shared between p and q. The search traffic being
significantly smaller than the voice traffic can be easily hidden from an external observer
using a uniform cover traffic [37].
A naive protocol operates in two steps. The first step uses a Skype like lookup protocol
to locate a peer p that is closest to src such that in(p) ≥ k, that is, peer p mixes at least
k voice flows. The second step uses the peer p to search for dst.sipurl. The route from src
to p concatenated with that from p to dst satisfies k-anonymity. However, such a protocol
may not essentially result in a low latency route from src to dst. In the rest of this section,
we present the AASIP protocol that integrates anonymity and latency awareness. Similar
to the Skype lookup protocol, the AASIP protocol operates in four phases: initSearch,
processSearch, processResult, and finSearch.
initSearch. A VoIP client src initiates a search for a receiver dst (identified by its
SIP URL) and an anonymity parameter k by broadcasting search(searchId, sipurl =
dst.sipurl, k, anonV ec=[1]) to all peers p ∈ ngh(src). The search identifier searchId is a
long randomly chosen unique identifier.
processSearch. Let a peer p receive a request req = search(searchId, sipurl, k, anonV ec)
from its neighbor q. If the call volume at peer p exceeds maxFlow(p), then peer p drops
the request. If peer p has seen searchId in the recent past then it extracts the cached
request entries reqC = 〈searchId, sipurl, prev, k, anonV ec〉. If for any cached request
entry c ∈ reqC, c.anonV ec satisfies k-anonymity or if c.anonV ec ≥ req.anonV ec then the
160
request is dropped. If peer p has seen searchId in the recent past then it extracts the
cached result entries resC = 〈searchId, next, k, anonV ec〉. If for any cached result entry c
∈ resC, c.anonV ec satisfies k-anonymity or if c.anonV ec ≥ req.anonV ec then the request
is dropped. If the request is not dropped, peer p adds 〈searchId, sipurl, q, k, anonV ec′〉
to its request cache reqC, where anonV ec′ = req.anonV ec.append(in(p)).
If peer p were to not have seen searchId in the past, peer p checks if sipurl is the
URL of a VoIP client connected to p. If so, peer p returns its IP address result(searchId,
p, anonV ec′) to peer q and adds the result to its cache resC. If not, peer p broadcasts
search(searchId, sipurl, k, anonV ec′) to all peers p′ ∈ ngh(p), including the neighbor
q from whom it received the request. As illustrated in Figures 75 and 76 it might be
beneficial to set up loops in VoIP routes for achieving higher anonymity. However, the
request dropping constraints described above ensures that no loop is traversed more than
once. Finally, peer p adds 〈searchId, sipurl, q, k, anonV ec′〉 to its request cache reqC.
processResult. Let a peer p receive a result res = result(searchId, q, anonV ec) from peer
q. If peer p has seen searchId in the recent past then it extracts the cached result entries
resC = 〈searchId, next, k, anonV ec〉. If for any cached result entry c ∈ resC, c.anonV ec
satisfies k-anonymity or if c.anonV ec ≥ res.anonV ec then the result res is dropped. If peer
p has seen searchId in the recent past then it extracts the cached request entries reqC =
〈searchId, sipurl, prev, k, anonV ec〉. If for any cached request entry c ∈ reqC, c.anonV ec
satisfies k-anonymity or if c.anonV ec ≥ res.anonV ec then the result is dropped. If the
result res has not been dropped, peer p adds a routing entry 〈sipurl, prev, q〉 and forwards
result(searchId, p, anonV ec) to peer prev. Unlike the Skype lookup protocol, the routing
entry is a three tuple 〈sipurl, prev, next〉, which indicates that voice packets from peer
prev destained to sipurl must be forwarded to next. The three tuple routing table allows
us to handle loops in routing table entries wherein the next hop depends not only on the
destination sipurl but also on the previous hop. For example, from Figure 76 peer p3 may
have the following two routing entries: 〈d1, p1, p2〉 and 〈d1, p2, p1〉.
finSearch. When the peer ngh(src) receives res = result(searchId, q, anonV ec) from
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peer q, it extracts the cached result entries resC = 〈searchId, next, k, anonV ec〉. If
for any cached result entry c ∈ resC, c.anonV ec satisfies k-anonymity or if c.anonV ec ≥
res.anonV ec then the result res is dropped. If not ngh(src) adds a routing entry 〈dst, ∗,
q〉 and adds res to its result cache resC.
The route set up protocol ensures that when a voice session is initialized, the route
from src to dst satisfies k-anonymity. We ensure that k-anonymity during a voice session
as follows. We piggy back the anonymity vector anonV ec along with the voice packets as
they are tunneled through the VoIP network along the designated route. If the VoIP route
were to violate the k-anonymity constraint, the caller could be warned of the lower level of
anonymity guaranteed by the route. We allow the VoIP client to set a lower watermark k ′
≤ k, such that if the anonymity level drops below k′ the session is terminated. Now, the
caller src may initiate a new route set up protocol with the goal of achieving the required
anonymity level. In our experimental section we study the probability that a VoIP session
is terminated due to a drop in the anonymity level. In addition, one can construct VoIP
routes that include multiple nodes that provide k-anonymity; hopefully, at least one of these
peers would offer k-anonymity for the entire duration of the VoIP session. We examine this
solution in greater detail in Section 4.4.2.3.
The AASIP protocol sets up the fastest possible route from src to dst that meets k-
anonymity (if there exists such a route). If no such route exists, the AASIP protocol set up
identifies a route with highest possible anonymity k′ < k; in addition, the AASIP protocol
sets up the fastest route that achieves k′-anonymous route from src to dst. Indeed, if one
sets k = ∞, then the AASIP protocol identifies the most anonymous route whose one-way
latency is smaller than maxLat = 250ms. Our experiments show that the AASIP protocol
is highly efficient in terms of its messaging cost and route set up latency and protects a
VoIP call from flow analysis attacks.
4.4.2.2 Flow Analysis Attacks on the AASIP Protocol
A flow analysis attack on the AASIP protocol operates in three phases. We assume that








































































Figure 79: AASIP Vs
SIP: Path Latency
all nodes p such that in(p) ≥ k. Let Gκsrc be a sub-graph of G obtained using the top-κ
shortest path tracing algorithm with caller src. We use Gκsrc and the flow measurements
to compute fsrc(p) for all p such that in(p) ≥ k starting with fsrc(src) = 1. Second, for
every such node p with in(p) ≥ k, we construct Gκp as a sub-graph of G obtained using the
top-κ shortest path tracing algorithm with caller p. We compute fp(r) for every candidate
receiver r starting with fp(p) = fsrc(p), where fsrc(p) is obtained from the first step. Third,
we compute f(r) for every receiver (VoIP clients) as a simple average of fp(r) over all such
nodes p. Similar to other flow analysis attacks, one could sort the receivers in descending
order of f(r) and use a top-m probability metric to study the efficacy of the attack.
Figures 77 and 78 compares the effectiveness of the AASIP protocol with the basic SIP
protocol in mitigating flow analysis attacks. We set the parameter k =∞ so that the AASIP
protocol identifies the most anonymous route from caller src to receiver dst that satisfies
the latency constraint. Figure 77 shows the top-10 probability using both the AASIP and
SIP protocol for varying call volumes. Observe that at low and moderate call volumes
the AASIP protocol offers significantly improved protection against flow analysis attacks.
Figure 78 shows the top-m probability for both the AASIP and the SIP protocol for varying
m and a call volume of 128 Erlangs. We observe that the AASIP protocol consistently out
performs the SIP protocol for all values of m. Figure 79 compares the average one-way
path latency for both the AASIP and the SIP protocol for varying call volumes. At low
call volumes the AASIP protocol may construct significantly longer routes that the SIP
protocol. Nonetheless, the AASIP protocol ensures that the latency is below 250ms and









































tion Cost: Tolerating Ma-
licious Proxies
4.4.2.3 Tolerating Compromised Proxies
In this section, we study the effect of compromised proxies on the AASIP protocol. Similar
to Section 4.4.1, we assume that a compromised peer will execute the AASIP protocol
honestly. However, the malicious peers may record observed information during the voice
session and collude with the external observer. In particular, a malicious Skype peer may
reveal the mapping between its in-flows and out-flows thereby decreasing the anonymity of
a VoIP flow.
We present a simple extension to the AASIP protocol to tolerate malicious peers and yet
preserve k-anonymity. We allow the caller src to specify a personalized security parameter
c for every VoIP call indicating that the route from src to dst should tolerate up to c
compromised nodes while preserving k-anonymity. The key idea is to construct a route
from src to dst with at least c + 1 peers p1, p2, · · · , pc+1 such that in(pi) ≥ k for all 1
≤ i ≤ c + 1. One can introduce this constraint into the AASIP protocol by replacing the
constraint anonV ec ≥ k with anonV ec ≥ (k, c). Note that anonV ec ≥ k denotes that there
exists an index j such that anonV ec[j] ≥ k. We use anonV ec ≥ (k, c) to denote that there
exists c + 1 indices j1, j2, · · · jc+1 such that anonV ec[ji] ≥ k for all 1 ≤ i ≤ c + 1.
One can extend the flow analysis attack on the k-anonymous SIP protocol to a (k, c)-
anonymous SIP protocol. We assume that the adversary knows the parameters k and c
used by a caller src. The adversary identifies a set of nodes S such that for all nodes p ∈
S, in(p) ≥ k. For every permutation of c nodes from the set S, the adversary computes
fsrc,p1,p2,··· ,pc(r) for a candidate receiver r. We recursively compute fp1,p2,··· ,pi(p) using
















































































Figure 85: Node Load
recursion terminates at the base case fstart(src) = 1. Finally, we compute f(r) as the
average of fsrc,p1,p2,··· ,pc(r) over all ordered selections of c nodes from the set S. This attack
reduces a simple flow analysis attack on the AASIP protocol when c = 1.
Figure 80 shows the effectiveness of the attack as we vary the fraction of nodes that is
compromised by the adversary and the parameter c. We use a call volume of 128 Erlangs,
k = 10 and κ = 2 in this experiment. We observe that as c increases the effectiveness
of the attack decreases significantly. Nonetheless, when an overwhelming large number of
nodes are malicious the AASIP protocol becomes vulnerable to flow analysis attacks. Under
a realistic setting, only a small number of nodes (< 10%) are likely to be malicious, the
AASIP protocol offers very good protection against flow analysis attacks.
4.4.3 Experimental Evaluation
4.4.3.1 Implementation Sketch
In this section, we describe a brief implementation of our algorithms using Phex [1]: an
open source Java based implementation of peer-to-peer broadcast search protocol. A VoIP
protocol like Skype operates on top of the peer-to-peer infrastructure. We have implemented
our algorithms as pluggable modules that can be weaved into the Phex client code using
AspectJ [33]. Our implementation is completely transparent to the VoIP protocol that
operates on top of the peer-to-peer infrastructure. Also, our implementation does not
require any changes to topology construction and maintenance algorithms (as nodes join,
leave, fail or recover) and the underlying TCP/IP or UDP based communication libraries.
Below we sketch our implementation of the AASIP protocol. As described in Section 4.2,
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a broadcast search protocol has four parts: initSearch, processSearch, processResult
and finSearch. These four operations are implemented as event handlers in Phex. When a
Phex client receives a messages, it determines the type of the message (search request, search
result, etc) and triggers the appropriate event handler. The AASIP protocol substitutes
all four event handlers (see Section 4.4.2.1). In addition, we also modify the search request
payload and the search result payload to include the parameters k, c and anonV ec.
4.4.3.2 Performance and Scalability
In this section, we compare the messaging cost and the search latency of the AASIP and
the SIP protocol. Figure 83 shows the messaging cost per node as we vary the call volume
and the anonymity parameter k (using c = 1). These experiments show that the AASIP
protocol incurs about 1-3 times the messaging cost of the SIP protocol. However, the search
request and the results are typically of the order of 300 Bytes. Hence, the communication
cost at a node for handling 10 messages (3 KB) is equivalent to a voice session of one second
(24 Kbps). Even though the AASIP protocol incurs higher communication cost than the
SIP protocols, its effect on the overall bandwidth consumption is negligible.
Figure 84 shows the latency of a search operation as we vary the call volume and the
anonymity parameter k (using c = 1). This experiment shows that the AASIP protocols
incurs about 30-40% higher search latency than the SIP protocol. One should note that
the search latency only affects the initial waiting time before the caller and the receiver
are connected. Once a path is established the AASIP protocol ensures good quality voice
conversations by limiting the path latency to 250ms.
Figure 85 shows the average number of VoIP calls handled by one VoIP proxy in the
VoIP network (using c = 1). The AASIP protocol incurs a higher load primarily because
the traffic is not routed through the optimal route. Hence, a voice route in the AASIP
protocol may include more network hops than the SIP protocol. This increases the average
number of proxies that route one voice call, and thus increase the average load on a proxy.
The percentile increase in average node load for higher call volumes is small. Hence, when
the call volume is high (VoIP network is heavily loaded), the AASIP protocol imposes small
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overheads (20-40%) than the SIP protocol. On the other hand, when the call volume is low
(VoIP network is lightly loaded), the AASIP protocol incurs 4-6 times the average node load
when compared to the SIP protocol. However, this 4-6x increase in node load is incurred
when the VoIP network is itself lightly loaded; hence, the AASIP protocol does not harm
the performance and scalability of the VoIP network.
4.5 Related Work
Several chapters have addressed the problem of tracing encrypted traffic using timing analy-
sis [112, 122, 126, 111, 14, 29, 110]. All these chapters use inter-packet timing characteristics
for tracing traffic. The timing characteristics may be obtained either by passively observing
the traffic or by actively embedding a timing signature in the traffic. Our approach entirely
differs from the above approaches since it uses network topology based timing measurements
to device caller identification attacks.
A large number of low latency anonymizing networks have been proposed. Onion routing
[40] and its second generation Tor [28] aim at providing anonymous transport of TCP
flows over the Internet. ISDN mixes [71] proposes solutions to anonymize phone calls
over traditions PSTN. While anonymizing networks protect the identity of the sender and
receiver using the concept of a mix [19, 91]. However, they assume that the sender src
and the receiver dst is known a priori. The above protocols do not take the search phase
(discovering the receiver dst) into account.
Tarzan [37] presents an anonymizing network layer using the peer-to-peer model. It
uses a gossip based approach to disseminate the identity of nodes on the peer-to-peer net-
work. The gossip protocol propagates 〈sipurl, IPAddr〉 information to all the nodes in the
network. At the end of the gossip protocol, the caller src supposedly knows the receiver
dst, thus obviating the need for a search protocol. This approach requires the caller and
receiver to be connected to the network sufficiently long before they can discover each other
(and make VoIP calls). Most peer-to-peer VoIP applications (like Skype [2]) use KaZaa like
broadcast search algorithm to discover the receiver dst and set up a low latency voice path
on the network.
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Traditionally, multicast and broadcast protocols have been used to protect receiver
anonymity [72]. This approach sends a unicast message to a single destination by multicas-
ting the message to a group containing the destination. The intended destination recognizes
the message is intended for itself because it expects this message (Hordes [90]) or because
the sender addresses the message implicitly (as in Section 4.3.2.3, [72]). In contrast to
these pieces of work, our chapter focuses on caller (source) anonymity as against receiver
anonymity.
Perng et. al. [70] have shown that multicasting data on an anonymizing network can
break some privacy guarantees. In particular, they show that the malicious nodes in the
network can use the popularity of a multicast packet to infer some information about the
data. Our attacks exploit the underlying multicast/broadcast nature of the search protocol
to construct triangulation based timing attacks. Unlike using the popularity of the multicast
data, we use network topology based timing information to infer the caller.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter we have addressed the problem of tracing the caller in encrypted peer-
to-peer VoIP networks. We have developed two attacks: one on the SIP protocol layer
and the second on the voice session layer. These attacks can be implemented by passively
observing the search traffic on the VoIP network. We have demonstrated the effectiveness
of these attacks using the popular Skype VoIP protocol. Next, we have developed solutions
to mitigate this attack while incurring an acceptable overhead on the one-way path latency.
We have presented a brief sketch of the implementation of our proposal on a Phex peer-to-
peer client. A detailed experiment evaluation shows that our guards protect caller identity
without significantly impacting the quality of voice calls.
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CHAPTER V
TRUST AND REPUTATION MANAGEMENT
Reputation systems have been popular in estimating the trustworthiness and predicting the
future behavior of nodes in a large-scale distributed system where nodes may transact with
one another without prior knowledge or experience. One of the fundamental challenges
in distributed reputation management is to understand vulnerabilities and develop mech-
anisms that can minimize the potential damages to a system by malicious nodes. In this
chapter, we identify three vulnerabilities that are detrimental to decentralized reputation
management and propose TrustGuard − a safeguard framework for providing a highly de-
pendable and yet efficient reputation system. First, we provide a dependable trust model
and a set of formal methods to handle strategic malicious nodes that continuously change
their behavior to gain unfair advantages in the system. Second, a transaction based reputa-
tion system must cope with the vulnerability that malicious nodes may misuse the system
by flooding feedbacks with fake transactions. Third, but not the least, we identify the im-
portance of filtering out dishonest feedbacks when computing reputation-based trust of a
node, including the feedbacks filed by malicious nodes through collusion. Our experiments
show that, comparing with existing reputation systems, our framework is highly dependable
and effective in countering malicious nodes regarding strategic oscillating behavior, flooding
malevolent feedbacks with fake transactions, and dishonest feedbacks.
5.1 Introduction
A variety of electronic markets and online communities have reputation system built in,
such as eBay, Amazon, Yahoo! Auction, Edeal, Slashdot, Entrepreneur. Recent works
[24, 6, 22, 48, 119] suggested reputation based trust systems as an effective way for nodes to
identify and avoid malicious nodes in order to minimize the threat and protect the system
from possible misuses and abuses by malicious nodes in a decentralized overlay networks.
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Such systems typically assign each node a trust value based on the transactions it has
performed with others and the feedbacks it has received. For example, XRep [24] provides
a protocol complementing current Gnutella protocol by allowing peers to keep track of
and share information about the reputation of other peers and resources. EigenTrust [48]
presents an algorithm similar to PageRank [68] that computes a trust value by assuming
trust is transitive and demonstrated its benefits in addressing fake file downloads in a peer-
to-peer file sharing network.
However, few of the reputation management work so far have focused on the vulnerabil-
ities of a reputation system itself. One of the detrimental vulnerabilities is that a malicious
node may strategically alter its behavior in a way that benefits itself such as starting to
behave maliciously after it attains a high reputation. Another widely recognized vulnerabil-
ity is the shilling attack [54] where malicious nodes submit dishonest feedback and collude
with each other to boost their own ratings or bad-mouth non-malicious nodes. Last, but
not the least, malicious nodes can flood numerous fake feedbacks through fake transactions
in a transaction-based feedback system.
We believe that a highly dependable reputation system is needed to safeguard the system
itself from malicious attacks through strategic oscillation, fake transactions, and dishonest
feedbacks. For example, a node’s reputation (represented by its trust value) should drop
quickly as soon as it misbehaves [123], while it should be hard for any node to boost its
reputation within a short period of time. In addition, the trust building techniques based
on reputation should be robust and effective in countering attacks through fake transactions
and dishonest feedbacks.
With these issues in mind, we present TrustGuard − a highly dependable reputation-
based trust building framework. The chapter has a number of unique contributions. First,
we introduce a highly dependable trust model to effectively handle strategic oscillations by
malicious nodes (Section 5.3). Second, we propose a feedback admission control mechanism
to ensure that only transactions with secure proofs can be used to file feedbacks (Section
5.4). Third, we propose feedback credibility based algorithms for effectively filtering out
dishonest feedbacks (Section 5.5). We describe performance enhancements by selective
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Figure 86: TrustGuard Architecture
replication and caching in Section 5.6. We also present a set of simulation based experiments,
showing the effectiveness of the TrustGuard approach in guarding against each of the above
vulnerabilities with minimal overhead in Section 5.7. Our experiments show that, comparing
with existing reputation systems, the TrustGuard framework is highly dependable and
effective in countering malicious nodes regarding strategic colluding or oscillating behavior,
flooding malevolent feedbacks with fake transactions, and using dishonest feedbacks to
manipulate ratings. We conclude the chapter with a brief overview of the related work
(Section 5.8), and a conclusion (Section 5.9).
5.2 TrustGuard: An Overview
5.2.1 System Architecture
We first present a high level overview of the TrustGuard framework. Figure 86 shows a
sketch of the decentralized architecture of the dependable reputation management system.
The callout shows that each node has a transaction manager, a trust evaluation engine and
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a feedback data storage service. Whenever a node n wants to transact with another node
m, it calls the Trust Evaluation Engine to perform a trust evaluation of node m. It collects
feedback about node m from the network through the overlay protocol and aggregates them
into a trust value. Such computation is guarded by strategic oscillation guard and dishonest
feedback filters. The Transaction Manager consists of four components. The trust-based
node selection component uses the trust value output from the trust evaluation engine to
make trust decisions before calling the transaction execution component. Before performing
a transaction, the transaction proof exchange component is responsible for generating and
exchanging transaction proofs. Once the transaction is completed, the feedbacks are manu-
ally entered by the transacting users. The transacting nodes then route these feedbacks to
designated nodes on the overlay network for storage through a decentralized overlay proto-
col (e.g. DHT based protocol). The designated nodes then invoke their data storage service
and admit a feedback only if it passes the feedback admission control where fake transac-
tions are detected. The feedback storage service is also responsible for storing reputation
and trust data on the overlay network securely, including maintaining replicas for feedbacks
and trust values. We build the TrustGuard storage service on top of PeerTrust [119].
Although we implement the TrustGuard framework using a decentralized implementa-
tion that distributes the storage and computation of the trust values of the nodes, it is
important to note that one could implement TrustGuard using different degrees of cen-
tralization. At one extremity, third-party trusted servers could be used for both trust
evaluation and feedback storage. One can also utilize the trusted servers to support only
selected functionality, for example, the transaction proof exchange (Section 5.4).
Finally, we assume that TrustGuard architecture is built on top of a secure overlay
network. Thus, the overlay network should be capable of routing messages despite the
presence of some malicious nodes and ensure that all nodes can be identified through some
digital certification based mechanism disallow malicious nodes from spoofing fake identities.
As shown by Douceur in his Sybil attack chapter [30], bad nodes may potentially amplify
their strength by a factor that is proportional to the number of identities they can spoof
simultaneously. One practical way to counter the pseudo-spoofing attack is to tie an identity
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to a node through digital certification based mechanisms or enforce a secure login procedure
for nodes wanting to join the overlay network. Readers may refer to [17, 97, 30] for a detailed
discussion on security issues in overlay networks.
5.2.2 Problem Statement and Solution Approach
The TrustGuard framework is equipped with several important safeguard components. In
the rest of the chapter, we focus on the following three types of vulnerabilities, analyze the
potential threats and describe countermeasures against such vulnerabilities using Trust-
Guard.
Strategic Oscillation Guard. Most existing reputation systems such as eBay use a
combination of average feedbacks and the number of transactions performed by a node as
indicators of its trust value. Our experiments show that using a simple average does not
guard the reputation system against oscillating behavior or dishonest feedbacks. For exam-
ple, a bad node may behave non-maliciously until it attains a good reputation (reflected
in its trust value) and then behave maliciously. Or it could oscillate between building and
milking reputation. A dependable reputation system should be able to penalize malicious
nodes for such dynamic and strategic behavioral changes. In TrustGuard, we promote the
incorporation of the reputation history and behavior fluctuations of nodes into the esti-
mation of their trustworthiness. We use adaptive parameters to allow different weighting
functions to be applied to current reputation, reputation history, and reputation fluctu-
ations. The current reputation of a node is computed from aggregating feedbacks about
this node over the recent period. The reputation history is computed with an incremental
aggregation of past reputation values of a node with a bias on recent history. The reputa-
tion fluctuation is computed using a derivative of the reputation value. We also develop a
fading memories based optimization technique to reduce the cost of maintaining historical
information of nodes.
Fake Transaction Detection. In a typical transaction-based feedback system, after each
transaction, the two participating nodes have an opportunity to submit feedbacks about
each other. This brings two vulnerabilities. First, a malicious node may flood numerous
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ratings on another node with fake transactions. Second, a malicious node may submit dis-
honest feedback about a transaction. A dependable trust model should be equipped with
mechanisms to handle malicious manipulation of feedbacks to guard the system against such
fake transactions, and to differentiate dishonest feedback from honest ones. In TrustGuard
approach, we propose to bind a feedback to a transaction through transaction proofs. In
other words, a feedback between nodes n and m on a given transaction is stored if and
only if n and m indeed transacted with each other. Concretely, before two nodes perform a
transaction, they exchange an unforgeable transaction proof. Once the transaction proof is
fairly exchanged, both the nodes can submit feedback about the transaction using the proof.
The feedback is then routed to appropriate nodes for storage and only those feedbacks with
valid transaction proof will be admitted into the feedback database.
Dishonest Feedback Filter. While the fake transaction detection guarantees that a feed-
back is associated with a real transaction, a malicious node may submit dishonest feedbacks
in order to boost the ratings of other malicious nodes or bad-mouth non-malicious nodes.
The situation is made much worse when a group of malicious nodes make collusive attempts
to manipulate the ratings. In this chapter, we build a dishonest feedback filter to differen-
tiate dishonest feedbacks from honest ones. The filter essentially assigns a credibility value
to a feedback source and weights a feedback in proportion with its credibility. We study
two such credibility measures and their effectiveness in filtering out dishonest feedbacks in
both non-collusive and collusive settings.
5.3 Strategic Malicious Nodes
We define a strategic malicious node as a node that adapts its behavioral pattern (with
time) so as to maximize its malicious goals. Consider a scenario wherein a bad node does
not misbehave until it earns a high trust value. The scenario becomes more complicated
when bad nodes decide to alternate between good and bad behavior at regular or arbi-
trary frequencies. In this chapter, we primarily focus on strategic oscillations by malicious
nodes and describe concrete and systematic techniques taken by TrustGuard to address
both steady and sudden changes in the behavioral pattern of a node without adding heavy
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overheads to the system. Other possible behavioral strategies that could be employed by
malicious nodes are not considered in this chapter.
A dependable trust model should be capable of handling the following four important
issues: (P1) sudden fluctuations in node behavior, (P2) distinguish an increase and decrease
in node behavior, (P3) tolerate unintentional errors, and (P4) reflect consistent node be-
havior. We propose a dependable trust model that computes reputation-based trust of a
node by taking into consideration: current feedback reports about the node, its historical
reputation, and the fluctuations in the node’s current behavior. First, we present an op-
timization theory based cost metric (Section 5.3.1) to formalize our design goals and then
present TrustGuard’s dependable trust model (Section 5.3.2).
5.3.1 Cost Model
The primary goal of our safeguard techniques is to maximize the cost that the malicious
nodes have to pay in order to gain advantage of the trust system. We first formally define
the behavior of a non-malicious and a malicious node in the system using the game the-
ory approach [26]. A non-malicious node is the commitment type and a long-run player
who would consistently behave well, because cooperation is the action that maximizes the
player’s lifetime payoffs. In contrast a strategic malicious node corresponds to an oppor-
tunistic player who cheats whenever it is advantageous for him to do so. Now we formally
describe a cost model for building reputation-based trust and use this cost model to il-
lustrate the basic ideas of maximizing the cost (penalty) to be paid by anyone behaving
maliciously. Let TVn(t) denote the trust value as evaluated by the system for node n at
time t (0 ≤ TVn(t) ≤ 1). Let BHn(t) denote the actual behavior of node n at time t
(0 ≤ BHn(t) ≤ 1), modeled as the fraction of transactions that would be honestly exe-
cuted by node n between an infinitesimally small time interval t and t + dt. We define
the extent to which a malicious node may misuse its reputation (denoted by Xn(t)) and
the amount of work to be done at time t by a malicious node in order to increase its
reputation-based trust value (denoted by Yn(t)) as Xn(t) = max(TVn(t) − BHn(t), 0) and
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Figure 87: Cost of Building Reputation








(BHb(x)− TVb(x)) dx (16)
Let G be the set of good nodes and B be the set of bad nodes. The objective is ∀g ∈ G :
TVg(t) ≈ 1 and ∀b ∈ B : cost(b) is maximized. Figure 87 provides an intuitive illustration
of the above cost function for a strategic malicious node oscillating between acting good
and bad. Referring to Figure 87, observe that the problem of maximizing the cost paid by
the malicious nodes can be reduced to maximizing the area under Yn(t) − Xn(t), that is,
minimizing the extent of misuse (Xn(t) = max(TVn() − BHn(t), 0)) and maximizing the
cost of building reputation (Yn(t) = max(BHn(t)− TVn(t), 0)).
In addition to maximizing the cost metric, we require TrustGuard to ensure that any
node behaving well for an extended period of time attains a good reputation. However, we
should ensure that the cost of increasing a node’s reputation depends on the extent to which
the node misbehaved in the past. For example a node that misbehaved for an extended
period of time in the past should find it very hard to build reputation in a short span of
time.
5.3.2 Dependable Trust Model
Bearing the above analysis in mind, we present TrustGuard’s dependable trust model in
this section. Let Rn(t) denote the raw trust value of node n at time t. Any of the existing
trust evaluation mechanisms such as [119, 48] can be used to calculate Rn(t). The simplest
form can be an average of the ratings over the recent period of time. Let TVn(t) denote
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Figure 88: Dependable Trust Model: Illustration
Note that R′(t) denotes the derivative of R(x) at x = t.






Rn(x)dx + γ ∗R′n(t) (17)
Equation 17 resembles a Proportional-Integral-Derivative controller used in control systems
[67]. The first component (proportional) refers to the contribution of the current reports
received at time t. The second component (integral) represents the past performance of the
node (history information). The third component (derivative) reflects the sudden changes
in the trust value of a node in the very recent past. Choosing a larger value for α biases
the trust value of a node n to the reports currently received about n. A larger value of β
gives heavier weight to the performance of the node n in the past. The averaging nature of
the proportional and integral components enables our model to tolerate errors in raw trust
values Rn(t) (P3) and reflect consistent node behavior (P4). A larger value of γ amplifies
sudden changes in behavior of the node in the recent past (as indicated by the derivative
of the trust value) and handles sudden fluctuations in node behavior (P1). We discuss
techniques to distinguish increase and decrease in node behavior (P2) later in this Section.
We now describe a simple discretized implementation of the abstract dependable trust
model described above. For simplicity, we assume that the trust values of nodes are updated
periodically within each time period T . Let successive time periods (intervals) be numbered
with consecutive integers starting from zero. We call TV [i] the dependable trust value of
node n in the interval i. TV [i] can be viewed as a function of three parameters: (1) the
feedback reports received in the interval i, (2) the integral over the set of the past trust
values of node n, and (3) the current derivative of the trust value of node n.
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Incorporating feedbacks by computing R[i]. Let R[i] denote the raw reputation
value of node n computed as an aggregation of the feedbacks received by node n in interval
i. Let us for now assume that all the feedbacks in the system are honest and transactions
are not faked. In such a scenario, R[i] can be computed by using a simple average over all
the feedback ratings received by node n in time interval i. We defer the extension of our
safeguard to handle dishonest feedbacks and fake transactions later to sections 5.4 and 5.5
respectively.
Incorporating History by Computing Integral. We now compute the integral (his-
tory) component of the trust value of node n at interval i, denoted as H[i]. Suppose the
system stores the trust value of node n over the last maxH (maximum history) intervals,





R[i− k] ∗ wk∑maxH
k=1 wk
(18)
The weights wk could be chosen either optimistically or pessimistically. An example of an
optimistic summarization is the exponentially weighted sum, that is, wk = ρ
k−1 (typically,
ρ < 1). Note that choosing ρ = 1 is equivalent to H being the average of the past maxH
reputation values of node n. Also, with ρ < 1, H gives more importance to the more recent
reputation values of node n. We consider these evaluations of H optimistic since they allow
nodes to attain higher trust values rather quickly. On the contrary, a pessimistic estimate
of H could be obtained with wk =
1
R[i−k] . Such an evaluation assigns more importance to
those intervals where the node behaved particularly badly.
Strengthening the dependability of TV [i]. Once we have calculated the feedback-based
reputation (R[i]) for the node n in the interval i and its past reputation history (H[i]), we
can use Equation 19 to compute the derivative component (D[i]). Note that Equation 19
uses H[i] instead of R[i− 1] for stability reasons.
D[i] = R[i]−H[i] (19)
Using Equation 19 to approximate the derivative component Dn[i] has a number of
advantages. First, one may use a simple approach to compute the derivative component:
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Dn[i] = Rn[i]−Rn[i− 1]. However, we observed that this measure is noisy due to the fact
that it is too coarse to use the difference between Rn[i] and Rn[i − 1] to approximate the
behavioral fluctuations of node n in the past history. One solution to dampen this noise
is to use the standard deviation of Rn[i] over all intervals in the past history using the
















is the average reputation value over the last maxH number of intervals. The main concern
of computing the standard deviation is the high overhead involved. Therefore, in the first
prototype of TrustGuard we choose to use Dn[i] = Rn[i] − Hn[i] for dampening the noise
and reducing the overhead (since history information Hn[i] is available from the second
component in our trust model).
We now compute the dependable trust value TV [i] for node n in the interval i using
Equation 20:
TV [i] = α ∗R[i] + β ∗H[i] + γ(D[i]) ∗D[i]
where γ(x) = γ1 if x ≥ 0 and γ(x) = γ2 if x < 0 (20)
In this equation, TV [i] is derived by associating different weights γ1 and γ2 for a positive
gradient and a negative gradient of the trust value respectively, enhancing the dependability
of TV [i] with respect to sudden behavioral changes of node n. One of the main motivations
in doing so is to set γ1 < β < γ2, thereby increasing the strength of the derivative component
(with respect to the integral component) when a node shows a fast degradation of its
behavior, and lowering the strength of the derivative component when a node is building
up its reputation (recall P2 in our design goal). Our experiments (see Section 5.7) show
that one can use the rich set of tunable parameters provided by Equation 20 to handle both
steady and sudden changes in the behavior of a strategic malicious node.
5.3.3 Fading Memories
In TrustGuard, we compute the dependable trust value of a node n in interval i based on its
current reputation, its reputation history prior to interval i and its reputation fluctuation.











FTV’[1] = FTV[0] + FTV[1] * (2  − 1)  FTV’[2] = FTV[1] + FTV[2] * (2  − 1)
Figure 89: Updating Fading Memories: FTV [i] denotes the faded values at time t
and FTV ′[i] denotes the faded values at time t + 1
trust values of node n for the past maxH number of intervals. By using a smaller value
for maxH, we potentially let the wrong-doings by a malicious node to be forgotten in
approximately maxH time intervals. However, using a very large value for maxH may
not be a feasible solution for at least two reasons: (i) The number of trust values held on
behalf of a long standing member of the system could become extremely large. (ii) The
computation time for our trust model (Equations 18 and 20) increases with the amount of
data to be processed. In the first prototype of TrustGuard, we introduce fading memories as
a performance optimization technique to reduce the space and time complexity of computing
TV [i] by allowing a trade-off between the history size and the precision of the historical
reputation estimate.
One simple technique to trade-off history size with precision would be to aggregate the
trust value in each k consecutive intervals into one value. However, from our experiments we
observed that it is vital to keep the trust values in the recent past very precise. Therefore,
we propose to aggregate data over intervals of exponentially increasing length in the past
{k0, k1, · · · , km−1} into m values (for some integer k > 0). Observe that the aggregates in
the recent past are taken over a smaller number of intervals and are hence more precise.
This permits the system to maintain more detailed information about the recent trust values
of node n and retain fading memories (less detailed) about the older trust values of node
n. Given a fixed value to the system-defined parameter m, one can trade-off the precision
and the history size by adjusting the value of k.
Now we describe how we implement fading memories in TrustGuard. To simplify the
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discussion, let us assume that k = 2. With fading memory optimization, our goal is to
summarize the last 2m−1 (∑m−1i=0 2i = 2m−1) trust values of a node by maintaining just m
(=log2(2
m)) values. This can be done in two steps. (i) we need a mechanism to aggregate
2m − 1 trust values into m values, and (ii) we need a mechanism to update these m values
after each interval.
TrustGuard performs Step 1 as follows. In the interval t, the system maintains trust
values in intervals t−1, t−2, · · · , t−2m in the form of m trust values by summarizing intervals
t− 2j , t− 2j − 1, · · · , t− 2j+1 + 1 for every j (j = 0, 1, · · · , m− 1), instead of maintaining
one trust value for each of the 2m − 1 time intervals. Figure 89 provides an example where
k = 2 and m = 3. The upper part of Figure 89 shows that at time t, FTV [0] is a summary
over the interval {t}, FTV [1] is a summary over the next two intervals {t − 1, t − 2}, and
FTV [2] is a summary over the next four intervals {t− 3, t− 4, t− 5, t− 6}.
Now we discuss how TrustGuard performs Step 2. Let FTV t[j] (0 ≤ j ≤ m − 1)
denote the faded trust values of node n at interval t. Ideally, re-computing FTV for
interval t requires all of the past 2m − 1 trust values. With fading memories we only
store m summarization values instead of all the 2m − 1 trust values. Thus, at interval
t we approximate the trust value for an interval t − i (1 ≤ i ≤ 2m) by FTV t[blog2 ic].
We use Equation 21 to approximate the updates to the faded trust values for interval j
(j = 0, 1, 2, · · · , m − 1) with the base case FTV t+1[0] = R[t]. Figure 89 gives a graphical
illustration of Equation 21 for m = 3.
FTV t+1[j] =
(FTV t[j] ∗ (2j − 1) + FTV t[j − 1])
2j
(21)
In summary, the fading memories approach closely resembles the way human beings remem-
ber their experiences. Our experiments show the vital role of fading memories in optimizing
the performance of the trust system while maintaining its dependability at trust model level.
5.4 Fake Transactions
We have presented a dependable trust metric, focusing on incorporating reputation history
and reputation fluctuation to guard a reputation system from strategic oscillation of mali-
cious nodes. We dedicate this and the next section to vulnerabilities due to fake transactions
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and dishonest feedbacks and their TrustGuard countermeasures.
In TrustGuard, we tackle the problem of fake transactions by having a feedback bound
to a transaction through a transaction proof such that a feedback can be successfully filed
only if the node filing the feedback can show the proof of the transaction. Our transaction
proofs satisfy the following properties: (i) Transaction proofs are unforgeable, and are hence
generated only if the transacting nodes indeed wished to transact with each other, and (ii)
Transaction proofs are always exchanged atomically; that is, a malicious node m cannot
obtain a proof from a non-malicious node n without sending its own proof to node n.
The atomicity property of the exchange of proofs guarantees fairness; that is, each of the
transacting parties would be able to file feedbacks at the end of the transaction. In the
absence of exchange atomicity a malicious node m could obtain a proof from node n but
not provide its proof to the non-malicious node n; hence, a non-malicious node n may never
be able to file complaints against the malicious node m. Note that if the entire system is
managed by a centralized trusted authority (like eBay) then one can completely eliminate
the problem of fake transactions. Our focus is on building a decentralized solution to handle
fake transactions.
We first present a technique to generate unforgeable proofs that curb a malicious node
from flooding feedbacks on other non-malicious nodes. Then we employ techniques based
on electronic fair-exchange protocol to ensure that transaction proofs are exchanged fairly
(atomically). It is important to note that the proofs act as signed contracts and are thus
exchanged before the actual transaction takes place. If the exchange fails, a good node
would not perform the transaction. Nonetheless, if the exchange were unfair, a bad node
could file a feedback for a transaction that never actually happened.
Note that the fake transaction detection does not prevent two collusive malicious nodes
from faking a large number of transactions between each other, and further give good
ratings with exchanged transaction proofs. This type of collusion will be handled by our
next safeguard - dishonest feedback filter. Additionally, one could also deploy a mechanism
which associates a non-negligible monetary cost with each transaction so that the attackers
may not be able to afford many fake transactions.
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5.4.1 Unforgeable Transaction Proofs
A simple and secure way to construct proofs of transactions is to use a public key cryp-
tography based scheme. Assume that every node n has an associated pair of public key
and a private key pair, namely, 〈PKn, RKn〉. We assume that the public keys are tied to
nodes using digital certificates that are notarized by trusted certification authorities. A
transaction T is defined as T = 〈Txn Descr〉 ‖ 〈time stamp〉, where 〈Txn Descr〉 is a
description of the transaction and the symbol ‖ denotes string concatenation. Node n signs
the transaction with its private key to generate a transaction proof PT = RKn(T ) and
send it to node m. If the proofs are fairly exchanged then node n would obtain RKm(T )
as a proof of transaction T with node m and vice versa. The key challenge now is how to
exchange proofs atomically to guarantee fairness.
5.4.2 Fair Exchange of Transaction Proofs
Significant work has been done in the field of fair electronic exchange [78, 62], aiming at
guaranteeing exchange atomicity. There are several trade-offs involved in employing a fair-
exchange protocol in the context of reputation management. In this section we analyze the
feasibility of trust value based fair-exchange protocol and optimistic fair-exchange protocol
for TrustGuard.
Trust Value based Fair-Exchange Protocol. Intuitively, one could achieve fair ex-
change of proofs between nodes n and m ( TVn > TVm) by enforcing that the lower trust
value node m sends its proof first to the higher trust value node n; following which the
higher trust value node n would send its proof to the lower trust value node m. However,
this solution is flawed. For example, a malicious node m with a high trust value may always
obtain a proof from non-malicious node n with a lower trust value, but not deliver its proof
to node n. Hence, a malicious node may pursue its malicious activities indefinitely without
being detected by the trust system.
Optimistic Fair-Exchange Protocol. In the first prototype of TrustGuard, we adopt
an optimistic fair-exchange protocol for exchanging transaction proofs. Optimistic fair-
exchange protocols guarantee fair-exchange of two electronic items between two mutually
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distrusting parties by utilizing trusted third parties (ttp). However, they reduce the involve-
ment of a ttp to only those exchanges that result in a conflict. Assuming that most of the
parties in an open electronic commerce environment are good, the ttp is hopefully involved
infrequently.
In particular, TrustGuard adopts the optimistic protocol for fair contract signing pro-
posed by Micali [62]. The protocol assumes that the transacting parties n and m have
already negotiated a would-be contract C. The nodes n and m now need to exchange
the signed contracts, (RKn(C) and RKm(C)) fairly. The protocol guarantees that if
both the nodes commit to the contract then node n has a proof that node m has com-
mitted to the contract C and vice-versa; even if one of the parties does not commit to
the contract C then neither party gets any proof of commitment from the other party.
We map this protocol for fairly exchanging transaction proofs by using contract C as
C = T = 〈Txn Descr〉 ‖ 〈time stamp〉.
Note that minimizing the amount of time the ttp needs to be online significantly lowers
its susceptibility to attackers. On the other hand, if the ttp comes up online very infre-
quently, the number of outstanding conflicts and the mean time to resolve a conflict would
increase significantly. Nonetheless, all conflicts would be eventually resolved.
One of the major advantages of using such an optimistic fair-exchange protocol is that
the ttp need not be always online. The ttp can infrequently come up online and resolve
all outstanding conflicts before going offline. A strategic malicious node could exploit the
delay in conflict resolution as shown in Figure 90. Let us assume that the ttp stays online
for a time period Ton and then stays offline for a time period Toff . When the malicious
node is building reputation, it behaves honestly and exchanges transaction proofs fairly (Y
in Figure 90). However, after the malicious node has attained high reputation, it unfairly
exchanges several proofs with other nodes in the system. By synchronizing the schedule of
the ttp, the malicious node can ensure that none of the conflicts caused by its malicious
behavior is resolved within Toff time units (X in Figure 90). Hence, despite of the fact
that the malicious node behaved badly over a period of Toff time units its reputation does
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Figure 90: Cost of Building Reputation with Delayed Conflict Resolution
reputation falls very steeply. Observe that the cost paid by a malicious node (see Equation
16) is much lower in Figure 90 when compared to Figure 87 (wherein Toff = 0).
Yet another issue with a large Toff is that the cost of detecting a replay attack on
the transaction proofs become expensive. A simple algorithm to detect duplicates would
proceed as follows: The trust management system maintains a cache of all proofs submitted
on behalf of complaints in the last Tcache time units, where Tcache is an upper bound on the
time it takes for a node to file a complaint once it has a proof in hand. When a new proof is
submitted on behalf of a complaint, it is accepted only if the time stamp on the proof is no
more than Tcache time units behind the current time and if the proof is not found amongst
the cache of all proofs submitted in the last Tcache time units. If one were to delay the
resolution of conflicts, one would have increase Tcache to Tcache + Toff . Hence, the size of




In conclusion, one needs to choose Toff very carefully so that: (i) the attackers do not
have enough time to compromise the trusted third party, and (ii) maximize the cost paid
by those malicious nodes that strategically exploit delayed conflict resolution.
5.5 Dishonest Feedbacks
In the previous section we have discussed techniques to ensure that both transacting nodes
have a fair chance to submit feedbacks. In this section we extend our safeguard model to
handle dishonest feedbacks. The goal of guarding from dishonest feedbacks is to develop
algorithms that can effectively filter out dishonest feedbacks filed by malicious nodes in the
system.
We propose to use a credibility factor as a filter in estimating the reputation-based trust
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value of a node in the presence of dishonest feedbacks. Recall that we use TVn to denote the
dependable trust value of node n and Rn to denote the reputation-based trust value of node
n without incorporating past history (Integral component) and fluctuations (Derivative
component). The main idea of using a credibility-based feedback filter in computing Rn
is to assign higher weight to the credible feedbacks about node n and lower weight to the
dishonest ones.
Concretely, we first extend the naive average based computation of trust value (Sec-
tion 5.3.2) into a weighted average. Let I(n) denote the set of interactions (transac-
tions) performed by node n. Let Fn(u) denote the normalized feedback rating (between
0 and 1) that a node n receives after performing an interaction u with another node. Let
CRn(u) denote the feedback credibility of the node u.x who submitted the feedback about
node n after interaction u. The reputation-based trust of node n can be computed as
Rn =
∑
u∈I(n) Fn(u) ∗ CRn(u). The information about the set of transactions performed
(I(n)) and the feedbacks received (Fn(u) for u ∈ I(n)) can be collected automatically [119].
Our goal is to design a credibility filter function that is most effective in ensuring that more
credible feedbacks are weighted higher and vice-versa.
A simple and intuitive solution is to measure feedback credibility of a node n using its
trust value TVn. We call it the Trust-Value based credibility Measure (TVM for short).
Let TVu.x denote the trust value of node u.x who had interaction u with node n. We can
compute the trust value based credibility measure of node u.x in the interaction u, denoted
by CRTV Mn (u), using Equation 22.




Several existing reputation-based trust systems use TVM or its variant to measure feedback
credibility [119, 48]. The TVM solution is based on two fundamental assumptions. First,
untrustworthy nodes are more likely to submit false or misleading feedbacks in order to hide
their own malicious behavior. Second, trustworthy nodes are more likely to be honest on
the feedback they provide. It is widely recognized that the first assumption is generally true
but the second assumption may not be true. For example, it is possible that a node may
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maintain a good reputation by providing high quality services but send malicious feedbacks
to its competitors. This motivates us to design a more effective credibility measure.
We propose to use a personalized similarity measure (PSM for short) to rate the feedback
credibility of another node x through node n’s personalized experience. Concretely, a node
n will use a personalized similarity between itself and node x to weigh all the feedbacks
filed by node x on any other node (say y) in the system. Let IJS(n, x) denote the set
of common nodes with whom both node n and x have interacted, and I(n, r) denotes the
collection of interactions between node n and node r. We compute similarity between node
n and x based on the root mean square of the differences in their feedback over the nodes
in IJS(n, x). More specifically, given a node m and an interaction u ∈ I(m) performed by
node m with node u.x, node n computes a personalized similarity-based credibility factor





Sim(n, x) = 1−
√∑






This notion of personalized (local) credibility measure provides a great deal of flexibility
and stronger predictive value as the feedback from similar raters are given more weight. It
also acts as an effective defense against potential malicious cliques of nodes that only give
good ratings within the clique and give bad rating outside the clique. Using personalized
credibility to weight the feedbacks will result in a low credibility for dishonest feedbacks by
malicious cliques. This is particularly true when measuring the feedback similarity between
a node m in a clique and a node n outside the clique. Our experiments show that PSM
outperforms TVM when the percentage of malicious nodes become large and when the












































































Figure 93: Effect of
Varying Parameters in the
Trust Model
5.6 Performance Enhancements
We have so far proposed techniques to guard from strategic node behaviors, dishonest and
fake transactions. However for the trust system to be feasible its performance should be
satisfactory. In this section, we provide some guidelines to enhance the performance of a
distributed trust system assuming that in the fraction of non-malicious nodes always tend
to dominate the system.
5.6.1 Efficiently Storing Feedbacks
Assuming that most nodes are non-malicious and our trust system functions correctly in
assigning trust values to nodes, one would expect that a large majority of the transaction in
the system turn out successful. When two nodes n and m interact, node n (symmetrically
node m) uses the following strategy for sending its feedback about the interaction. If the
interaction were to turn out successful, node n would send its feedback directly to node m.
It is in the interest of node m to retain the feedback and present it to other nodes to prove
its goodness. However, if the interaction turns out unsuccessful (with a small probability),
node n sends its feedback to a set of R nodes that hold complaints against node m. Note
that node m cannot be trusted to store a negative feedback, since node m may as well delete
the feedback (manipulating the feedback is not possible because the feedback is digitally
signed). Hence, when a node k is interested in the trust value of node m, it can obtain all
positive feedbacks about node m directly from node m and obtain all negative feedbacks
about node m from the set of R replica nodes. Suppose node m were good a large fraction
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f of its interactions would receive positive feedbacks and hence reduces the communication
cost for the querying node k by a fraction f ∗ (1− 1
R
) and the average storage space required
per transaction to 1− f + R ∗ f .
5.6.2 Minimizing the Replica Lookup Cost
Any node n would typically query the trust value of a couple of other nodes before deciding
to interaction with one of them. In doing so, node n would have to locate the R feedback
holders of node m. Distributed reputation management systems like [119, 48] use a DHT-
based structure [106, 77] to locate feedback holders on an overlay network. Typically, the
feedback holders for node m is derived as nodes responsible for h(ID(m) ‖ i), 1 ≤ i ≤ R,
where ID(m) is usually h(IP (m) (IP (m) is IP-address of node m) 1. Hence, node n would
have to perform a lookup for each of these R identifiers to locate the feedback holders of
node m. This would cost node n about O(log N) ∗ R hops on the overlay network. We
can potentially avoid this cost by ensuring that every node m maintains a cache of its
feedback holders. This cache at node m could be updated by notifications when a feedback
holder of node m enters or leaves the system. This would significantly cut down the online
communication cost for a node n wanting to file a negative feedback about node m since it
almost entirely avoids the lookup cost for locating feedback nodes.
However, in doing so, we potentially run into the danger of node m providing a list of
its own friends as its feedback holders. Hence, effectively none of the negative feedbacks
filed against node m would be recorded in the system. We can circumvent this problem
by using certain properties of the DHT-system. For example, node n knows that the ith
feedback holder of node m is a node that is responsible for the key Ki = h(ID(m) ‖ i).
Hence, if node m claims that its ith feedback holder is some node q, node n can verify if
the key Ki is reasonably close to ID(q) = h(IP (q)). Clearly, this scheme has scope for
both false positives and false negatives. A false positive occurs when a node n mistakenly
believes that node q cannot be the node that is responsible for key Ki, when node q is
actually responsible for key Ki. A false negative occurs when a node n mistakenly believes






























Figure 94: Probability of
False Positives and False






























Figure 95: Probability of
False Positives and False



























Figure 96: Trust Value
Lookup Cost
that a node q is responsible for key Ki, when node q is actually not responsible for key Ki.
One can show that given the distance threshold (xthr) and the fraction of malicious nodes
known to any malicious node m (pm) one can show that the false positive (FP ) and the
false negative (FN) probabilities are as follows:
FP (xthr) = e
−xthr (24)
FN(xthr, pm) = 1− e−xthr∗pm (25)
For further details refer to the Appendix. Observe that the probability of false negative
increases with the threshold value. Figure 94 and 95 shows the probability of false positives
and false negatives for different values of threshold (xthr) and the fraction of malicious nodes
in the system (p). Figure 94 shows the results for pm = p, that is, node m is aware of all the
bad nodes in the system. Figure 95 shows the results for a more realistic (less pessimistic)
scenario wherein we assume that only 20% of the malicious nodes collude (pm =
p
5). Observe
from Figure 95 that for xthr = 2.5, the false positive and the false negative probabilities is
under 0.1 even for p = 20%.
Figure 96 shows the latency in terms of the number of application level hops required
to lookup the trust value of one node in the system using the naive and the optimized tech-
niques. Recall that the naive technique performance a DHT-lookup, one for each feedback
holder of the node. In the optimized technique the node whose trust value is being queried
itself returns its feedback holders. Hence the online cost of locating a nodes feedback hold-
ers is just one hop. However, this technique requires that each node maintains a cache of
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its feedback holders. We used a simple update based caching mechanism wherein if a node
m becomes a feedback holder for node n, then it updates node ns cache. We assumed that
the mean transaction rate (λ) is about ten times the mean life time ( 1
µ
) of a node [120]
(equivalently, an average node performs ten transactions before failure). Say the mean
query rate λ = 1 per node per second and each node queries the trust value of 10 other
nodes before choosing to interact with one of them the naive scheme would cost it about
350 hops/node/second while the optimized scheme costs online 10 hops/node/second and
offline 0.4 hops/node/second (Note, µ = λ10 = 0.1). In spite of the fact that the optimized
technique has scope for false positives and negatives (see Figures 94 and 95) and possibilities
of stale/outdated cache entries (less than 10% in our experiments), its performance benefits
motivates us to employ it for efficiently looking up trust values.
5.7 Evaluation
In this section, we report results from our simulation based experiments to evaluate Trust-
Guard’s approach to build dependable reputation management. We implemented our simu-
lator using a discrete event simulation [36] model. Our system comprises of about N = 1024
nodes; a random p% of them is chosen to behave maliciously. In the following portions of
this section, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the three guards that we have proposed in
this chapter.
5.7.1 Guarding from Strategic Node Behaviors
In this section we evaluate the ability of our trust model to handle dynamic node behaviors.
We first study the behavior of our guard against strategic oscillations by comparing the
optimistic and pessimistic summarization techniques. We demonstrate the significance of
various parameters in our dependable trust metrics by varying the weights assigned to re-
ports received in the recent time window (α), the history (β), and the derivative component
(γ). Then, we show the impact of history size (maxH) on the effectiveness of our trust
model and the advantages of storing past experiences using fading memories.
For all experiments reported in this section, we studied four different models of strategic
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malicious behaviors (refer Section 5.3.1 for the definition of node behavior). In Model I
shown in Figure 91, the malicious nodes oscillate from good to bad behavior at intervals
of regular time periods. In model II, the malicious nodes oscillate between good and bad
behaviors at exponentially distributed intervals. In model III, the malicious nodes choose
a random level of goodness and stay that level for an exponentially distributed duration of
time. In model IV the malicious node shows a sinusoidal change in its behavior that is the
node steadily and continuously changes its behavior unlike models I, II and III which show
sudden fluctuations.
5.7.1.1 Comparing Optimistic and Pessimistic Summarizations
We first compare the two types of weighted summarization techniques discussed in Section
5.3.2. Figure 92 shows the values obtained on summarization given the node behavior model
I shown in Figure 91 (using ρ = 0.7, maxH = 10 and time period of malicious behavior
oscillation = 10). The result shows that mean value (mean) and exponentially weighted
sum (exp) have similar effect and they both are more optimistic than the inverse trust
value weighted sum (invtv). Observe that the more pessimistic a summarization is, the
harder it is for a node to attain a high trust value in a short span of time and the easier it
is to drop its trust value very quickly. Also observe that the exponentially weighted sum in
comparison to the mean rises quite steeply making it unsuitable for summarization.
5.7.1.2 Trust Model Parameters
Figure 93 shows the results obtained from our trust model with various parameter settings
under the malicious behavior shown in model I (m1). alpha shows the results obtained
when α is the dominant parameter (α β, γ). With a dominant α the trust model almost
follows the actual behavior of the node since it amounts to disregarding the history or the
current fluctuations in the behavior of the node (see Equation 17). beta-invtv shows the
results obtained with β as the dominant parameter using inverse trust value weighted sum.
With more importance given to the behavior history of a node, the trust value of a node
does not change very quickly. Instead it slowly and steadily adapts to its actual behavior.























Figure 97: Trust Model






















Figure 98: Trust Model






















Figure 99: Trust Model
with Fading Memories
trust value responds very swiftly to sudden changes in the behavior of the node. Observe
the steep jumps in the trust value that correspond to the time instants when the node
changes its behavior. These results match our intuition, namely, α, β and γ are indeed
the weights attached to the current behavior, historical behavior and the fluctuations in
a node’s behavior. Finally, non-adaptive shows the trust value of a node in the absence
of dependable schemes to handle dynamic node behaviors. From Figure 93 it is evident
that the cost paid by a malicious node in a non-adaptive model is almost zero, while that
in a dependable model is quite significant. A more concrete evaluation that considers the
combined effect of various trust model parameters is a part of our ongoing work.
5.7.1.3 Varying History Size
In this section we show the effect of history size maxH on the cost (see Equation 16) paid
by malicious nodes. Figure 97 shows a scenario wherein the malicious nodes oscillate in
their behavior every 10 time units. Note that in this experiment we used α = 0.2, β = 0.8,
γ1 = 0.05 and γ2 = 0.2. Based on our experiences with the dependable trust model one needs
to choose α and β such that β
α
is comparable to maxH (intuitively, this weights the history
component in proportion to its size (maxH)). Note that this experiment uses maxH = 5
which is less than the time period of oscillations by the malicious nodes. From Figure 97 it
is clear that the dependable trust models (TrustGuard-adaptive in figure) performs better
in terms of cost to be paid by the malicious nodes than the non-adaptive trust model (recall
the cost model in Section 5.3.1). However, this does not entirely maximize the cost paid
by malicious nodes. Figure 98 shows the trust values obtained when α = 0.1, β = 0.9,
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γ1 = 0.05, γ2 = 0.2 and maxH = 15 (larger than the time period of oscillation by the
malicious node). Clearly, having a larger history ensures that one can maximize the cost
paid by the malicious nodes. In fact, one observes that the cost paid by malicious nodes for
maxH equal to 5, 10 and 15 are in the ratio of 0.63 : 1 : 3.02 respectively. This observation
tells us that if a strategic malicious node knew that maxH = 5, then it would oscillate
at a period equal to 5 time intervals since anyway the system does not remember its past
performance beyond 5 time intervals. In short, by knowing the exact value of maxH, a
strategic malicious node would start to oscillate with time period equal to maxH so as
to minimize its cost. It is interesting to note that, when the non-adaptive model is used,
the cost paid by malicious nodes is close to zero for all values of time period of behavior
oscillation and history size maxH.
5.7.1.4 Fading Memories
We now evaluate the effectiveness of the fading memories technique in efficiently storing the
performance of a node over the last 2maxH intervals using a logarithmically small number
of values. Figure 99 shows the effect of using fading memories when a malicious node
oscillates with time period equal to 100 time units. It compares a dependable trust model
(TrustGuard-adaptive in figure) with maxH = 10 and a dependable trust model using
fading memories (TrustGuard-ftv in figure) based technique with m = 8. From Figure 99 it
is apparent that using a simple adaptive technique with maxH = 10 enables a bad node to
recover from its bad behavior that stretched over 100 time units in just 10 additional time
units, since the past performance of the node is simply forgotten after 10 time units. As we
discussed in Section 5.3, one of the design principles for dependable trust management is to
prevent a bad node that has performed poorly over an extended period of time to attain a
high trust value quickly. Clearly, the adaptive fading memories based technique can perform
really well in this regard, since using just 8 values, it can record the performance of the
node over its last 256 (28) time intervals. It is important to note that the solution based
on fading memories has bounded effectiveness in the sense that by setting m = 8, any node


























































































memories based approach is its ability to increase the cost paid by malicious nodes, with
minimal overhead on the system performance.
5.7.1.5 Other Strategic Oscillation Models
We also studied the cost of building reputation under different bad node behavior models
discussed in the beginning of Section 5.7.1. From our experiments, we observed that the
response of our trust model towards models II, III and IV are functionally identical to that
obtained from model I (Figure 91). However, from an adversarial point of view, we observed
that these strategies do not aid in minimizing the cost to be paid by malicious nodes to gain
a good reputation when compared to model I. In fact, the cost paid by malicious nodes using
models I, II, III and IV are in the ratio of 1 : 2.28 : 2.08 : 1.36. In models II and III, the
malicious nodes do not pursue their malicious activities the very moment they attain a high
reputation. In model IV, the malicious nodes slowly degrade their behavior, which does not
given them good benefits (see the extent of misuse Xn(t) in Figure 87) when compared to a
steep/sudden fall. Hence, a strategic malicious node that is aware of maxH would oscillate
with time period maxH in order to minimize its cost (refer Equation 16). Nonetheless this
emphasizes the goodness of our dependable trust model since it is capable of effectively
handling even its worst vulnerability (model I with oscillation time period maxH).
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5.7.2 Guarding from Fake Transactions
In this section we study the feasibility of using optimistic fair-exchange protocol for exchang-
ing transaction proofs. First, we demonstrate the superiority of optimistic fair-exchange
protocol over the trust value based exchange protocol. Second, we show the effect of vary-
ing the server offline duration on the effectiveness of the trust management system.
5.7.2.1 Trust Value Based Protocol Vs Optimistic Protocol
Figure 100 shows the percentage of fair exchange of transaction proofs with progress in
time for the two exchange protocols discussed in Section 5.4, namely the trust value based
fair exchange protocol and the optimistic fair exchange protocol. The experiment measures
the percentage of fair transactions when 20% of the nodes are malicious. The trust value
based exchange scheme suffers because a strategic malicious node may gain high trust
value initially and then fake arbitrarily large number of transactions by unfairly exchanging
transaction proofs without being detected by the system.
5.7.2.2 Trusted Server Offline Duration in Optimistic Protocol
As we have discussed in Section 5.4, it is important to decrease the amount of time the
trusted third party server is online so as to make it less susceptible to attackers. However,
doing so increases the amount of time it takes to resolve a conflict. We have shown in Section
5.4.2 that a malicious node can exploit the delay in conflict resolution to may ensure that
none of its malicious activities be made visible to the trust management system for Toff
units of time. In this experiment, we show how the transaction success rate varies with
Toff , the time period for which the trusted third party server is offline.
Table 18 shows the normalized cost (see Equation 16) paid by malicious nodes when
we introduce a delay in conflict resolution. We assume that all good nodes file complaints
as soon as they have the transaction proof that enables them to do so. Recall that a
malicious node may ensure that none of its malicious activities be made visible to the trust
management system for Toff units of time. We have normalized Toff with the history size
(maxH) maintained by TrustGuard’s adaptive trust model (see Section 5.3). Figure 18
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Toff 0 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3
Cost 1 0.9 0.85 0.78 0.66
Table 18: Relative Cost paid by Malicious Nodes Vs Toff (normalized by maxH)
shows that in order to keep the cost from dropping more that 10%, Toff should be no more
than 5% of maxH. Note that this is another scenario where fading memories (see Section
5.3) helps the system. Fading memories essentially allow the history size (maxH) to be very
large and hence the duration of the time for which a trusted third party server is offline
could be sufficiently large without significantly decreasing the cost paid by malicious nodes.
5.7.3 Guarding from Dishonest Feedbacks
In this section we present an evaluation of our algorithm to filter dishonest feedbacks (Sec-
tion 5.5). Recall that the fake transaction guard does not prevent fake transactions between
two malicious nodes. So, we simulated two settings, namely, non-collusive and collusive
setting. In the collusive setting, a group of collusive malicious nodes may attempt to deter-
ministically boost their ratings by providing highly positive feedbacks on each other through
innumerable fake transactions.
Figures 101 and 102 show the error in trust computation as a function of the fraction
of malicious nodes in the system in a non-collusive and a collusive setting respectively.
Observe that the naive technique (an average of the feedback without credibility factor)
for computing trust drops almost linearly with fraction of malicious nodes. Also, the naive
technique and the TVM approach are extremely sensitive to collusive attempts even when
the number of malicious nodes is very small. On the other hand, the PSM approach remains
effective even with both large fraction of malicious nodes and collusion. Recall that PSM
computes a personalized trust value and hence, the trust value of a node may be different
from the perspective of various other nodes in the system. For example, the trust value of a
node m from the perspective of other nodes within its clique may be very high, and yet, the
trust value of node m as seen by other nodes in the system might be very low. Therefore,



























Figure 103: Transaction Success Rate:





























Figure 104: Transaction Success Rate:
Non-Collusive and Collusive Settings
5.7.4 Transaction Success Rate
In addition to low level metrics like the cost paid by malicious nodes, we also report a
higher level metric, namely, the mean transaction success rate that can be achieved using a
trust based node selection. We say that a transaction is successful if both the participating
nodes cooperate. Given that the trust value of all nodes are made available by our trust
system, a node n can use this value to identify one node from a collection of nodes that
is most qualified to perform a job. For instance, a node may use a simple threshold based
technique wherein, a node n decides to transact with node m only if TV (m) > TVthr(n),
where TVthr(n) is the trust threshold used by node n.
Figure 103 shows the transaction success rate that can be achieved using a non-adaptive
model (non-adaptive), a dependable model (TrustGuard-adaptive) and a dependable model
using fading memories (TrustGuard-ftv). A non-adaptive model pays for its inability to
adapt the trust value of a node quickly when the node behavior changes. A dependable
model with fading memories has a clear edge over the basic dependable model because it
encodes an exponentially larger chunk of a node’s past in a given storage space.
Figure 104 shows the transaction success rate in a system consisting of N = 1024 nodes
with 20% nodes being malicious under both collusive and non-collusive settings. Observe
from Figure 104 that the transaction success rate is close to 100% for both TVM and PSM
in spite of their non-zero trust computation error (see Figures 101 and 102). This is because
even if the computed trust values are not 100% accurate, they do differentiate good nodes




In this chapter we have described the TrustGuard framework for building secure and dis-
tributed reputation management system. The TrustGuard framework includes a trusted
third party (TTP) to handle fake transactions. However, the TTP could become a per-
formance bottleneck and a single point of failure. Further, if the TTP were compromised
by an adversary then the adversary would be able fake transactions in the system. Our
experiments show that the TTP does not become a performance bottleneck with 1024 nodes
in the system. However it would be interesting to study the performance, fault-tolerance
and scalability of the TTP for larger systems.
The TrustGuard framework assumes that it is built on top of a secure overlay network.
Thus, the overlay network should be capable of routing messages despite the presence of
some malicious nodes and ensure that all nodes can be identified through some digital
certification based mechanism disallow malicious nodes from spoofing fake identities. As
shown by Douceur in his Sybil attack chapter [30], bad nodes may potentially amplify
their strength by a factor that is proportional to the number of identities they can spoof
simultaneously. One practical way to counter the pseudo-spoofing attack is to tie an identity
to a node through digital certification based mechanisms or enforce a secure login procedure
for nodes wanting to join the overlay network. Readers may refer to [17, 97, 30] for a detailed
discussion on security issues in overlay networks.
In the PSM based trust evaluation model, relationship between nodes can be very sparse.
Hence, it might get hard to find sufficient number of raters towards a common target node.
The Birthday paradox states that given a set of N elements, two randomly chosen subsets
of size
√
N have a common element with probability 12 . Hence, with N = 1024 nodes, two
nodes n and m that have interacted with 32 random nodes each, have at least one common
node with probability 12 . Hence, even when relationships between nodes are sparse, one
might be able to find raters. Further, one could additionally use a combination of TVM
and PSM to alleviate the problem of sparse raters.
199
5.8.2 Related Work
Dellarocas [26] provides a working survey for research in game theory and economics on
reputation. The game theory based research lays the foundation for online reputation
systems research and provides interesting insights into the complex behavioral dynamics.
Most of the game theoretic models assume that stage game outcomes are publicly observable.
Online feedback mechanisms, in contrast, rely on private (pair-wise) and subjective ratings,
thereby raising concerns on the incentive for providing feedbacks or the truthfulness of the
feedback.
Related to reputation systems that help establishing trust among entities based on their
past behaviors and feedbacks, there is research on propagating trust among entities based
on their trust relationship. Yu and Singh [124] propose using historical trust values to
update trust values for centralized reputation management systems. Whitby et. al [116]
suggest using statistical filtering techniques to update trust values. Yu and Singh [123]
also propose a framework based on a gossip protocol. Richardson et al. [79] developed
a path-algebra model for trust propagation. Very recently, Guha et al. [41] developed a
formal framework for propagating both trust and distrust. The TrustGuard framework is
capable of accommodating these algorithms by replacing its dishonest feedback guard.
In the P2P domain reputation management systems like P2Prep [22], Xrep [24] and
EigenTrust [48] have emerged. P2PRep provides a protocol on top of Gnutella to estimate
trustworthiness of a node. It does not discuss trust metrics in detail and does not have
evaluations. XRep extends P2PRep by assigning a reputation value for both peers and
resources. EigenTrust assumes that trust is transitive and addresses the weakness of the
assumption and the collusion problem by assuming there are pre-trusted nodes in the sys-
tem. We argue that pre-trusted nodes may not be available in all cases. More importantly,
neither of these reputation management systems addresses the temporal dimension of this
problem (strategic behavior by malicious nodes) and the problem of fake transactions.
Dellarocas [27] has shown that storing feedback information on the most recent time
interval is enough; and that summarizing feedback information for more than one window
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of time interval does not improve the reputation system. However, this result subsumes
that there are no errors in the feedbacks and that all nodes behave rationally. In the
presence of dishonest feedbacks there are bound to be errors in identifying a honest feedback
from a dishonest one. Further, our experiments show that the history component helps in
stabilizing the system by avoiding transient fluctuations due to transient errors or dishonest
feedbacks.
B. Yu and M. P. Singh [123] suggest refining personal opinions differently for cooperation
and defection and achieves a certain level of adaptivity. Our dependable trust model is based
upon the PID controller popularly used in control theory [67], as against ad hoc techniques
suggested in their chapter.
S. K. Lam and J. Riedl [54] experimentally studied several types of shilling attacks
on recommender systems. Our experiments show that TrustGuard is resistant to random
shilling attacks. As a part of our future work, we hope to model and analyze different types
of shilling attacks on reputation systems and enhance our algorithms to further counter
them.
Fair exchange protocols [78, 62, 45] have been the prime focus of researchers working in
the field of electronic commerce. Ray and Ray [78] provides a survey on fair exchange of
digital products between transacting parties. They compare various algorithms including
trusted third parties, true & weak fair exchanges, gradual exchanges and optimistic ex-
changes. In this chapter, we used an optimistic fair-exchange protocol proposed by Micali
[62] for fair-contract signing.
5.9 Summary
We have presented TrustGuard − a framework for building distributed dependable reputa-
tion management systems with the countermeasures against three detrimental vulnerabili-
ties, namely, (i) strategic oscillation guard, (ii) fake transaction guard, and (iii) dishonest
feedback guard. In TrustGuard we promote a modular design such that one could add more
safeguard components, or replace the techniques for one module without having to worry
about the rest of the system. The main contribution of this chapter is threefold. First, we
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proposed to measure the trustworthiness of peers based on current reputation, reputation
history and reputation fluctuation and develop formal techniques to counter strategic os-
cillation of malicious nodes. Second, we presented electronic fair-exchange protocol based
techniques to rule out the possibility of faking transactions in the system. Third, we de-
veloped algorithms to filter out dishonest feedbacks in the presence of collusive malicious
nodes. We have demonstrated the effectiveness of these techniques through an extensive
set of simulation based experiments. We believe that the TrustGuard approach can effi-
ciently and effectively guard a large-scale distributed reputation system, making it more
dependable than other existing reputation-based trust systems.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
With the ever increasing rate of digital information available from online services, fostered
by the proliferation of ubiquitous computing devices and pervasive networks, security has
increasingly become a requirement for system correctness. Over the last decade, overlay
network computing model has emerged as a new computing paradigm for large scale parallel
and distributed computing. However, due to the large and growing size of overlay networks
and their pervasive nature, they have become increasingly more vulnerable to security
threats and attacks. Hence, the key challenge here is to retrofit security properties into
legacy systems.
In this thesis we have developed system level security algorithms and techniques to sup-
port overlay network based applications. In particular, we focused on security issues in a
general overlay network and studied two popular applications: publish/subscribe networks
and VoIP networks. While it is widely acknowledged that security large scale distributed
systems is a complicated problem, we have analyzed and developed guards to protect such
systems against a wide range of attacks. In general we have shown that overlay network
computing platforms that exhibit highly decentralized and distributed control, require new
techniques and solutions for addressing security and scalability problems. However, a com-
mon design philosophy employed in this thesis successfully applies to scalably securing
overlay network applications. Concretely, we have demonstrated techniques to retrofit se-
curity into legacy applications in the form of small customizable plug-ins in way that we
minimally modify the legacy system code and yet preserve its performance and scalability.
In particular, this thesis includes the following four major developments targeted to-
wards developing scalable security solutions in overlay networks, publish/subscribe networks
and VoIP networks.
Overlay Network Security: We have described LocationGuard− a technique for securing
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wide area serverless file sharing systems from targeted file attacks. Analogous to traditional
cryptographic keys that hide the contents of a file, LocationGuard hides the location of a
file on an overlay network. LocationGuard protects a target file from DoS attacks, host
compromise attacks, and file location inference attacks by providing a simple and efficient
access control mechanism with minimal performance and storage overhead. The unique
characteristics of LocationGuard approach is the careful combination of location key, routing
guard, and an extensible package of location inference guards, which makes it very hard for
an adversary to infer the location of a target file by either actively or passively observing
the overlay network. Our experimental results quantify the overhead of employing location
guards and demonstrate the effectiveness of the LocationGuard scheme against DoS attacks,
host compromise attacks and various location inference attacks.
We have presented TrustGuard − a framework for building distributed dependable rep-
utation management systems with the countermeasures against three detrimental vulnera-
bilities, namely, (i) strategic oscillation guard, (ii) fake transaction guard, and (iii) dishonest
feedback guard. In TrustGuard we promote a modular design such that one could add more
safeguard components, or replace the techniques for one module without having to worry
about the rest of the system. The main contribution of this chapter is threefold. First, we
proposed to measure the trustworthiness of peers based on current reputation, reputation
history and reputation fluctuation and develop formal techniques to counter strategic os-
cillation of malicious nodes. Second, we presented electronic fair-exchange protocol based
techniques to rule out the possibility of faking transactions in the system. Third, we de-
veloped algorithms to filter out dishonest feedbacks in the presence of collusive malicious
nodes. We have demonstrated the effectiveness of these techniques through an extensive
set of simulation based experiments.
Publish/Subscribe Network Security: We have presented EventGuard, a secure sys-
tem architecture for protecting pub-sub services from various attacks. EventGuard offers
security features that are critical to pub-sub overlay services, such as authenticity, confi-
dentiality, integrity, and resilience to flooding based DoS attacks. We have described the
two key components of EventGuard: The first component is a suite of security guards that
204
secure the basic publish and subscribe operations from DoS attacks and unauthorized reads
and writes. These guards can be plugged-into a wide-area content-based pub-sub system
in a seamless manner. The second component is a resilient pub-sub network design that is
capable of providing secure and yet scalable message routing, countering message dropping-
based DoS attacks. A unique feature of EventGuard is its unified security framework that
meets both security goal for safeguarding the pub-sub overlay services from various vul-
nerabilities and threats and performance goal for maintaining the simplicity and scalability
of the overall system while providing security guarantees. We have reported a series of
experimental evaluations, showing that EventGuard can secure a pub-sub overlay service
with minimal performance penalty. Our prototype implementation on top of Siena [16] also
demonstrates that EventGuard is easily stackable on any content-based pub-sub core.
VoIP Network Security: We have addressed the problem of tracing the caller (and the
receiver) in encrypted peer-to-peer VoIP networks. We have developed two attacks: one on
the SIP protocol layer and the second on the voice session layer. On the SIP protocol layer,
we have developed three triangulation based timing attacks that can identify the caller
with high probability. We have shown that these attacks can be implemented by passively
observing the search traffic on the VoIP network. We have demonstrated the effectiveness
of these attacks using the popular Skype VoIP protocol. Next, we have developed random
walk based solutions to mitigate this attack while incurring an acceptable overhead on the
one-way path latency. On the voice session layer, we have identified flow analysis attacks
that can reveal the identity of a receiver to an external observer. We have used network
flowing analysis and statistical inference to study the efficacy of such an attack assuming
that some of the VoIP network nodes may be compromised. Second, we have developed
mixing based techniques to provide a guaranteed level of anonymity for VoIP clients. We
have developed an anonymity aware session initiation protocol (AASIP) that allows clients
to specify personalized privacy requirements for their voice calls using a quantifiable k-
anonymity metric. We have presented a brief sketch of the implementation of our proposal
on a Phex [1] peer-to-peer client. A detailed experiment evaluation shows that our guards
protect caller identity without significantly impacting the quality of voice calls.
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6.1 Open Issues and Future Research Directions
While this thesis has presented a set of techniques, algorithms and systems level security
architectures for building large scale overlay network applications, it also draws attention to
a number of open issues. In this section, we start with discussing open issues in the context
of this thesis and then present an outlook of future directions.
6.1.1 Open Issues in the Context of this Thesis
First, we present open issues in context of overlay networks and the two applications studied
in this thesis: publish/subscribe networks and VoIP networks.
Overlay Networks: In the context of overlay network security, we have developed algo-
rithms for secure routing and techniques to hide data objects on an overlay network. Our
solutions require that the nodes have unique identities. We ensured this by either using a
PKI infrastructure or a login-password mechanism through a trust gateway to the overlay
network. However, identity management in a completely open overlay network is an open
problem. Recent work on Sybil attack [30] illustrates the hardness of identity management
in open systems. As a result studying weak identifiers (that limit the number of pseudo-
identities) in the context of open overlay networks is an important extension to this research
problem.
The second research problem of interest in this context is the problem of building re-
silient reputation management systems. In this thesis, we have developed guards to protect
a reputation management system from three vulnerabilities: oscillating behavior, fake trans-
actions and dishonest feedbacks. However, these attacks do not cover all possible strategies
that could be deployed by malicious nodes to subvert the reputation management system.
One potential approach to solve this problem would be to model it as a greedy multi-player
game and identify optimal attack and defense strategies.
The third research problem of crucial interest in this context is algorithmic DoS at-
tacks. In our work we have studied several flooding and spamming based network attacks.
All such attacks can be categorized under network level DoS attacks. Algorithmic DoS
attacks target several average case assumptions made by the system (such as Web server
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cache, DB operations, thread management), while keeping the attack nearly undetectable
at the network level. The subtle nature of algorithmic DoS attacks makes it very hard to
exhaustively enumerate them, let alone detect and curb them. While an overlay network
may use its distributed infrastructure to protect from network level DoS attacks, mitigating
algorithmic DoS attacks in overlay network applications is an open problem.
Publish/Subscribe Networks: In this thesis we have proposed secure and scalable access
control algorithms for publish/subscribe networks. However, our solutions do not apply to
all pub-sub matching operators, although it covers most of the popular ones [16]. One solu-
tion is to use computation and communication intensive secure multi-party communication
protocols. Nonetheless, scalable access control for arbitrary matching operators remains an
open problem.
This thesis has also presented secure and scalable content-based routing protocols for
publish/subscribe networks. However, our solution does not provide completely confiden-
tiality on an event’s routable attributes. We presented techniques to largely increase the
entropy (high entropy = high uncertainty = more confidential) using probabilistic multi-
path event routing. Guaranteeing absolutely confidentiality on routable event attributes
while supporting scalable content-based routing is a challenging problem.
VoIP Networks: In this thesis we have pointed out caller identification attacks on VoIP
networks and developed random walk based solution mechanisms to alleviate the problem.
As the random walk protocol incurs high one-way path latency, we have proposed hybrid
algorithms that combine the good features of the broadcast and the random walk based
search protocols. However, identifying a distributed search protocol that is Pareto-optimal
with respect to both one-way latency and attack resilience is an open problem.
This thesis has also identified and developed flow analysis attacks on VoIP networks.
We have proposed a k-anonymity based solution to protect the identities of the caller and
the receiver from an external observer. However, providing complete privacy (k = total
number of clients in the network) for the callers and the receivers without using cover
traffic remains a challenging problem. Additionally, in the context of VoIP networks, such
a privacy solution must also satisfy the one-way latency constraint.
207
6.1.2 An Outlook for Future Research Directions
Compositionality of Security Plug-ins: Compositionality has become a corner stone
in software design as more and more applications are built simply by composing one or
more components. Hence, studying compositionality of security mechanisms is an intrinsic
requirement in building usable security architectures for emerging applications. In the con-
text of security plug-ins, one should ensure that when two or more plug-ins are installed
into an application, then the plug-ins do not conflict with one another or interact in a
way that results in unintended behavior. We believe that for such security plug-ins to be
highly usable, it must support policies that allow two or more of these mechanisms to be
composed in different ways. These policies will allow an administrator to achieve an appro-
priate level of security, while suitably trading off the system’s performance and scalability
metrics. Therefore, developing expressive and yet usable specification languages and formal
reasoning techniques for studying policy based compositionality of security mechanisms is
a challenging area for future research.
Ubiquitous Computing Applications: We believe that the recent emergence of auto-
nomic and pervasive computing has extended the envelope of the Internet to include: mobile
and wireless nodes, automatic resource discovery, self-healing and self-optimizing behavior,
etc. However, there are several interesting security challenges in this area due to resource
constraints (computing, networking and storage) on the weaker wireless/sensor/mobile
nodes. Mobility makes this problem more complicated by making the network topology
volatile and thus susceptible to a wide range of DoS attacks. Hence, it is of utmost im-
portant to study security issues in this domain using several representative applications
and security threats including: location privacy for mobile applications, access control for
data stream management applications, highly available resource discovery and routing al-
gorithms for continual query applications, and combating voice spam in VoIP networks. A
related problem is to study security issues in such ubiquitous applications assuming that
the nodes are built upon small trusted computing base. The use of a trusted computing
base may significantly alter the threat model, limit the efficacy of several attacks and make
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it feasible to develop highly scalable and efficient ubiquitous computing systems.
Bridging Fault-Tolerance and Security: With the increasing growth of massively dis-
tributed systems, fault-tolerance and security have become an integral part of a system’s
correctness requirement. While fault-tolerance studies natural faults in a system, security
delves into human induced faults that are intentional and goal driven (say, monetary ben-
efits). Several concepts and algorithms proposed in systems security share commonalities
with fault-tolerance. For instance, fault-tolerance techniques such as replication and re-
dundancy tend to improve availability: we have used fault-tolerance techniques to build
a r−resilient event delivery network to defend against message dropping based DoS at-
tacks. The key challenge here is to understand the commonality and differences between
the notion of faults in fault-tolerance and that of attacks in security. Also, it would be very
challenging to study the applicability of fault-tolerant algorithms in building secure and
high performance systems.
Security: Ground Up Architecture Vs Retrofitting: In this thesis we have advo-
cated a retrofitting model for injecting security features into a legacy system. Our work has
focused on large legacy applications (such as publish/subscribe networks, VoIP networks),
identifying and analyzing security vulnerabilities, developing guards in the form of cus-
tomizable plug-ins that can be neatly weaved into the legacy system code. While we have
demonstrated this methodology using two popular applications the key question remains:
Is it always feasible to retrofit security mechanisms into a legacy system?
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